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Since 1990, Germany has changed its role from a passive beneficiary of collective 
defense to a ―co-producer‖ of security in international affairs. At the same time, however, 
Germany has been reluctant to transform its military, the Bundeswehr, into an all-
volunteer force and to develop capabilities for expeditionary warfare. It has also spent 
less on defense in relation to its resources than other European partners. This case study 
attempts to elaborate on this apparent inconsistency and to answer the question of why 
and how the Bundeswehr has changed after 1990. The thesis argues that German military 
transformation during this period is informed by driving forces and limiting factors on the 
international level, as well as the domestic level. Given Germany's preference for 
multilateralism, it is unsurprising that NATO and the European Union (EU), as well as 
the military missions conducted by these two institutions, have had an impact on the 
evolution of the Bundeswehr. Against this background, the notion of a distinct German 
strategic culture helps to explain the ambivalence of German security and defense policy. 
Other variables on the national level, above all the limited defense expenditure and the 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
In 2005, on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the German armed forces, 
the Bundeswehr, a former German general stated that, ―an army is constantly in 
transformation, it never reaches a clear and definite end state. But its constant 
advancement should always focus on a symbiosis between traditional elements and 
innovations.‖1 A closer look at contemporary German security and defense policy reveals 
that this assessment particularly holds true for the Bundeswehr. Over the last two 
decades, the German armed forces have been in a constant state of flux. While such 
processes of change are neither rare nor uncommon, post-Cold War Germany has been a 
rather unique and puzzling case that has confounded many external observers. For 
example, although Germany is the second-largest member state of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) in terms of population and economic power, it has reduced 
its armed forces from nearly 500,000 in 1989 to approximately 250,000 in 2010. Current 
restructuring proposals from the Bundesministerium der Verteidigung [BMVg] (Federal 
Ministry of Defense) recommend a further reduction—by one third—over the next few 
years.2 Germany’s defense budget likely will stay at a mere 1.3-percent share of its GDP, 
a proportion that places it only twenty-first of the twenty-eight NATO countries.3  
These strategic choices have a long-term impact and raise important questions 
about contemporary German security and defense policy: Why and how has the German  
 
                                                 
1 ―Eine Armee ist immer in Bewegung, sie ist niemals ―fertig.‖ Aber in ihrer steten Weiterentwicklung 
sollte sich immer Neues mit Bewährtem verbinden.‖ Ulrich de Maiziere, ―Was war neu in der 
Bundesewehr? - Betrachtungen eines Zeitzeugen zum 50jährigen Jubiläum,‖ Europäische Sicherheit 
Online, June 2005, http://www.europaeische-sicherheit.de/ (accessed May 20, 2011). Ulrich de Maiziere, a 
former army general and chief of staff of the Bundeswehr (1966-1972), was the father of Germany's current 
Defense Minister Thomas de Maiziere. 
2―Eckpunkte für die Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr,‖ Official website of the BMVg, May 18, 2011, 
http://www.bmvg.de/ (accessed October 30, 2010). 
3 Svenja Sinjen and Johannes Varwick, ―Die Bundeswehr und die Aufgaben der Nordatlantischen 
Allianz,‖ in Bundeswehr – Die nächsten 50 Jahre. Anforderungen an deutsche Streitkräfte im 21. 
Jahrhundert, eds. Joachim Krause and Jan C. Irlenkaeuser (Opladen: Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2006), 97.  
 2 
military changed after the end of the Cold War? What driving forces and determining 
factors account for the evolution of the Bundeswehr since 1990? Why have Germany’s 
military reforms not always followed a consistent path?  
B. IMPORTANCE 
The present work comprises an inquiry into the nature of change in German 
security and defense policy and institutions in the past twenty years—a subject of intense 
political speculation in Germany during the years 2010–2011, and one that has highly 
suggestive scholarly value as well. However, such an analysis is not only helpful in 
strategic studies by offering an academic exchange about theory, but it also speaks to the 
needs of policy. The answers to the aforementioned questions have real-world 
ramifications for Germany’s ability to fulfill its international commitments in the realm 
of security and defense. As one of the largest European troop contributors to 
peacekeeping missions, Germany will continue to bear a substantial part of the military 
burden of current and future operations under the auspices of NATO and the European 
Union’s (EU) Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). However, over the last two 
decades, western allies and observers repeatedly criticized Germany for its insufficient 
spending on military capabilities and its reluctance to transform the Bundeswehr into an 
all-volunteer fighting/intervention force capable of meeting the security challenges of the 
twenty-first century. As one scholar stated with reference to the perennial burden-sharing 
problem: ―[…] rather than worrying about Europe doing too much on its own, Americans 
should continue to be concerned about Europe, and particularly Germany, doing too 
little.‖4  This apparent gap between international expectations on the one hand, and the 
actual limits of German restructuring and modernization efforts on the other, requires a 
thorough analysis of the factors that drive and shape the ongoing transformation of the 
Bundeswehr.  
These insights are important because a ―popular question-and-answer game since 
German unification has been: What should be Germany’s role in the post-Cold War 
                                                 
4 Mary Elise Sarotte, German Military Reform and European Security, Adelphi Paper 340 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2001), 65. 
 3 
world?‖5 Many scholars provided their views and predictions about this fundamental 
issue, as the country—now ―liberated from the chains of a divided Europe‖6—appeared 
to be a promising subject of research. As a result, Germany was marked by some scholars 
as a ―central power in Europe,‖ as a ―civilian power,‖ as a ―precarious power,‖ or as an 
―economic power.‖7 At the core of these diverse points of view lay the differences 
between a school of thought, which argued that Germany’s foreign and security policy 
would significantly change, and a group of scholars who insisted that the continuities of 
German state behavior—informed by historical experiences and processes—would 
prevail.8 Thus, this examination might also promote a deeper understanding of German 
security policy in general. 
C. GERMAN SECURITY POLICY AND MILITARY TRANSFORMATION 
IN PERSPECTIVE 
Since this thesis will be part of a broader body of scholarly and policy oriented 
work that relates to the overall topic of German defense and security, it can build on 
existing literature of political and social science as well as contemporary history. 




                                                 
5 Franz-Josef Meiers, ―A Change of Course? German Foreign and Security Policy after Unification,‖ 
in The Berlin Republic: German Unification and a Decade of Changes, eds. Winand Gellner and John D. 
Robertson (Portland: Frank Cass & Co., 2003), 195. 
6 Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Karl Kaiser, ―Academic Research and Foreign Policy Making,‖ in 
Germany’s New Foreign Policy. Decision-Making in an Interdependent World, eds. Wolf-Dieter Eberwein 
and Karl Kaiser (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 4. 
7 Rainer Baumann, ―Deutschland als Europas Zentralmacht,‖ in Handbuch zur deutschen Außenpolitik, 
eds. Siegmar Schmidt, Gunther Hellmann, and Reinhard Wolf (Wiesbaden: Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften, 2007) 62-72; Hans W. Maull, ―Germany and Japan: the new Civilian Powers,‖ 
Foreign Affairs 69 (1990), 91-106; Gunther Hellmann, ―Precarious Power: Germany at the Dawn of the 
Twenty-First Century,‖ in Germany’s New Foreign Policy. Decision-Making in an Interdependent World, 
eds. Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Karl Kaiser (New York: Palgrave, 2001) 293-311; Michael Staack: 
―Deutschland als Wirtschaftsmacht,‖ in Handbuch zur deutschen Außenpolitik, eds. Siegmar Schmidt, 
Gunther Hellmann, and Reinhard Wolf (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007), 85-100. 
8 Gunther Hellmann, Reinhard Wolf, and Siegmar Schmidt, ―Deutsche Außenpolitik in historischer 
und systematischer Perspektive,‖ in Handbuch zur deutschen Außenpolitik, eds. Siegmar Schmidt, Gunther 
Hellmann, and Reinhard Wolf (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007), 34. 
 4 
mainstream of contemporary German studies. Rather, the transformation of the 
Bundeswehr is mostly seen as an integral part of the general thrust of German security 
and defense policy. 
In this context, the developments on the international scene after 1990 are one of 
the most common explanations for changes in German security in general, and the 
Bundeswehr in particular. Being part of the prosperous and relatively stable Euro-
Atlantic region, states like Germany faced new challenges presented by a growing 
number of failing or failed states, intra-state wars, regional instability, transnational 
terrorism, or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.9 Above all, this complex 
set of emerging threats made functional alterations of the German armed forces 
inevitable.10 At base, these threats shifted the primary area of Bundeswehr operations 
beyond German borders—Germany’s freedom and security had to be defended outside of 
Alliance territory.11 The new security environment required Germany to transform its 
tank-heavy Cold War divisions into flexible, interoperable, and mobile forces that were 
able to conduct a broad array of ―out-of-area‖ missions, ranging from humanitarian aid, 
monitoring of cease-fires, and peacekeeping to high-intensity peace-enforcing.12  
Scholars also claim that these profound changes in the role and mission of the 
armed forces illustrate that the Bundeswehr gradually evolved into a distinct foreign 
policy instrument of unified Germany.13 Thus, this body of work is at least implicitly 
                                                 
9 Ernst-Christoph Meier, ―Vom Verteidigungsauftrag des Grundgesetzes zum Begriff Vernetzter 
Sicherheit—Zur politischen Einordnung des Weißbuchs 2006,‖ in Friedensethik und Sicherheitspolitik. 
Weißbuch 2006 und EKD-Friedensdenkschrift 2007 in der Diskussion, eds. Angelika Dörfler-Gierken and 
Gerd Portugall (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2010), 53. 
10 Sven Bernhard Gareis, ―Militärische Beiträge zur Sicherheit,‖ in Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik. 
Herausforderungen, Akteure und Prozesse, ed. Sven Bernhard Gareis and Stephan Böckenförde (Opladen 
& Farmington Hills: Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2009), 100. 
11 Benjamin Schreer, ―Die Transformation des Heeres,‖ in Bundeswehr-Die nächsten 50 Jahre; 
Anforderungen an deutsche Streitkräfte im 21. Jahrhundert, eds. Joachim Krause and Jan C. Irlenkaeuser 
(Opladen: Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2006), 182. 
12 Martin Wagener, ―Auf dem Weg zu einer ―normalen‖ Macht? Die Entsendung deutscher 
Streitkräfte in der Ära Schröder,‖ in Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik – Eine Bilanz der Regierung Schröder, 
eds. Sebastian Harnisch, Christos Katsoulis and Marco Overhaus (Baden-Baden: Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft, 2004), 100–1. 
13 Rolf Clement, ―Die neue Bundeswehr als Instrument deutscher Außenpolitik,‖ Aus Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte B11 (2004), 42–6. 
 5 
informed by the main schools of thought in IR theory.14 The logic that the conditions of 
the international system mainly defined the course of the Bundeswehr transformation 
over time is basically an argument of structural realism. But, although such an analysis 
has a lot of explanatory power, for example, by illustrating how the emergence of such 
new threats as international terrorism affected security thinking, it cannot sufficiently 
answer the question of why the process of reforming the German armed forces often took 
place in a piecemeal and unassertive way. For example, Germany only recently curtailed 
compulsory military service—a fact that confounds this school of thought because even 
countries like France—as the inventor of the levée en masse—abandoned conscription in 
2002 in the face of a dynamic security environment that called for professional forces. 
Additionally, some proponents of neo-realism predicted that a unified Germany—as 
Europe’s potentially most powerful state—would act like such other major European 
powers as France and the United Kingdom. This process of ―normalization‖ most likely 
would result in a return to past patterns of power politics, and especially a stronger 
emphasis on the use of military force.15 However, the policy path of the ―Berlin 
Republic‖ has taken quite a different trajectory after 1990.  
Due to these apparent limits of neo-realist models, the constructivist school of 
thought, which relies on socially constructed beliefs, values, and norms and the way that 
these ideational factors shape a state’s perception of the international system, increasingly 
paid attention to the German case.16 In this context of constructivist explanations, the 
                                                 
14 Gunther Hellmann, Reinhard Wolf, and Siegmar Schmidt, ―Deutsche Außenpolitik in historischer 
und systematischer Perspektive,‖ in Handbuch zur Deutschen Außenpolitik, eds. Siegmar Schmidt, Gunther 
Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007), 41. 
15 John J. Mearsheimer, ―Back to the future. Instability in Europe after the Cold War,‖ International 
Security 15 (Summer 1990), 5–56. 
16 John S. Duffield, World Power Forsaken. Political Culture, International Institutions, and German 
Security Policy after Unification (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998); Thomas U. Berger, Cultures 
of Antimilitarism. National Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1998); John S. Duffield, ―Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds 
Neorealsim,‖ International Organization 53 (1999), 765-803; Kerry Longhurst, Germany and the Use of 
Force: The Evolution of German Security Policy 1990-2003 (Manchester, GBR: The Manchester 
University Press, 2004); Björn Conrad and Mario Stumm, German Strategic Culture and Institutional 
Choice: Transatlanticism and/or Europeanism?, Trierer Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik (Trier: 
Lehrstuhl für Außenpolitik und Internationale Beziehungen, 2004); Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, Germany, 
Pacifism and Peace Enforcement (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2006); Tobias 
Wilke, German Strategic Culture Revisited. Linking the Past to Contemporary German Strategic Choice, 
Forschungsberichte Internationale Politik 36 (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2007). 
 6 
notion of culture and its interrelationship with a state’s interests and behavior received 
growing attention in national security policy research.17 This new theoretical focus 
promised to account for variations in state preferences, which neo-realism had typically 
assumed and treated as homogenous across states.18 Thus, it did not deny ―the realist’s 
argument about the importance of the international context in which Germany’s 
transformation took place.‖19 Rather, the concept of ―strategic culture,‖20 with its 
inclusion of factors on the domestic level, attempted to evaluate the impact of shared 
historical experiences as well as persistent norms and values on specific German security 
policy outcomes.21 Strategic culture is a sub-component of the broader approach of 
―political culture,‖ which may be defined as a socially transmitted set of decision rules, 
assumptions, and operating procedures that affect a collective’s stance on its political 
environment.22 Despite an intense academic debate, which mainly revolved around the 
question of whether strategic culture is an independent explanatory variable for state 
behavior, no universally accepted definition has been established so far.23 
Amid an apparent lack of scholarly consensus, this thesis will begin with the 
presumption that strategic culture can be defined as the: 
norms, ideas and patterns of behavior that are shared among the most 
influential actors and social groups within a given political community, 
which help to shape a ranked set of options for a community’s pursuit of 
security and defense goals.24 
                                                 
17 Jeffrey S. Lantis, ―Strategic Culture and National Security Policy,‖ International Studies Review 4 
(2002), 87. 
18 Duffield, Political Culture and State Behavior, 765. 
19 Dalgaard-Nielsen, Germany, Pacifism and Peace Enforcement, 3. 
20 Duffield called the phenomenon a German ―national security culture;‖ at the same time Berger 
pointed to a distinct German ―political-military culture.‖ Nonetheless, this thesis will make use of the more 
common term ―strategic culture.‖ 
21 Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, 1. 
22 Conrad and Stumm, German Strategic Culture and Institutional Choice, 11. 
23 This thesis cannot participate in this ongoing scholarly dispute. For an overview of the main 
arguments of the debate, see: Wilke, German Strategic Culture Revisited, 17–24. 
24 Cristoph O. Meyer, The Quest for a European Strategic Culture. Changing Norms on Security and 
Defense in the European Union (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 20. 
 7 
Proponents of this school of thought stress that, although these ideational and normative 
foundations tend to be stable over time, German strategic culture can be subject to 
learning processes and forces of incremental change.25 They claim that this hypothesis 
explains, for example, Germany’s slowly growing willingness to participate in out-of-
area military missions since the end of the Cold War. In sum, strategic culture helps to 
understand Germany’s continuing preference for multinational and non-military modes of 
addressing external crises and conflicts. If this concept can answer the question of why 
and how German security and defense policy has been shaped, channeled, or restrained 
by cultural factors, it should also be able to explain the main thrust of military reform in 
the post-Cold War era.26 In other words: military reforms should resemble alterations in 
German strategic culture. 
In light of Germany's strong preference for multilateralism, those international 
organizations that are Germany’s most important platforms of security and defense 
cooperation, namely NATO and, since recently, the EU, are to be taken into account as 
well.27 The existing literature on these entities sheds light on the issue from different 
angles. Both NATO and the EU have had an impact on German military reforms, because 
they have been forums for pursuing security interests as well as sources of constraint due 
to binding treaties and obligations.28  
                                                 
25 Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, 148. 
26 A weakness of this cultural approach is its focus on elite opinions. The general public is often 
neglected. However, during the Iraq crisis in 2003, as well as during the Libya Crisis in 2011, electoral 
interests of decision-makers arguably restrained German policy behavior, which suggests that popular 
sentiments do matter, sometimes quite directly. 
27 This focus on NATO and the EU is not intended to downplay the significance of other institutions, 
for instance, the UN or the OSCE. However, the former have traditionally played a more important role 
with regard to German security and defense policy. 
28 Michael Staack, ―Normative Grundlagen, Werte und Interessen deutscher Sicherheitspolitik,‖ in 
Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik. Herausforderungen, Akteure und Prozesse, ed. Sven Bernhard Gareis and 
Stephan Böckenförde (Opladen & Farmington Hills: Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2009) 45–78; Franz H.U. 
Borkenhagen, ―Entwicklungslinien aktueller deutscher Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik,‖ in Die 
Bundeswehr 1955-2005. Rückblenden-Einsichten-Perspektiven, ed. Frank Nägler, (München: R. 
Oldenbourg Verlag, 2007), 501–518. 
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On the one hand, NATO especially ―offered Germany a channel through which it 
might exercise considerable influence on Western strategy.‖29 On the other hand, unified 
Germany was presented with growing expectations and political pressure from the 
Alliance. With its substantial resources, Germany was supposed to graduate from its 
alleged role as a ―security free-rider‖ under U.S. tutelage and to take a pro-active stance 
on global security affairs. Thus, NATO’s gradual paradigm shift from collective defense 
towards collective security, as well as readjustments of its role, strategy, and missions, 
had serious consequences for an organization as deeply enmeshed in Alliance structures 
and procedures as the Bundeswehr. Several key allies expected Germany to assume 
greater international responsibility and to provide well-trained troops for a growing 
number of crisis management endeavors on the European periphery and beyond.30 
Consequently, Germany’s commitments to this institutional framework31—for example, 
the enhancement of certain capabilities or military contributions to the NATO Response 
Force (NRF)—must be regarded as eminent forces of change in the structure, armament, 
and doctrine of the Bundeswehr.32 Some scholars even claim that the overall course of 
German military reforms since 1990 has mainly served two purposes: ensuring 
interoperability between the Bundeswehr and its major allies, and preserving political 
influence within NATO.33 
                                                 
29 Catherine Kelleher and Cathleen Fischer, ―Germany,‖ in The Defense Policy of Nations: a 
Comparative Study, eds. Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotti (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1994), 164. 
30 Meiers, A Change of Course? German Foreign and Security Policy after Unification, 210. 
31 For a brief overview of obligations within NATO and the EU see: Johannes Varwick, 
―Nordatlantische Allianz,‖ in Handbuch zur deutschen Außenpolitik, eds. Siegmar Schmidt, Gunther 
Hellmann, and Reinhard Wolf (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007), 763–778; Svenja 
Sinjen and Johannes Varwick, 101-106; Wolfgang Wagner, ―Die Außen-, Sicherheits- und 
Verteidigungspolitik der Europäischen Union,‖ in Handbuch zur deutschen Außenpolitik, eds. Siegmar 
Schmidt, Gunther Hellmann, and Reinhard Wolf (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007), 
143–156; Johannes Varwick, ―Die Bundeswehr als Teil einer europäischen Eingreiftruppe,‖ in Bundeswehr 
– Die nächsten 50 Jahre. Anforderungen an deutsche Streitkräfte im 21. Jahrhundert, eds. Joachim Krause 
and Jan C. Irlenkaeuser (Opladen: Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2006), 109-–26. 
32 Johannes Varwick, ―Deutsche Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik in der Nordatlantischen 
Allianz: Die Politik der rot-grünen Bundesregierung 1998-2003,‖ in Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik – Eine 
Bilanz der Regierung Schröder, eds. Sebastian Harnisch, Christos Katsoulis and Marco Overhaus (Baden-
Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2004), 28. 
33 Olaf Theiler, ―Bundeswehr und NATO,‖ in Armee im Einsatz, eds. Hans J. Gießmann and Armin 
Wagner (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2009) 189. 
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Since the Franco-British rapprochement in the late 1990s concerning the role of 
the EU as an independent security policy actor, additional pressure to adapt the 
Bundeswehr stemmed from German participation in the EU’s emerging security and 
defense policy.34 The ambitious European plans to establish an autonomous crisis-
response capacity resulted in substantial German military contributions.35 The fact that 
ESDP/CSDP military missions did not always take recourse to NATO resources under 
the ―Berlin Plus‖ arrangement made these obligations all the more burdensome.36 
Notwithstanding its strong commitments to NATO and ESDP/CSDP, a significant gap 
between Germany’s official contributions to these organizations and its financial 
resources devoted to defense issues has been identified.37 Germany’s commitments, 
though quantitatively substantial, did not seem commensurate with the qualitative 
requirements of modern expeditionary forces. Thus, narrowing the analysis of military 
transformation to the role and influence of international security regimes would be overly 
simplistic. 
Another category of literature about issues of German defense and security only 
indirectly derives from the above discussion about the effects of international institutions. 
These studies systematically analyze multinational crisis-response operations with a 
                                                 
34 Hans-Joachim Reeb, ―Die neue Bundeswehr,‖ in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 48 (2009), 20–1. 
35 Wilhelm Knelangen, ―Die Europäische Union und die deutsche Sicherheitspolitik,‖ in Deutsche 
Sicherheitspolitik; Herausforderungen, Akteure und Prozesse, eds. Stephan Böckenförde and Sven 
Bernhard Gareis (Opladen & Farmington Hills: Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2009), 272–5. 
36 Autonomous European missions had to go without U.S. military capabilities and assets as well as 
NATO’s sophisticated planning capacities. 
37 Wagener, Auf dem Weg zu einer ―normalen‖ Macht? Die Entsendung deutscher Streitkräfte in der 
Ära Schröder, 109. Sarotte, German Military Reform and European Security. Martin Agüera, ―Ambitious 
Goals, Weak Means? Germany’s Project ―Future Bundeswehr‖ is Facing Many Hurdles,‖ Defense and 
Security Analysis, 17 (2001), 289–306. 
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German participation and their repercussions for the Bundeswehr.38 The latter has 
participated in monitoring missions as well as in far more complex military ventures. As 
a result, long-term peacekeeping or state-building efforts and, above all, peace-enforcing 
missions presented the Bundeswehr with challenges regarding such issues as 
deployability, logistics, command and control, viable equipment, and the availability of 
combat-ready personnel. Recent works argue that Germany’s constitutional norms, 
societal conditions, and present military capabilities do not sufficiently reflect the new 
reality of a fully operational Bundeswehr that has been continuously involved in out-of-
area missions on three continents since the early 1990s.39 However, several shortcomings 
in the Bundeswehr’s structure, equipment, training and doctrine have been resolved 
because of the experiences of international military missions. These aspects tend to be 
overlooked by studies that solely focus on the overall scheme of security policy on the 
systemic level.  
Furthermore, several studies convincingly portray additional driving factors on 
the domestic level: first, budgetary constraints; second, key actors and decision-makers; 
and third, electoral and economic interests.40 
The Bundeswehr has operated under increasingly constrained financial resources 
since 1990. Germany continuously reduced its defense spending in relative terms after 
unification and spent considerably less for its forces than, for example, France and 
Britain. Proponents of strategic culture have either no explanation at all for this 
                                                 
38 Andreas M. Rauch, Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 
2006); Lutz Holländer, ―Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr: Bilanz und Perspektive,‖ in Bundeswehr – Die 
nächsten 50 Jahre; Anforderungen an Streitkräfte im 21. Jahrhundert, eds. Joachim Krause and Jan C. 
Irlenkaeuser (Opladen: Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2006), 225–236; Klaus Naumann, ―Der Wandel des 
Einsatzes von Katastrophenhilfe und NATO-Manöver zur Anwendung von Waffengewalt und 
Friedenserzwingung,‖ in Die Bundeswehr 1955 bis 2005. Rückblenden - Einsichten - Perspektiven, ed. 
Frank Nägler (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2007), 477–494; Stephan Mair (ed.), Auslandseinsätze der 
Bundeswehr. Leitfragen, Entscheidungsspielräume und Lehren (Berlin, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 
2007); Hans J. Gießmann and Armin Wagner (eds.), Armee im Einsatz. Grundlagen, Strategien und 
Ergebnisse einer Beteiligung der Bundeswehr (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2009). 
39 Reeb, Die neue Bundeswehr, 17–23. 
40 Hanns W. Maull, ―Normalisierung oder Auszehrung? Deutsche Außenpolitik im Wandel: Eine neue 
deutsche Außenpolitik?‖ in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B11 (2004), 21. 
 11 
phenomenon41 or argue that this policy outcome is fully in line with their cultural 
concepts by claiming that Germany’s pacifist leanings impeded an increased defense 
spending.42 However, other scholars call the lack of funding the ―Achilles heel‖ of 
Bundeswehr transformation.43 Several specific analyses explore the German defense 
expenditure and its implications for security and defense policy.44 A review of the 
attendant literature reveals two main aspects: first of all, unprecedented events like the 
costly process of German unification, consolidation obligations like the Maastricht 
criteria of the EU, or systemic shocks like the world financial crisis of 2008–2009 can 
curtail German government spending—eventually leading to defense budget reductions 
and obstacles for military transformation.45 Furthermore, the internal structure of the 
defense budget itself—with its high operating and personnel costs—has hindered 
attempts to modernize the Bundeswehr.46 Hence, budgetary constraints represent a 
discrete variable for military reform in Germany, and defense spending and its 
repercussions for Bundeswehr transformation over time will be a recurring issue during 
the research of this thesis.  
Apart from this financial dimension, some further consequences of domestic 
politics must not be underestimated. For example, in February 2011 the German media 
                                                 
41 Longhurst mentions the problem of reduced defense spending, but provides no comprehensive 
analysis for the underlying causalities; Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, 114–6. 
42 ―As a culturalist might expect, defense spending retained a low priority in the context of Germany’s 
strategic culture;‖ Dalgaard-Nielsen, Germany, Pacifism and Peace Enforcement, 145. 
43 Franz-Josef Meiers, ―Zur Transformation der Bundeswehr,‖ Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 21 
(2005), 21. 
44 Martin Agüera, ―Deutsche Verteidigungs- und Rüstungsplanung im Kontext von NATO und EU: 
Ein (Reparatur-)Werkstattbericht,‖ in Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik – Eine Bilanz der Regierung Schröder, 
eds. Sebastian Harnisch, Christos Katsoulis and Marco Overhaus (Baden-Baden: Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft, 2004), 119–144.; Daniel Sattler, ―Die Kosten der Bundeswehr und deren Finanzierung 
durch den Bundeshaushalt: Probleme, Perspektiven, Spielräume,‖ in Bundeswehr – Die nächsten 50 Jahre; 
Anforderugen an Streitkräfte im 21. Jahrhundert, eds. Joachim Krause and Jan C. Irlenkaeuser (Opladen: 
Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2006), 277–290; Gregor Richter, ―Ökonomisierung der Bundeswehr,‖ in 
Handbuch Militär und Sozialwissenschaft, eds. Sven B. Gareis and Paul Klein (Wiesbaden: Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften, 2006), 40–50; Stefan Bayer, ―Die Mittelausstattung der Bundeswehr. Der Einzelplan 
14 im Spannungsfeld zwischen Auftragslage und (finanzieller) Realität,‖ in Armee im Einsatz, eds. Hans J. 
Gießmann and Armin Wagner (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2009) 224–234. 
45 The current plans for a new Bundeswehr reform have arguably been a direct result of the world 
financial crisis. Christian Mölling, ―Für eine sicherheitspolitische Begründung der Bundeswehr,‖ SWP-
Aktuell 20 (2011), 1. 
46 Sattler, Die Kosten der Bundeswehr und deren Finanzierung durch den Bundeshaushalt, 281. 
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reported that the ambitious plans for a new Bundeswehr reform had been thwarted by the 
Chancellor’s Office, a surprising turn of intra-party dissent.47 A few weeks later, the 
country’s leading news magazine published an article that stated that the sudden 
resignation of Defense Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg had de facto removed a 
political rival of Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle—who is also the head of the 
coalition partner party, the FDP.48 These two episodes provide valuable insights into 
German political culture and have manifold ramifications for an evaluation of military 
transformation. Above all, the influence of and interdependencies between relevant 
political actors on the national level is of considerable significance. German security 
policy is to a large extent shaped in the political triangle of the Kanzleramt (Chancellor’s 
Office), the Auswärtiges Amt (Foreign Office), and the BMVg (Federal Ministry of 
Defense).49 In other words, the course of the Bundeswehr also takes direction from 
domestic sources outside the core ―defense community‖ of the BMVg. The nature of the 
―balance of power‖ between the Chancellor and these two Ministers, as well as the 
question of whether security issues have a priority on the overall national political 
agenda, can either facilitate or hinder necessary changes of the armed forces. For 
example, in light of high budget deficits and a Foreign Minister who is a member of a 
party that is more inclined to lower taxes than raise government spending, it seems 
unlikely that all current restraints on the defense expenditure will be removed any time 
soon. 
To make this matter even more complicated, the literature also stresses the need to 
account for the strategic interests of these top representatives of the executive. Decisions 
                                                 
47 ―Merkels Experten kanzeln die Bundeswehrreform ab,‖ SPIEGEL Online, February 26, 2011, 
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,747890,00.html (accessed April 25, 2011). This critique 
was unexpected because then Defense Minister zu Guttenberg had been the ―rising star‖ of the ruling 
Christian democratic parties, the CDU/CSU.  
48 ―Kabinettsumbildung: Guido Glückspilz,‖ SPIEGEL Online, March 5, 2011, 
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,748873,00.html (accessed April 25, 2011).  
49 Sven Bernhard Gareis, ―Die Organisation der Sicherheitspolitik in Deutschland - Akteure, 
Kompetenzen, Verfahren und Perspektiven,‖ in Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik. Herausforderungen, Akteure 
und Prozesse, eds. Sven Bernhard Gareis and Stephan Böckenförde (Opladen & Farmington Hills: Verlag 
Barbara Budrich, 2009) , 79–98. Karl-Rudolf Korte, ―Bundeskanzleramt,‖ in Handbuch zur deutschen 
Außenpolitik, eds. Siegmar Schmidt, Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf (Wiesbaden: Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften, 2007), 203–209.  
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to deploy the Bundeswehr to high-intensity conflicts, such central themes of German 
civil-military relations as conscription, and the sensitive issue of military basing can 
become very salient in times of elections, when decision-makers tend to avoid stirring 
resistance of the electorate or political affiliates.50  
Additionally, economic considerations with a political dimension occasionally 
come to the fore and inform military transformation. Such large-scale multinational 
procurement programs as the Eurofighter multirole combat aircraft or the Airbus A-400M 
transport aircraft are undoubtedly securing thousands of jobs of highly skilled workers all 
across Europe. ―Buying European‖ with regard to weapon systems has a high-profile 
political dimension because it is supposed to support and sustain an independent 
European defense industry.51 This policy comes at a price, of course, because the 
development of new systems often consumes more time and resources than buying ―off-
the-shelf‖ solutions. In this context, frequent delays and negative effects on the 
operational readiness of the Bundeswehr are unsurprising. Thus, the decision to buy the 
A-400M, for example, so far has had a negative impact on an important aspect of German 
military transformation, namely the need to increase strategic airlift capacities. 
Which preliminary conclusions can be drawn from the review of the existing 
literature on issues of German security and defense? First, the bulk of assessments tends 
to view the transformation of the Bundeswehr as the result or the by-product of crucial 
developments on the international stage on the one hand, and an ingrained unwillingness 
of consecutive German governments to endow the Bundeswehr with sufficient financial 
resources on the other. These explanations, however, omit the sway of national driving 
                                                 
50 The Iraq Crisis of 2003 is a good example for the prevalence of electoral interests. The German 
abstention from Operation Iraqi Freedom was largely based on strong public resistance in the run-up to the 
2002 federal elections. Marco Overhaus, ―Civilian Power under Stress: Germany, NATO, and the European 
Security and Defense Policy,‖ in Germany’s Uncertain Power; Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic, ed. 
Hanns W. Maull (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 67. Conscription remained a controversial topic 
throughout the two decades after unification with ultimate decisions often delayed because of compromises 
within ruling coalition governments. Wilfried von Bredow, Militär und Demokratie in Deutschland. Eine 
Einführung (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2008), 223–4. Any Bundeswehr reform that 
comprises realignments of military basing or even base closures is a highly contentious issue and likely to 
meet regional political resistance due to the importance of military installations for the local economy. 
Sarotte, German Military Reform and European Security, 46–7.  
51 Von Bredow, Militär und Demokratie in Deutschland, 276–80. 
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forces. Second, while a cultural approach to the issue obviously helps to better 
understand the peculiarities and shortcomings of Germany’s post-Cold War strategic 
choices and military reforms, notably on the domestic level, the concept seems to fall 
short of including such aspects as the electoral interests of relevant decision-makers.  
Third, although coherent and systematic examinations of post-unification German 
military transformation already exist, they are unable to close all present gaps in the 
literature. For example, Sarotte provided a cogent study that also covered domestic 
variables.52 However, her analysis does not include the important reforms that were 
initiated after 2002. The dissertations of Weisswange and von Neubeck incorporate large 
amounts of data and offer a systematic and thorough approach on the topic of German 
security policy after 1990.53 Weisswange attempted to elaborate on the notion of what he 
labels as a distinct German ―security policy culture‖ and to account for a broad spectrum 
of determining factors for military reforms. But his study, like the one of Sarotte, ends in 
2002, leaving almost a decade unexplored. Von Neubeck mainly discussed the political, 
legal, and military dimensions and consequences of the growing number of German out-
of-area missions, and therefore omitted such aspects on the domestic level as the issue of 
base closures.  
A somewhat unique research design was chosen by Dyson.54 His study points out 
that in times of elections, the strategic interests of political decision-makers tend to 
inform military transformation.55 Nevertheless, the focus of his assessment is arguably 
too narrow because in trying to promote the concept of ―policy leadership,‖ which  
 
                                                 
52 Mary Elise Sarotte, German Military Reform and European Security, Adelphi Paper 340 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2001). 
53 Arne von Neubeck, Die Transformation der Bundeswehr von der Verteidigungs- zur Einsatzarmee – 
Eine sicherheitspolitische Analyse unter Berücksichtigung politischer, verfassungspolitischer und 
militärpolitischer Aspekte (Dissertation, Julius-Maximilians-Universität, Würzburg, 2007). Jan-Phillip 
Weisswange, Der sicherheitspolitische Entwicklungsprozess der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1990-2002: 
Neue Orientierungen einer euro-atlantischen Sicherheitskultur (Dissertation, Albert-Ludwigs-Universität, 
Freiburg i. Br., 2003). 
54 Tom Dyson, The Politics of German Defence and Security. Policy Leadership and Military Reform 
in the Post-Cold War Era, (New York: Berghahn Books 2007). 
55 The author stresses the importance of strategic electoral interests of key actors, the ramifications for 
social policy, and the politics of base closures. 
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basically underscores the role of individual key actors as agenda-setters or veto-players of 
security policy outcomes, he left out other factors such as, for instance, the impact of out-
of-area missions. 
Finally, there is no literature about the far-reaching reform plans of the current 
German government, which were announced in May 2011. All in all, it seems promising 
to advance existing German security studies by taking a broad analytical approach and 
incorporating recent political developments. 
D. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Based on the literature review, the driving forces of German military 
transformation can be categorized into determinants on the international scene and 
domestic factors. The former category includes developments in the international security 
environment, the strategic direction of NATO and the EU, and the military missions in 
which Germany has participated. The latter category comprises Germany’s unique 
political and strategic culture, the impact of defense spending, and the role and interests 
of key political actors. This general distinction guides the research of this thesis. 
Consequently, the analysis takes a trifold approach: first, the international context of 
German security and defense policy is explored. Second, Germany’s domestic setting is 
assessed. These results serve as the basis for the third and most important part of the 
research—an examination of the actual content of military transformation. Major changes 
in the tasks, the structures, the procedures, and the capabilities of the Bundeswehr are 
identified and discussed in detail. Based on this general structure, this study attempts to 
answer the following additional questions: 
 How have the external and domestic contexts of post-Cold War Germany 
affected military transformation? 
 How does the process of transforming the armed forces reflect the 
strategic culture of the Federal Republic as well as its political culture? 
 How has the issue of the use of military force as a political, legal, and 
operational problem been related to post-Cold War German military 
transformation? 
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 What has been the content of German military reform during this period—
that is, in what phases has it unfolded with what essential results and what 
new issues arose in the midst of this reform? 
These research questions are explored in a single case study of German military 
transformation in the period from 1990 to 2011. Figure 1 shows that this timeframe is 
marked by different German coalition governments. These governments have pursued 
different security and defense policies; their legislation and strategic decisions have set 
the course for the transformation of the Bundeswehr. Therefore, this study does well to 
follow the chronological sequence of events and security policy outcomes and to apply 
the analytical framework to the terms of office. Specifically, its chapters mirror the 
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Figure 1. Coalition Governments in Germany Since 1990 
Before the research questions can be addressed in detail, it is also necessary to 
define the term military transformation.56 According to the German Defense White Paper 
2006 ―transformation is the proactive shaping of a continuous process of adaptation to the 
ever-changing framework conditions with the aim of enhancing the Bundeswehr’s 
                                                 
56 This thesis uses the terms military transformation and military reform synonymously. 
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operational effectiveness.‖57 This broad definition provides at least three important 
elements: transformation is a deliberate process, it has a broad context, and it is supposed 
to result in improved military performance. The need to evaluate the outcome of 
transformation requires a further operationalization of the term. As a consequence, this 
case study of German security and defense themes uses a condensed definition that views 
military transformation as the intentional and target-oriented process of adjusting the 
Bundeswehr’s capabilities, structures, procedures, and norms in order to meet national 
security policy goals as well as commitments to international security regimes.  
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis consists of seven chapters. Following this introduction, Chapter II 
briefly sets the stage for the later analysis of the post-Cold War period. It sheds light on 
the historical foundations of the Bundeswehr, the formation of German strategic culture 
after 1945, and long-term trends and continuities in the foreign and security policy of the 
Bonn Republic. Chapter III examines German foreign and security policy between 1990 
and 1998. The focus of this part is an analysis of the limited military reforms initiated by 
Defense Minister Volker Rühe in light of the challenges of German reunification, 
staggering shifts in the security environment, and growing external obligations and 
political pressure. With regard to issues of German defense and security, the period from 
1998 to 2005 includes such a high sequence of important events such as the Kosovo 
Crisis of 1999, the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the Iraq Crisis of 
2002–2003 that it seems necessary to subdivide the analysis of the tenure of Chancellor 
Schröder. Thus, Chapter IV covers the period from 1998 to 2002, while Chapter V 
elaborates on the timeframe between 2002 and 2005. These two chapters, together, 
concentrate on the attempts of the Red-Green coalition to transform the Bundeswehr from 
a territorial defense force into a combat-ready policy instrument, simultaneously engaged 
                                                 
57 Federal Ministry of Defense, Defense White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future 
of the Bundeswehr (Berlin: October 25, 2006), 75. For the White Paper 2006 transformation is an integral 
part of the German concept of networked security—a mode of crisis prevention that is based on well-
coordinated and closely interconnected measures of all relevant policy areas (foreign, security, defense, 
development, economic, and social policy as well as diplomacy). The concept is used in a multilateral, ―all-
embracing approach that can only be developed in networked security structures based on a comprehensive 
national and global security rationale.‖ 
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in missions in the Balkans and in Afghanistan, but plagued by a lack of capabilities and 
resources. Chapter VI includes security policy outcomes and the phase of consolidation 
in military reforms from 2005 onward. It also evaluates current developments, for 
example, by focusing on the impact of the world economic crisis in 2008–2009 and the 
likely consequences of recently announced reform plans. Chapter VII summarizes the 
main findings of this thesis and provides an outlook on future trends in German security 
and defense policy as well as challenges for the Bundeswehr. It concludes that although 
the Bundeswehr has been transformed into an all-volunteer force and a policy instrument, 
its role in multinational peace enforcement missions, as well as its capabilities for 
expeditionary warfare, will remain limited. The main causes for this assessment are the 
low priority of security and defense issues in German politics and the persistence of a 
―culture of reticence.‖ 
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II. THE LONG SHADOW OF THE BONN REPUBLIC 
Historians, as well as political and social scientists, claim that the past informs the 
present through processes of learning and reconsideration. The evolution of (West) 
German politics and society in the second half of the twentieth century is a showcase of 
these causal mechanisms. And the last two decades of German state behavior cannot be 
understood without taking into account some of the continuities of the forty-year post-
war history of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Specifically, this chapter 
explores those aspects of the ―Bonn Republic‖58 that affected the course of German 
security and defense policy, as well as the role, structure, and characteristics of the 
Bundeswehr. 
The end of the Second World War represented a critical juncture in German 
history. The country was not only divided into an eastern and a western zone (after 
having lost substantial parts of its former territory), but it was also put under allied 
occupation. Emerging from the experience of total defeat and horrified at the magnitude 
of death and destruction all across Europe that had been caused by German aggression 
and genocide, leaders and thinkers in and of Germany posited a Stunde Null—a ―zero 
hour,‖—that is, a notional point at which all Germans intervened in their own history to 
interrupt the previous trends of excessive nationalism, militarism, and megalomania. A 
new Federal Germany should take root in the carefully prepared soil of democracy and 
human rights, neither forgetting nor repeating its earlier development toward National 
Socialism or other extreme ideologies. In this context, constructivists emphasize ―how 
culture originates in events of existential significance for the national community.‖59 The 
Second World War was such an event for Germany. ―By the end of the war in 1945, […] 
Germany had been shaken to the core both physically and psychologically.‖60 As a 
consequence, both West Germany as a state and its identity had to be reconstructed and 
                                                 
58 This term refers to the fact that the small city of Bonn in North Rhine-Westphalia had been chosen 
as the seemingly permanent ―provisional‖ capital of the Federal Republic of Germany, the democratic 
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reformulated. The Germans reinvented themselves. The impulses for these fundamental 
changes stemmed from forces within the West German society and its new political class, 
as well as from the outside. Above all, the western allies, the ―Three Powers,‖ tried to 
ensure the solidification of democracy in the FRG and to eradicate German militarism 
and Nazism. Their state-building efforts—establishing democratic political institutions 
and procedures, and an efficient administration—were accompanied by a strict policy of 
the ―four Ds:‖ denazification, demilitarization, decartelization, and disarmament, meant 
to refashion German society.61 These processes and policies had profound impacts on the 
face of the Bonn Republic as well as on its political and strategic culture. 
Additionally, the structure of the international system strongly affected West 
German foreign policy and finally triggered the inception of a new German military. The 
increasing tensions of the Cold War and West Germany’s dependence on the western 
allies, above all on U.S. economic aid, rendered the option of German neutrality 
impossible.62 The Cold War also deepened the divide between the two Germanys. While 
the Bonn Republic was bound more firmly to the western system of democracies, 
institutions, and security regimes, East Germany's status as a bulwark of the Soviet 
sphere of influence was tightened. Finally, it inevitably led to the rearmament of both 
German states and determined the role of the Bundewehr as the first democratic defender 
of a German state for more than three decades.  
A. ANCHORED TO THE WEST 
One of the most important features of the Bonn Republic was its emergence as a 
―civilian power.‖ This role concept has been defined as a nation that puts an emphasis on 
the use of ―soft power‖ in foreign policy, cooperation through multilateral channels and 
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institutions, and primarily economic—rather than military—means of defending its 
national interests.63 West Germany’s general preference for non-military policy 
instruments and multilateralism was both a means to an end and an end in itself. The 
government of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer viewed multilateralism as a way of 
preventing the recurrence of what had been perceived as a Sonderweg—a special path of 
undemocratic and unilateralist leanings of German political and military elites since late 
nineteenth century that, in the conventional view of German history, had contributed to 
the Nazis’ takeover of state and society.64 In this sense, multilateralism operationalized 
the refrain of ―nie wieder,‖ or ―never again.‖  But in the face of West Germany’s initially 
circumscribed sovereignty, economic and security cooperation also provided a means of 
regaining influence on the international scene. Thus, the Bonn Republic made efforts ―to 
enlarge [its] political autonomy by integrating [its] foreign policy into multilateral 
systems or international institutions that offered a chance for codetermination.‖65 The 
more apt motto, then, was ―nie wieder allein,‖ or ―never again alone.‖ 
Another controversial subject was closely linked to the issue of national 
sovereignty and political freedom of action: how to finally find a peaceful solution to the 
country’s most daunting political task—accomplishing the unity of the divided German 
nation. Of course, this task did not just concern the Germans. As a matter of international 
treaties and practical politics, the Four Powers controlled the unification process.66 
Against this background, Chancellor Adenauer was convinced that the FRG had to be 
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West German contributions to NATO and other institutions would ensure the continuous 
support of the western allies for a peaceful unification of the two German states in the 
long run.67 
In the meantime, firm ties to and in the West promised the FRG the most security 
and prosperity. Therefore, Westintegration was the key imperative of the Bonn 
Republic’s foreign policy.68 During Adenauer’s chancellorship, the young Federal 
Republic integrated itself deeply into such organizations as the European Community 
(EC)—the predecessor of the European Union—the Western European Union (WEU), 
and NATO. Membership in the WEU, but especially in NATO offered security vis-à-vis 
the Soviet Union as well as an opportunity to demonstrate West Germany’s resolve to 
bear a part of the collective defense burden by making a strong and visible contribution to 
NATO’s conventional forces.69 Thus the foundation of the Bundeswehr in 1955 was not 
an expression of growing German self-assurance and economic power. Rather, it was the 
necessary answer to the growing tensions between the East and the West, as well as the 
political price for the Federal Republic's return to the western community of states on an 
equal footing with its allies.70 
Overall, Adenauer—and succeeding West German governments—wanted the 
country to be regarded as a reliable actor and partner in international affairs, above all in 
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the eyes of the United States and France.71 Bonn’s foreign policy as a whole was marked 
by a clear preference for bi- and multilateral arrangements, focusing on themes of 
reticence, humanitarianism, and cooperation.72 This low-profile policy persisted 
throughout the course of the Cold War, and it became part of West Germany's 
Staatsräson that this political ―culture of restraint‖ enhanced rather than limited Bonn’s 
influence in international affairs.73 
B. SKEPTICISM OVER THE USE OF ARMED FORCE 
While German political elites attempted to embed the Federal Republic in the 
West via NATO and other institutions in order to regain political sovereignty and 
influence, large parts of the West German society remained skeptical of all things 
military in general, and the possible reappearance of armed Germans in military uniforms 
in particular.74 Both the army as the ―school of the nation‖ and the military establishment 
had been largely discredited by the events between 1914 and 1945. Representatives of all 
political parties were convinced that the distance between the former Reichswehr and the 
political institutions of the Weimar Republic (1919–1933) had contributed to the 
downfall of German democracy in the 1930s. As a result, they wanted to prevent the 
recurrence of German militarism and of armed forces that were decoupled from the 
democratic state.75  
Because the democratic and peaceful Federal Republic was being built on the 
ashes of a Germany that had been ruined by its nationalistic and overly militant ideology, 
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many Germans had no taste for rearmament. The potentially lethal consequences of the 
Cold War bloc confrontation made military solutions even less palatable. This deeply 
rooted skepticism over the use of force and the military became a basic feature of the 
German public and of parts of the political elites. Some observers called this phenomenon 
a ―culture of antimilitarism.‖76 Against this background, notions of ―nie wieder Krieg‖—
or ―never again war‖—were evoked.77 These slogans contrasted with the claim of the 
ruling center-right parties that ―never again alone‖ was the blueprint for German foreign 
policy; antimilitary voices in government and the media further questioned a West 
German military contribution to collective defense.78  
As a result, the question of whether or not there should be a new West German 
military so shortly after the national trauma of 1933–1945 perhaps affected West 
Germans more than any other contentious issue of the 1950s.79 Initial plans of the 
Adenauer administration to contribute West German troops to the emerging European 
Defense Community (EDC) aroused energetic political resistance from the opposition 
and large parts of the public.80 When the Federal Republic became a candidate for NATO 
membership after the failure of the EDC, new protests erupted, above all, because Bonn’s 
substantial share of the Alliance defense burden in Central Europe had to rely on 
universal male conscription. Objections against rearmament were voiced by political 
parties, labor unions, the churches and other social groups alike.81  
In light of the threat imposed by the Soviets’ conventional forces, however, the 
FRG’s membership in NATO and the Bundeswehr were viewed as a necessary evil over 
time. Nonetheless, an antimilitaristic stance persisted in spite of the defensive character 
of the Bundeswehr. This rift became visible when the traditional social fabric of the 
Federal Republic was challenged by post-materialist struggles and the rise of critical 
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student groups in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This emerging ―new left‖ comprised 
different social movements such as women's rights, anti-nuclear, and environmental 
activists, and had a clearly pacifist bias. These movements were a part of West German 
society that loosely combined all those opposed to NATO’s nuclear rearmament on 
German territory, the use of military force, nuclear energy or even certain aspects of 
capitalism.82 The peace movement experienced a renaissance in the context of NATO's 
dual-track decision of 1979.83 The prospect of a nuclear arms race partially taking place 
on German soil subsequently stirred resistance in significant parts of the German 
population.84  
Thus, ―never again war‖ gradually joined ―never again alone‖ as a basic tenet of 
the strategic culture of the Bonn Republic. The result of these two conflicting stances was 
a low profile security and defense policy that emphasized the strictly limited role of the 
West German military. National and collective defense were the only raison d’être of the 
Bundeswehr during the Cold War. Additionally, the prevalent antimilitarism called for 
armed forces that had to break with their historic record of authoritarianism and slavish 
obedience. The relationship between German soldiers and German state and society had 
to be completely redefined.  
C. THE BUNDESWEHR AS THE NEW MODEL ARMY 
When the course for West Germany’s rearmament and its NATO accession 
finally had been set in the early 1950s, the Adenauer government faced several 
challenges. Because West Germany was supposed to contribute a total of 500,000 troops 
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within only a few years, its new armed forces had to rely in part on former soldiers of the 
Wehrmacht.85 While the U.S. government was not too unsettled by the idea of having 
battle-hardened German veterans forming a first line of defense against alleged Soviet 
expansionism at the time, other western allies like France were afraid of West Germany’s 
military potential.86 And, of course, on the domestic level Germany’s homegrown 
antimilitarism fueled public debates about the pros and cons of rearmament.  
In this context, a new strategic rationale and professional ethos for the 
Bundeswehr had to be found in order to calm the reservations in all quarters about the 
establishment of West German armed forces. The two approaches that were taken to 
resolve these issues had long-lasting effects on the Bundeswehr. On the international 
level, NATO provided a framework for harnessing the FRG’s military power. The 
Bundeswehr had to be integrated into NATO command structures and deployed 
according to the respective strategic concepts of the Alliance.87 On the domestic level, 
the armed forces had to be embedded in the pluralistic structures of the Federal Republic. 
As a consequence, a normative framework codified the primacy of democratic political 
control over the military.88 Additionally, both the notion of ―citizens in uniform‖ and 
general conscription served as the basis for the integration of the armed forces into West 
German politics and society.  
1. Citizens in Uniform 
The question of how to integrate armed forces into the democratic framework of a 
nation is of high significance for its democratic civil-military relations and the character 
of its defense and military institutions. The answer provides a deep insight into a 
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country’s strategic culture, as well as into the role of military power within its portfolio of 
policy tools in its political culture. Remarkably, the first version of the Federal German 
constitution, the Grundgesetz (Basic Law),89 had not even addressed the issue of armed 
forces because of West Germany’s demilitarization shortly after the war. 
When the Bundeswehr was founded, it was essential to fix German soldiers, as 
individual citizens, in the democratic principles and norms of the Basic Law. In contrast 
to the totalitarian ideology of the Nazi regime—which oversaw the suspension of the 
basic civil liberties guaranteed by the Weimar constitution and simply ignored the rest of 
the document—Article 1 of the Basic Law presents a firmly liberal and democratic vision 
of basic human rights: ―Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall 
be the duty of all state authority.‖ During the discussions about NATO accession for the 
FRG, the explicit inclusion of soldiers in this protection against the possible misuse of 
state power was a political precondition for rearmament.90 As a consequence, the soldiers 
of the Bundeswehr were to be granted the same constitutional and democratic-
participatory rights as any other citizen of the FRG, limited only insofar as necessary for 
military discipline during their time of military service.91 The reform-oriented founders 
of the Bundeswehr ―desired that the recruit be first a human being; second, a citizen; and 
third, a soldier.‖92  
This notion of West German soldiers as ―citizens in uniform‖ or citizen soldiers is 
the core element of the concept of Innere Führung.93 It bridges the gap between the 
duties and responsibilities of a soldier and the rights and liberties that inhere in an 
individual member of a democratic society. Innere Führung is the guiding principle for 
the inner order of the armed forces and for the relationship between the Bundeswehr, the 
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state, and society. At the same time, it provides behavioral norms as well as moral 
leadership, and orders the relationship between superiors and subordinates.94 The concept 
of Innere Führung was revolutionary at the time because it created a new self-image of 
the Bundeswehr and deliberately broke with the military traditions of the soldiers of the 
Weimar-era Reichswehr and of Hitler's Wehrmacht.  
In this context of binding the armed forces to democratic principles and values 
and perpetuating a close link between the Bundeswehr and a skeptical society, 
conscription played a central role and incrementally developed into a hallmark of the 
Bonn Republic’s civil-military relations and strategic culture. Thus, compulsory military 
service was much more than a prerequisite for mobilizing the large manpower resources 
necessary for collective defense. Rather, the constant influx of recruits from all social 
strata would turn the Bundeswehr into a reflection of the pluralistic West German society. 
Conscription was therefore regarded as an ideal means ―to preclude the Bundeswehr's 
isolation from society, to ensure the congruence of military and societal values, and to 
guard against the emergence of the military as state within the state.‖95  
2. Primacy of Democratic Political Control 
The most important constitutional and legal prerequisite for embedding the 
Bundeswehr in the democratic state and society was the so-called Wehrverfassung.96 This 
adjustment of the constitution in 1956 set forth the main pillars that legitimized the West 
German armed forces and established the outlines of an all-embracing civilian control of 
the Bundeswehr.97 As a consequence, the Bonn Republic renounced the historically 
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charged notion of supreme command vested in the head of state.98 Rather, Article 65a 
stressed that the power of peacetime national military command and authority is wielded 
by the Federal Minister of Defense.99 Article 87a of the Basic Law posited the essentially 
defensive nature of the West German armed forces and the primacy of democratic 
political control in the form of parliamentary scrutiny.100 The Bundestag (parliament) not 
only had the right to approve the annual defense budget, but also the structure and the 
manning level of the Bundeswehr.101 Additionally, the unique office of the 
Wehrbeauftragter (Parliamentary Commissioner of the Armed Forces) was created with 
the dual purpose of enhancing parliamentary supervision and allowing the soldiers of the 
Bundeswehr to voice their complaints and grievances directly and outside the military 
chain of command.102 
This central principle of democratic control of the armed forces was not only 
enshrined in the Basic Law, but it was also reflected in the organizational structures 
within the BMVg itself. The position of the Federal Minister of Defense combined the 
functions of commanding the armed forces in peacetime and heading the defense 
administration.103 Based on the Ressortprinzip (departmental principle), the Minister of 
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Defense has the right to run his portfolio more or less independently.104 In exercising his 
administrative and command authorities he was supported by civilian Staatssekretäre 
(State Secretaries/ Undersecretaries of Defense—either from parliament or the career 
civil service) and different military and civilian divisions within the Ministry. The latter 
took ministerial decisions for the Bundeswehr as a whole and planned and directed the 
activities of the defense administration for the armed forces; the former executed the 
functions of a supreme headquarters for all Bundeswehr soldiers.105 
It is important to note in this context that, despite its complex structures at the 
ministerial level, the Cold War Bundeswehr had no capacities to plan and conduct 
autonomous military missions outside of alliance command echelons. Because of the 
unease among the allied powers about West Germany’s military potential, Bonn had to 
abdicate national command and control over most of its standing forces save for the 
―territorial army‖ that existed from the 1960s until the 1990s.106 There was consensus 
between the allies and West German politicians that there would be no old-fashioned 
Generalstab (general staff) in the Bundeswehr.107 As a consequence, the highest ranking 
military officer in the Bundeswehr, the Generalinspekteur (chief of staff, Bundeswehr), 
only had limited powers of leadership and command.108  This four-star general acted as 
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the senior military advisor to the Defense Minister as well as to the Chancellor, and was 
responsible for exercising oversight for the development and implementation of force 
planning in the Bundeswehr.109 However, he was not included in the official chain of 
command between the Minister and the armed forces. Rather, the three services enjoyed a 
relatively high degree of independence. The chiefs of staff of the army, the air force, and 
the navy were the highest representatives of their respective service. With regard to their 
responsibility of assuring the operational readiness of their services, they were 
immediately subordinate to the Federal Minister of Defense, without any intermediate 
authority in between.110  
These arrangements arguably represented a leitmotif of checks and balances, 
based on the perceived failures of the past. In this connection, they served political, if not 
always practical, ends. By focusing on civil control and the dispersion of decision-
making power within the BMVg, West Germany acquiesced into a defense ministry that 
may have worked well in the parameters of the Cold War, but whose checks and balances 
became problematic in the past twenty years. The limited powers of the 
Generalinspekteur, along with the autonomy of the three services, brought along 
incoherent planning and decision-making processes, a diffusion of responsibilities, and 
consistent disputes over scarce resources.111 
3. The Forward Defense of German and Alliance Territory 
During the Cold War, the North Atlantic Alliance was the linchpin of the Federal 
Republic’s security and defense policy.112 The foundation of the Bundeswehr in 1955 
was seen as establishing the main pillar of NATO defense of Central Europe. During the 
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Federation may by a law transfer sovereign powers to international organizations.‖ 
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following years the Bundeswehr gradually underwent a major force build-up. Figure 2 
shows that within only a decade its peacetime strength went up to more than 450,000 
troops in 1966. In the late 1980s, the Bundeswehr's strength stabilized at roughly 480,000 
troops. This high manning level could only be accomplished and sustained by a 












Figure 2. Peacetime Strength of the Bundeswehr During the Cold War114 
With a total of 334,000 soldiers, the German Army accounted for the bulk of 
these Bundeswehr forces.115 As it supplied almost half of all ready land forces, it was the 
backbone of NATO defense at the eastern flank and consisted of the Army Field Forces 
and the Territorial Army.116 The Army Field Forces comprised a total of twelve divisions 
                                                 
113 In wartime this figure would have been increased to a total of 1.34 million soldiers through 
mobilization efforts, which made the Bundeswehr the largest governmental organization of West Germany.  
114 Source: Varwick, Bundeswehr, 247. 
115 Wilfried von Bredow. ―The Defense of National Territory: the German Experience‖, in Defense 
Transformation in Europe: Evolving Military Roles, eds. Timothy Edmunds and Marjan Malešič 
(Amsterdam: IOS Press 2005), 29. 
116 Joseph E. Nation, West German Military Modernization Goals, Resources, and Conventional Arms 
Control, (Santa Monica: RAND 1991), 5. The Territorial Army was to stay outside the Alliance’s 
command structure and included three Territorial Commands with twelve home defense brigades. The 
Territorial Army’s mission was to protect vital installations in the rear, to maintain freedom of action of all 
forces on German territory, and to support NATO forces in West Germany. Federal Ministry of Defense. 
White Paper 1985 - The Situation and Development of the Federal Armed Forces, (Bonn 1985), 186. 
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with thirty-six combat ready brigades.117 These units were subordinate to three 

































Figure 3. Army Structure 4 (ca. 1980–1992)118 
As the main task of the Bundeswehr was to deter or to defeat any Soviet 
aggression, it relied heavily on a core of armored and mechanized army units. These 
forces were supposed to conduct combined arms operations, including air support, in 
order to counter advancing Warsaw Pact troops on German soil. Therefore, the whole 
Cold War arsenal of the Bundeswehr was based on equipment that was specialized for 
                                                 
117 Despite several consecutive structural reforms within the army, this figure remained unchanged 
throughout the Cold War. In the event of war the Army Field Forces would have defended in four corps 
sectors approximately half of the frontage between the Baltic Sea and the Alps and would also have 
contributed to NATO’s nuclear force posture. Federal Ministry of Defense, White Paper 1985, 186. 
118 Official website of the German army, http://www.deutschesheer.de/portal/a/heer (accessed October 
30, 2010). 
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operational and tactical use in Central Europe.119 This focus on one single threat, namely 
conventional Warsaw Pact troops, came at the expense of capabilities to deploy over 
great distances and to operate remotely. The Bundeswehr, unlike other major Western 
allies, had no strategic capabilities or weapon systems120 during this era. Other than using 
training installations or providing humanitarian aid, military missions abroad were 
unthinkable at that time; the term ―power projection‖ was non-existent in West 
Germany’s military or political language. 
In this NATO-centric world, organizational and structural adjustments or changes 
in capabilities, doctrine, and training of the Bundeswehr mainly followed alterations in 
the overall strategic approaches of the Alliance.121 Another aspect of this NATO-
dependency was the issue of command and control. For example, the West German army 
had not established any form of central or joint command above the corps level because 
the three German corps commanders would have implemented their NATO defense plans 
under the respective army group headquarters of the Alliance: NORTHAG in 
Mönchengladbach and CENTAG in Heidelberg.122 The combat forces of the navy and 
the air force were NATO-assigned as well. 
Thus, the Cold War structure of the Bundeswehr ensured a certain degree of 
international control over the FRG’s military potential through NATO and the allied 
                                                 
119 In the 1980s, the German army comprised a total of 2,700 main battle tanks, 1,800 infantry 
fighting vehicles, 600 self-propelled howitzers, and a multitude of anti-tank missile systems, anti-aircraft 
artillery, and rotorcraft combat aviation; the German air force could employ fighter and reconnaissance 
aircraft, fighter bombers, SAM batteries and tactical air transport capabilities. The German navy consisted 
of small vessels such as frigates, fast patrol boats, and submarines, which were optimized for naval 
operations in the Baltic Sea and in the North Sea. 
120 Such as aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships, strategic bombers, cruise missiles, air-to-air 
refueling- and strategic airlift capabilities or satellites etc. 
121 For example, NATO's shift toward the strategy of flexible response at the end of the 1960s caused 
changes in the structure, readiness, and equipment of the army. This notion of NATO as a driving force for 
change is not intended, however, to neglect or underestimate the importance of other reforms at the time. 
Defense Minister Helmut Schmidt, for example, implemented profound reforms in the early 1970s in order 
to remove existing deficiencies with regard to the efficiency of structures and procedures as well as the 
training, education, and mindset of the soldiers. For a discussion of these reforms, see Bald, Die 
Bundeswehr—Eine kritische Geschichte 1955-2005, 70–98. 
122 Young, Post-unification German military organization, 336. 
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forces stationed along the German-German border.123 Organizational aspects and 
capabilities also mirrored contemporary West German views on security policy: the use 
of force only as a last resort, namely in an act of self defense, and the general rejection of 
any form of military intervention; being regarded as a reliable member of the Alliance by 
making a credible contribution to the overall NATO defense posture, and deterrence as a 
multilateral way of achieving political goals. 
 
Figure 4. NATO's ―Layer Cake Defense‖ of the FRG (ca. 1985)124 
D. CONCLUSION 
In 1945, it was far from self-evident that the western remnant of Germany would 
eventually emerge as a democratic state with substantial military power only a decade 
later. The Cold War set the stage for a new international order in which the western allies 
embraced their former enemies. Bonn used this opportunity and committed itself to the 
West—politically, economically, and militarily. These efforts helped to establish a 
                                                 
123 Detlef Bald, Das Paradigma der Sicherheitspolitik in Deutschland – Die Rechte der vier Mächte, 
SOWI-Arbeitspapier No. 36, (Munich: 1990), 6. 
124 Source: http://www.crp-infotec.de/05sipo/kalterkrieg/grafs/vorneverteidigung.gif (accessed 
September 4, 2010). 
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perception of the Federal Republic as a reliable partner, as well as overcoming national 
shame, international marginalization, and initial reservations of its neighbors. This good 
reputation served Bonn well over time because it could eventually begin to pursue its 
own political goals and interests through the multilateral channels and forums provided 
by NATO, the European Community, and other institutions. 
Against this background, some observers might argue that West Germany’s 
military contribution to the Alliance was just a means to an end—some sort of 
―admission fee‖ to an influential club of western democracies and organizations. 
Therefore, sacrificing sovereignty over its armed forces was acceptable for Bonn because 
it regained political influence in return. But on the other hand, the Federal Republic was 
not able to pursue an autonomous security and defense policy. Rather, NATO was the 
basic framework for all its security issues and concerns. By relying on NATO staffs, 
command arrangements, and resources, West Germany had no capacity for taking any 
unilateral military action. As a consequence, the Bundeswehr did not provide the FRG 
with a classical ―hard power‖ instrument during this period.  
Rather, the character of the Bundeswehr represented a compromise between the 
two competing elements of West German strategic culture. Embedding the young Federal 
Republic in western security institutions required that the Germans accept responsibility 
in international affairs. Rearmament was thus an expression of ―never again alone,‖ and 
the Bundeswehr emerged as an instrument to demonstrate Bonn’s willingness and 
solidarity.125 At the same time, however, the foundation of the Bundeswehr also had to 
take into account the deep-rooted public skepticism about the armed forces and military 
service. In order to tame these domestic concerns of ―never again war,‖ both the new 
organization and its soldiers had to be fully integrated into the democratic constitutional 
and social framework through conscription and a dense web of supervisory mechanisms 
and legal norms.  
                                                 
125 West Germany’s Cold War defense expenditures prove that it was serious about its share of the 
defense burden; the defense budget constantly remained at a level of above a 3.0 percent share of its GNP 
between 1956 and 1989. Wallace J. Thies, Friendly Rivals. Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO 
(Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 2003), 197–203. 
 37 
All in all, West Germany took a cautious approach of establishing its armed 
forces after the Second World War. In order to account for its NATO allies’ historical 
experiences with German militarism, the Bonn Republic always emphasized the purely 
defensive nature of the Bundeswehr. Additionally, West German governments insisted on 
a restrictive interpretation of the Basic Law with regard to Bundeswehr missions abroad. 
As a consequence, the Alliance’s territory was designated as the only area of Bundeswehr 
operations.126 During the Cold War, this precept of the boundaries for the use of West 
German military force was repeatedly used to justify the refusal to send Bundeswehr 
troops into ―out-of-area‖ missions during the Cold War. This self-restriction was 
countenanced, even broadly accepted, by the FRG’s western allies. 
In this context, the Bundeswehr could be seen as a purely territorial defense force 
that was legally limited to and technically optimized for the potential battlefields of 
Central Europe and was kept under close control of NATO. This perception was 
reinvigorated by the very nature of the security environment of the Cold War. Most 
contemporaries were aware that any Soviet surprise attack on Alliance territory would 
have been doomed to failure because of the nuclear deterrent and the policy of mutual 
assured destruction. Thus, a military apocalypse was rather unlikely at the time and the 
soldiers of the Bundeswehr savored their life in a relatively stable niche in the shadow of 
the two towering military blocs.  
While the Bundeswehr conducted exercises in which it repelled fictitious Soviet 
invasions through the Fulda Gap, some of its closest western allies repeatedly fought 
proxy wars and intervened militarily in former colonies. For four decades the Bonn 
Republic was exempt from this form of realpolitik and never seriously called on to 
unleash its military might outside the static realm of the Alliance. 
                                                 
126 Peter E. Quint, Imperfect Union: Constitutional Structures of German Unification, (Ewing: 
Princeton University Press 1997), 290. 
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III. THE SEARCH FOR A NEW ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL 
AFFAIRS, 1990–1998 
The perfect balance of German defense and security collapsed with the 
unforeseen fall of the ―iron curtain‖ in 1989. The end of the bipolar world order marked a 
real caesura for Germany. With its unification in October 1990, the country achieved 
perhaps its most important foreign policy goal. On the one hand, this historical moment 
heralded the reclamation of full sovereignty and a significant increase in national power. 
But, on the other hand, the end of the Cold War also left the largest Western European 
military force, the Bundeswehr, without a plausible adversary, because both the Warsaw 
Pact and the Soviet Union were disintegrating. This turn of events also meant the end of 
the East German Nationale Volksarmee [NVA] (National People's Army). For a moment, 
as the last decade of the twentieth century dawned, the sudden end to the existential threat 
of the end-all Cold War nuclear showdown suggested that perhaps some kind of post-
security age might follow.  
But instead of ―the end of history‖ and a millennium of ―perpetual peace,‖ the 
aftermath of the Cold War brought a series of unanticipated security threats for which 
neither the previous era’s defense institutions, nor the pacifist optimism of 1989–1990, 
equipped Germany or its allies. To be sure, these threats did not present themselves 
immediately or with the clarity that they seem to have twenty years later.127 The Iraqi 
aggression against Kuwait in 1990 and the break-up of the former Yugoslavia in 1991 
were precursors of a rapidly changing international order in which new regional conflicts 
were starting to proliferate. Both the North Atlantic Alliance and Europe had to adapt 
their strategies and policies to these fast-paced changes in the international system. 
Eventually, multilateral crisis management and conflict prevention—even with military 
means—emerged as the proper answer.  
Germany, however, had difficulties with effectively contributing to this broad 
approach because its Cold War strategic culture prevented the country from acting along 
                                                 
127 This phrase relates to Fukuyama's widely recognized article about the triumph of Western 
liberalism: Francis Fukuyama, ―The end of history?‖ The National Interest, No. 16 (summer 1989).  
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the same lines as its western partners. It took several years until a political consensus 
obtained on the elite level regarding issues of security and defense and Germany pursued 
a more active policy in international affairs. This initial ambivalence and reticence was 
reflected in slow and incoherent changes in the role, mission, and structure of the German 
armed forces in the 1990s. The Bundeswehr remained a classical defense force that relied 
on large numbers of conscripts and tactical capabilities that left it ill-prepared to 
participate in multinational out-of-area missions.  
The German military was also affected by other domestic political and economic 
issues, most notably the consequences of unification. The defense budget and other areas 
of public spending were reduced substantially in favor of the overwhelming domestic 
need to rebuild the five new states of the ex-GDR. Additionally, the Bundeswehr had to 
incorporate or decommission the personnel and materiel of the NVA.  
In all, growing external political pressure, as well as domestic constraints, 
prevented Germany from pursuing a more coherent security and defense policy during 
the later tenures of Chancellor Helmut Kohl. 
A. THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
The Alliance’s London declaration of July 1990 reflected the fundamental change 
that was about to take place—NATO not only offered the Warsaw Pact states peaceful 
cooperation, but also moved away from forward defense.128 With the Soviet military 
arsenal no longer poised at its borders, Germany found itself with an unprecedented 
degree of external security.129 
However, the international context also put Germany under growing pressure to 
assume greater responsibility and to contribute to the promotion of peace and stability in 
this newly re-ordered world to an extent that corresponded with its substantial increases 
                                                 
128 Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, 101. 
129 The Soviet decline and Germany’s unification in 1990 caused a redistribution of power in Europe. 
With a population of more than 80 million, substantial territorial gains, and its economic resources, unified 
Germany emerged as the major actor in central Europe. As a consequence, fears of Germany aggressively 
seeking economic and military dominance over Europe occurred among its neighbors after 1990. 
Abenheim, Soldiers and Politics Transformed, 18. 
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in national resources and power because of unification.130 International organizations 
such as the United Nations, now free of the almost perpetual stalemate in the Security 
Council, were beginning to ask Germany to make contributions to multilateral efforts of 
peacekeeping and peacemaking. 
From a NATO perspective, the Gulf War and the disintegration of the former 
Yugoslavia illustrated the continuing importance of the Alliance for the security of its 
members as well as the necessity to adapt the organization to these new challenges.131 
―Crisis management,‖ in the form of NATO intervention beyond its territorial borders, 
gradually became a new focal point of Alliance activities.132 The new NATO Strategic 
Concept of November 1991 pointed out that ―the risks to Allied security that remain are 
multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict and 
assess.‖133 Therefore, it called for the development of ―appropriate crisis management 
measures as required from a range of political and other measures, including those in the 
military field,‖134 in addition to its traditional role of collective defense. 
At the same time, the European Allies aspired to a more independent role in 
security and defense. The Rome declaration of 1991 underlined that NATO as a whole 
favored this development of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within the 
Alliance framework.135 ―It was hoped that the ESDI would enhance Europe's capacity to 
take political and military action, reduce its dependency on the United States, and 
establish a more balanced structure within the alliance.‖136  
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The notion of a European pillar within NATO reflected developments in the 
European Union. The Maastricht Treaty of 1991 established a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP), which was based on intergovernmental decision-making. 
Transforming the WEU into the defense arm of the EU was intended to give the Union a 
key role in the future European security order. The Petersberg Declaration of 1992 stated 
that the WEU would conduct a full range of crisis response tasks, including humanitarian 
aid and rescue missions, peacekeeping tasks, and employing combat forces to 
peacemaking tasks.137 Against this background, Germany and France also proposed the 
Eurokorps, a multinational corps-sized military unit capable of conducting these WEU 
missions from the basis of the Franco-German brigade.138 In an attempt to promote trans-
Atlantic burden-sharing and to further enhance the limited European military capabilities 
by ensuring access to NATO assets and capabilities for European military missions, the 
United States proposed a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept in NATO in late 
1993.139  
B. THE DOMESTIC CONTEXT 
These expectations from Germany’s allies put the foundations of post-war 
German strategic culture to the test. Domestic political disputes ignited over the future 
role of the German armed forces in international security affairs. Because the opposition 
was unable to come to terms with the strategic choices of the Kohl government, any form 
of consensus over this question could only be reached after a decision of the German 
Constitutional Court. 140 At the same time, however, Germany was trying to cope with 
the burdens of economic and social integration of the western and eastern parts of the 
country. Security issues were generally low on the national agenda after unification, and 
                                                 
137 Western European Union Council of Ministers, ―Petersberg Declaration,‖ June 19, 1992; available 
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138 Meiers, A Change of Course? German Foreign and Security Policy after Unification, 201. 
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Culture Revisited, 73. 
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the Primat der Innenpolitik (primacy of internal affairs) limited the options for change in 
German security and defense policy.141 The German perception of being ―encircled by 
friends and allies‖ reinvigorated these trends.142  
1. Adjusting to the ―Real World‖ 
Even while Germany was still engaged in bringing together the two different 
social, economic, and military systems of its former Western and Eastern sides, the 
realities of the post-Cold War world challenged German pacifism at shocking speed. The 
Gulf War was particularly disturbing because it forced Germany to state, in detail, how it 
would define its role in such a conflict.143 Early U.S. inquiries about whether Germany 
would be ready to send troops to the Gulf put the Kohl administration under severe 
political pressure.144 The Bundeswehr’s active participation in the international coalition 
against Iraq was regarded as a form of repaying moral and political debts to the United 
States and other allies for strongly supporting German unification.145  
However, the German chancellor faced a series of obstacles to an active military 
involvement. First, when Saddam Hussein’s troops invaded Kuwait in the summer of 
1990, German decision-makers were still preoccupied with negotiating the Treaty on the 
Final Settlement with Respect to Germany (2+4 Treaty).146 They concluded that at this 
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point the completion of the delicate political task of unification should have precedence 
over discussions about new Bundeswehr missions.147 Foreign Minister Genscher also 
referred to alleged constitutional constraints (Article 87a) and claimed that the 
participation of German troops in UN peacekeeping missions outside NATO territory 
would require an amendment to the Basic Law.148 With an election pending and the 
public overwhelmingly disinclined to imagine such an engagement of German troops,149 
the Kohl administration officially adopted the Genscher view that the Basic Law 
prevented German combat troops from participating in the anti-Hussein coalition.150 
Similarly, Kohl sought broad support for his policy; and he was willing to follow a path 
which could satisfy diverging internal and external pressure groups. While continuing to 
reject the use of military force, he wanted to prove that Germany would at least do 
something to fulfill its role as a reliable NATO member.151 The result was a compromise: 
Germany’s contribution to the international coalition mainly entailed financial aid, its 
―checkbook diplomacy,‖152 and massive logistical support for the coalition’s war effort. 
Additionally, and more significantly in terms of a departure from traditional patterns of 
abstaining from ―out-of-area‖ missions, Germany agreed to further Bundeswehr 
deployments. Thus, German political elites realized the need to find a middle ground 
between strictly pacifist and excessively militarist attitudes toward the use of force.153 
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In this context of domestic divisions over the meaning of security after the Cold 
War and Germany’s responsibilities in the international community, the UN mission to 
Cambodia in 1992 provided Germany with an opportunity to account for growing 
external obligations and internal reluctance.154 This mission had two advantages. First, it 
was a good starting point for further Bundeswehr out-of-area missions, because this 
Asian country did not present Germany with any ―historical burdens‖ or conflicting 
interests. Second, the mission was limited to the provision of medical and humanitarian 
aid, which was expected to win international public favor and to appease the opposition 
in the Bundestag.155  
The violent break-up of the former Yugoslavia in 1991–1992 was the next step 
toward incremental change in German strategic culture. While the Kohl government had 
been widely criticized for its reluctance to employ military forces before and during 
Desert Storm, it was now accused of unilateralism because of its early recognition of 
Slovenia and Croatia.156 On the domestic level, the pressure on the political leadership 
increased because the public was concerned about waves of refugees from the war 
zone.157 Above all, the fruitless series of European diplomatic activities and unsuccessful 
cease-fires as well as the scale of the atrocities cast doubt on Genscher’s consensus policy 
of ―responsibility.‖158 Even pacifists gradually realized that by insisting on the ―never 
again war‖ principle, Germany risked being ―singularized‖ vis-à-vis more assertive 
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European partners like Britain or France.159 This uneasiness was reinforced by lessons of 
the past: despite the disreputable role of the Wehrmacht in the Balkans during World 
War II, images of Serbian concentration camps triggered a moral debate that touched a 
historic nerve.160  
Under which circumstances could the Bundeswehr be used outside German 
borders and what constitutional instruments were needed? These questions resulted in a 
new consensus within the ruling coalition. Because an attempt to achieve a clarifying 
amendment to the Basic Law had been stalled due to overly restrictive demands by the 
opposition and a lack of public support, the CDU/CSU-FDP government initiated a 
process of gradually expanding the type and number of Bundeswehr out-of-area 
missions.161  
Against this backdrop, Germany’s decision to support UNOSOM II162 with 
ground troops heralded a new dimension of Bundeswehr out-of-area missions.163 The 
Kohl government repeatedly emphasized the purely humanitarian nature of the mission 
and insisted on a deployment to an untroubled part of Somalia in order to minimize the 
risk of clashes between German troops and militant elements of the local population. 
Nonetheless, members of the opposition became enraged about this alleged 
―militarization‖ of German foreign policy and filed a formal complaint with the German 
Constitutional Court in June 1993 in order to prevent the deployment.164 
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The subsequent leading decision of the Court can be regarded as one of the 
turning points that paved the way for a continuous German participation in international 
military missions. With a final decision on July 12, 1994:  
the Court ruled that the deployment of German troops in military 
operations outside of NATO area was constitutional, provided they formed 
part of a multilateral operation designed to uphold international peace and 
security, carried out by an organization of collective security such as 
NATO, WEU, or the UN.165  
Furthermore, each individual deployment required approval by a simple majority of the 
Bundestag. This groundbreaking decision was of utmost importance because it realigned 
the framework of German political and strategic culture. On the one hand, it promoted 
consensus building on the elite level and silenced moderate critics. On the other hand, it 
emphasized the central role of the Bundestag in questions of the use of force.166  
However, the ruling did not end Germany’s restrained style of security policy or bring 
about an irreversible change to established perspectives on the use of force.167 
When the situation in Bosnia deteriorated and international attempts to solve the 
crisis gained momentum, Germany was again called on to contribute to these efforts with 
military means. Despite the favorable Constitutional Court decision, the debates in the 
Bundestag continued, but illustrated that the rift between the government and the 
opposition had shifted to a clash between moderate and strictly pacifist politicians within 
the opposition.168 In this context, the mass killing of Bosnian Muslim civilians in the 
UN-controlled area around Srebrenica in mid-1995 marked a real turning point for 
numerous German pacifists.169 
                                                 
165 Dalgaard-Nielsen, Germany, Pacifism and Peace Enforcement, 62. 
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primacy of (parliamentary) political control over the Bundeswehr. 
167 Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, 65. 
168 Von Neubeck, Die Transformation der Bundeswehr von der Verteidigungs- zur Einsatzarmee, 227. 
169 They realized that the ―never again war‖ principle must not prevent intervention in cases of 
extreme human rights abuses and continuous aggression against ethnic minorities. Thus, ―converted 
pacifists‖ later became strong advocates of a ―never again genocide‖ stance. Dalgaard-Nielsen, Germany, 
Pacifism and Peace Enforcement, 46. 
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As a consequence, more than 80 percent of all Bundestag members approved the 
decision to deploy Bundeswehr troops to Croatia in order to support NATO’s IFOR 
mission in Bosnia in December 1995.170 NATO’s follow-on operation—the Stabilization 
Force (SFOR)—received a similar approval and underlined Germany’s new willingness 
to actively support multilateral peace-keeping operations which were based on a UN 
Security Council mandate. This evolution of strategic culture had repercussions for the 
German armed forces: The Bundeswehr was forced to adapt its structures, doctrine, and 
equipment to these new missions. 
2. The Impact of Unification and the Role of Key Actors 
At the same time, the staggering and ongoing costs of unification proved to be a 
substantial drain on national resources.171 The Kohl government underestimated the 
magnitude of the economic backlog caused by forty years of ―real-existing socialism‖ in 
Germany's five new Länder (states). Financial transfers to these parts of Germany added 
up to an annual average of DM 137 billion throughout the 1990s.172 This dismal state of 
affairs constantly led to calls for tax increases as well as reductions in public spending.  
In the absence of an immediate threat, the defense budget did not remain 
untouched by these cuts, with serious consequences for the Bundeswehr. The defense 
expenditure as a share of Germany's GDP fell from more than 3 percent to 2.2 percent 
                                                 
170 Germany committed a total of 4,000 troops to NATO’s first out-of-area ground force mission. A 
contingent of 2,700 ground troops was deployed to Croatia with a robust mandate. Dalagaard-Nielsen, 
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modest in comparison with some other allies, it was an important deployment: German elites had finally 
overcome their reservations about sending German troops into an area which had suffered badly under 
German occupation during the Second World War.  
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2+4 Treaty, Germany had agreed to finance the redeployment of the Western Group of Soviet forces in 
East Germany; these costs added up to a total of DM 15 billion. Wolfgang F. Schlör, German Security 
Policy. An examination of the trends in German security policy in a new European and global context, 
Adelphi Paper 277 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993), 92. Germany’s 
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172 Michael Münter and Roland Sturm, ―Economic Consequences of German Unification,‖ in The 
Berlin Republic: German Unification and a Decade of Changes, eds. Winand Gellner and John D. 
Robertson (Portland: Frank Cass & Co., 2003), 182. 
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between 1989 and 1994, and then dropped further to 1.6 percent between 1995 and 
1999.173 The BMVg often was forced to compensate for the reductions by taking money 
out of investment because personnel costs were largely fixed in the short term.174 These 
―emergency measures‖ sometimes even affected the procurement of equipment that was 
assigned for out-of-area operations.175 Dwindling resources also negatively affected the 
operational readiness of Bundeswehr units.176 In response, Defense Minister Volker 
Rühe attempted to free resources by closing several military installations. However, to 
the extent that garrisons meant purchasing power and employment for local workers, 
especially in remote, economically underdeveloped regions of Germany, any such base-
closing scheme was likely to spur stiff resistance by Länder governments and their 
electorates. In fact, Rühe's plans faced so much opposition by the SPD and local 
authorities that the initial proposal had to be withdrawn.177 Even members of his own 
cabinet (e.g., Finance Minister Theo Waigel) did not support shutting down a large 
number of bases.  
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Figure 5. German Defense Expenditure 1990–1997178 
The period from 1990 to 1998 also illustrates why some observers have called 
Germany a Kanzlerdemokratie (Chancellor Democracy), ―that is a democratic system 
rotating around the institution of the Chancellor who occupies center stage with the 
Foreign Minister and other important secretaries and their officials in supporting 
roles.‖179 Chancellor Kohl, who had played a crucial and assertive leadership role in the 
process of unification, often dominated German foreign and security policy issues with 
direct ramifications for the Bundeswehr at the time. For example, the 2+4 Treaty required 
the Bundeswehr to reduce its peacetime strength to 370,000 troops by 1994. However, 
this figure was not the result of deliberate and long-term strategic planning. Rather, it was 
the political concession that Chancellor Kohl had made to achieve General Secretary 
Gorbachev's consent for a NATO membership of reunified Germany during a bilateral 
meeting of the two leaders in the Caucasus in July 1990.180  
Kohl sometimes even made final decisions concerning issues of security and 
defense without prior consultations with his Defense Minister. For example, the decision 
                                                 
178 Source: Dirk Koob, Deutsche Militärpolitik in den neunziger Jahren. Wie (selbst-)organisiert ist 
die Bundeswehr? (Marburg: Tectum Verlag, 1999), 60. 
179 Haftendorn, Coming of Age, 5. 
180 Karl Kaiser, ―Germany's Unification,‖ Foreign Affairs, No. 1 (1990/1991), 198. This troop ceiling 
only later became the subject of the 2+4 negotiations as well as the CFE talks. 
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to send German troops to Iraq in 1991 in order to provide humanitarian aid in the 
aftermath of operation Desert Storm, as well as his agreement with the French President 
Mitterand to establish the multinational Eurokorps, were not initiated by the BMVg.181 
These episodes show that developments on the international scene were not the only 
driving forces for the politics of German defense and security at the time. 
C. THE BUNDESWEHR AFTER 1989: UNCERTAINTY AND THE 
BURDENS OF THE PAST 
The sequence and complexity of crises and risks that emerged after 1989 did not 
allow for any intermission in security and defense issues. The Bundeswehr could not 
provide the imaginary ―peace dividend‖ that the German public longed for. Instead of 
being able to take the initiative and to formulate a long-term strategic policy that would 
meet the new challenges, the Bundeswehr could only react to growing external and 
internal pressures.  
1. The Incorporation of the East German National People’s Army 
On October 3, 1990, West and East Germany were officially unified. One day 
prior to unification, the Nationale Volksarmee ceased to exist. The Bundeswehr 
subsequently assumed command over all remnants of the military forces of the former 
GDR.182 Some 90,000 East German servicemen were still on active duty at the time.183 
Despite some initial West German proposals for the instantaneous dismissal of all NVA 
soldiers, the BMVg decided to abolish the NVA as a whole, but to retain parts of its 
personnel so as to organize an orderly disbandment and to establish new structures.184 
Thus, starting in August 1990 substantial manpower, planning, and financial resources of 
the Bundeswehr were directed to plan and execute this complex task. 
                                                 
181 Wolfgang F. Schlör, German Security Policy, 18. 
182 In 1989 the authorized strength of the NVA was 175,000. 
183 Of the 90,000 soldiers, 50,000 were regulars; 11,000 of these were later selected for employment 
in the Bundeswehr. Additionally, 48,000 civilian employees were still on the pay roll. Federal Ministry of 
Defense, White Paper on the Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Situation and Future of 
the Bundeswehr 1994 (Bonn, 1994), 15. 
184 Abenheim,  Soldiers and Politics Transformed, 21. 
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The obligations of the 2+4 Treaty—namely the condition not to station any 
NATO troops in the new Länder until 1994—forced the Bundeswehr to meet these 
challenges on its own. For the first time in its history the Bundeswehr established a joint 
command, the Bundeswehrkommando Ost (Bundeswehr Eastern Command) in 
Strausberg on the eastern periphery of Berlin. Immediately, its staff had to incorporate 
the remnants of the NVA, incrementally decommission its units as well as dismiss most 
of the personnel, exercise control over the eastern part of German territory, and closely 
cooperate with the Western Group of the Red Army in order to ensure a safe and orderly 
withdrawal of these Soviet troops.185 
The Bundeswehr became responsible for a total of 2,300 military installations in 
East Germany. Most of these facilities were in a poor state of repair and had to be 
renovated or sold. Additionally, the Bundeswehr had to take over extensive materiel from 
the holdings of the former NVA, most of which in turn had to be scrapped.186 This 
materiel had to be concentrated at central sites, securely guarded, and prepared for a 
handover to international allies or destruction. The costs for the demolition and disposal 
of hazardous or out-dated NVA materiel alone added up to DM 1.4 billion.187 As late as 
1994, more than ten percent of Germany’s defense expenditure was still consumed by 
such unification-related costs.188 As a consequence, the acceptance of the NVA’s 
―inheritance‖ under the terms of the 2+4 Treaty was probably ―the most extraordinary 
phase since [the Bundeswehr’s] foundation in the 1950s.‖189 
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2. Strategies for the New Environment 
As early as July 1990, an expert commission was established by the BMVg to 
develop proposals for the future role and tasks of the Bundeswehr, the first of many in the 
years to come.190 In 1991, the commission’s final report concluded that German security 
would continue to be influenced by the degree of stability in the former Soviet Union. As 
a result, territorial defense would remain the core function of the Bundeswehr.191 
However, the report also stated that peacekeeping and peacemaking missions under the 
auspices of the UN should become part of the Bundeswehr’s tasks.192 
The BMVg developed its own conceptual framework at the end of 1991.193 
Subsequently, this strategic proposal became a basis for the new Verteidigungspolitische 
Richtlinien [VPR] (Defense Policy Guidelines), which were published by Defense 
Minister Rühe in November 1992—but not in the form of the Weissbuch (Defense White 
Paper) as had happened in 1985.194 By pointing to emerging regional conflicts on the 
European periphery, the VPR stressed the need to redefine the European role and 
strategic horizon of unified Germany. The use of military capabilities not only comprised 
territorial defense but also an active prevention and, if necessary, termination of crises 
and conflicts in Europe.195  
However, being the product of only one ministry, the VPR lacked broader 
political support. Thus, the Kohl government only published its first post-Cold War 
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White Paper in April 1994, nine years after the last such document and in a different, 
more corporate look form than the White Papers of the era 1969–1985. Direct attacks 
against Germany or other NATO members were seen as unlikely, but continued to pose 
the most risk to German security—above all, because future developments in the former 
Soviet Union remained unpredictable.196 Such an official assessment illustrates that it 
was a difficult and long-term process for contemporary military and political elites to 
abandon their traditional patterns of security thinking, with its emphasis on classic 
interstate warfare. Consequently, the 1994 White Paper echoed the main findings of the 
1991 BMVg commission and continued to identify territorial defense as the primary task 
of the Bundeswehr. At the same time, however, the Bundeswehr was supposed to 
contribute to crisis management within the Alliance framework, the Petersberg tasks of 
the WEU, or under the Charter of the UN.197  
The ambiguity of these three different documents (commission report, VPR, and 
White Paper) and their lack of strategic coherence clearly reflected all the uncertainties 
about possible security threats, as well as Germany's future role in international affairs 
that prevailed among political elites at that time. The White Paper's plans for the future 
force structure of the Bundeswehr also mirrored this indecisiveness. The German armed 
forces were to consist of standing reaction forces (RF) for crisis prevention and largely 
mobilization-dependent main defense forces (MDF).198 While these national precepts 
corresponded with strategic thinking in NATO and underlined Germany’s preference for 
effective multilateralism, they also revealed some sort of ―strategic helplessness.‖ On the 
one hand, a small part of the Bundeswehr had to be made available for out-of-area 
missions in order to manage crises where they emerged and to live up to international 
expectations. On the other hand, in the face of instability and obstacles for a democratic 
transition in the former Soviet Union, the bulk of the forces kept being organized and 
equipped for fending off Cold War-style attacks.  
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In this context of perceived security threats that might still loom in the east, it is 
unsurprising that all of these documents also called for the retention of conscription—
based on ―historico-political, security-related, social and military grounds.‖199 Thus, a 
conservative risk assessment prevented Germany from taking a more ambitious approach 
to changing existing force structures by converting the Bundeswehr into an all-volunteer 
force and making serious attempts to acquire capabilities for force projection and 
expeditionary warfare. 
3. Attempts to Restructure the Armed Forces 
The obligations of the 2+4 Treaty, international arms control agreements such as 
the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty),200 and, above all, the 
amalgamation of the Bundeswehr and the NVA, confronted the German armed forces 
with Herculean tasks during the first tenure of the Kohl government. All efforts to 
restructure the armed forces between 1990 and 1994 focused on the tight schedule for 
downsizing the post-unification Bundeswehr from 588,000 to 370,000 troops—according 
to the ceiling of the 2+4 Treaty.201 Another obstacle to military reform was the fact that 
the German army was in a transition phase to another structure that had already been 
planned in 1989.202  
At the end of 1993, repeated cuts in the defense budget forced the BMVg to 
initiate further reductions in the Bundeswehr’s strength.203 Official plans that were 
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released in July 1994 called for an overall peacetime strength of 340,000 soldiers.204 The 
new concept, which was more or less similar to NATO strategy in the 1991 Strategic 
Concept, also implemented the White Paper’s commitment to establish high-readiness 
reaction forces: a 50,000-strong body—the Krisenreaktionskräfte [KRK] (Crisis Reaction 
Forces)—consisting of professionals and long-term volunteers in the army, air force and 
navy and designed for alliance defense as well as crisis-response operations under the 
auspices of NATO, the WEU, or the UN.205 The remaining Bundeswehr troops—the 
Hauptverteidigungskräfte [HVK] (Main Defense Forces)—were intended primarily for 
national and collective defense.206 This twofold force structure resembled similar 
developments in NATO.207  
Furthermore, the German army was largely affected by a general trend toward 
multinational staffs and units that prevailed throughout the 1990s.208 It participated in 
NATO's Reaction Forces as well as in all corps in Central Europe. These units included 
not only the Eurokorps in Strasbourg, but also the I German Netherlands Corps in 
Münster, the II German-U.S. Corps in Ulm, as well as the V U.S.-German Corps in 
Heidelberg, and the Multinational Corps Northeast in Szczecin.209 On the one hand, 
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Germany's contribution to these corps illustrated its traditional preference for 
multilateralism and international cooperation as a fundamental principle of German 
security and defense. On the other hand, the trend reflected the desire by its neighbors to 
retain their own forces in areas of traditional deployment as well as to embed the German 
military potential in international structures.210 A third aspect was burden-sharing. 
Notwithstanding the problematic issues of command and control and national caveats, 
these multinational units generally facilitated a German participation in international 
military missions and enhanced NATO's or the EU's capacity to act which was an urgent 
need in the confusion of the 1990s and the impact of the peace dividend amid what in 
retrospect was growing conflict. 


























Figure 6. Multinational Corps with German Participation211 
The attempt to establish a highly deployable crisis management capacity via the 
KRK was accompanied by at least two other innovative and specialized formations which 
were without precedent in the German army's history. In 1996, the Luftmechanisierte 
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of Germany's direct neighbors participated in these corps structures. 
211 Source: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Bestandsaufnahme. Die Bundeswehr an der 
Schwelle zum 21. Jahrhundert (Bonn: May 1999), 49. 
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Brigade (Air Mechanized Brigade) for deep operations and the Kommando Spezialkräfte 
[KSK] (Special Forces Command) were established.212 Both units represented first 
attempts to improve the mobility and deployability of army forces and to meet the 
demand for a national special operations capability.213 However, the foundation of the 
KSK met with reservations and uneasiness among some German politicians. The notion 
of a covertly operating military elite unit seemed to be inconsistent with post-1945 
German antimilitarism and raised questions about parliamentary control. 
But strategic culture could not only have limiting effects on innovations in 
existing force structures as in this case, it sometimes even impeded change at all. For 
example, initial plans to establish a joint Streitkräfteführungskommando [SKFüKdo] 
(Armed Forces Operations Command), capable of commanding all German troops 
deployed abroad, leaked to the press and received a critical media echo.214 Old images of 
the resurgence of the infamous Prussian Generalstab were evoked in order to discredit 
this idea of coherent command and control structures. The allusion to past elements of 
German strategic culture was sufficient to convince the defense minister to abandon the 
SKFüKdo-option. 
4. Command and Control: From Ad-Hoc Arrangements to Permanent 
Structures 
Despite the failure to establish a Streitkräfteführungskommando, the need for a 
national operational command and control capability remained urgent. This need had 
already become clear during the Bundeswehr’s participation in the international relief 
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operations in Turkey, Iran, and Iraq in 1991.215 However, due to the political sensitivity 
of the revival of autonomous, national command organizations in Germany,216 the BMVg 
decided to rely on such interim solutions as ad hoc working groups on a case by case 
basis in the early 1990s.217 Germany’s cautious approach to out-of-area missions allowed 
for ―learning by doing‖ on a small-scale level.218 Based on these insights and 
experiences, the Bundeswehr subsequently established more capable command 
structures: Within the BMVg, the Führungszentrum der Bundeswehr [FüZBw] 
(Bundeswehr Operations Center) was created in 1995 in order to exercise command over 
several missions at the same time.219  
On the level of the forces, a Führungskommando [FüKdo] (Force Command) was 
established in 1994 in each of the three armed services.220 These Führungskommandos 
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assumed command over all active units of the army, the air force, and the navy.221 With 
regard to international missions they provided the necessary command linkage between 
the BMVg and deployed Bundeswehr contingents by adopting the role of a ―lead 
command‖ as shown in Figure 7.222 In the absence of a joint operational command, this 
solution represented the only way of implementing command structures below the 




















Figure 7. National Command Structures (ca. 1995) 223 
D. CONCLUSION 
The analysis of the period from 1990 to 1998 suggests that a plethora of factors in 
state and society affected the evolution of the Bundeswehr, as well as factors within it. 
While most German political elites finally drew the same conclusions about the emerging 
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security threats of the international system, they obviously did not always pursue a 
stringent and consistent security and defense policy to meet these challenges in the 1990s 
where the peace dividend and the needs of unification stood uppermost.  
In this case, the concept of strategic culture offers a good explanation for 
Germany’s initial reluctance to deploy its armed forces to out-of-area missions. The lack 
of consensus on the elite level about Germany’s role in international affairs, which was 
marked by the public collision of ―never again war‖ with ―never again alone,‖ could only 
be removed by the ruling of the Constitutional Court in 1994, i.e., in the middle of the 
decade as the ex-Yugoslav crisis worsened. As a result, the Kohl government took a 
cautious approach to accustom both the opposition and the German public to a growing 
number of Bundeswehr deployments in a kind of salami tactic. The continuous reference 
to the humanitarian purposes and multilateral framework of these missions illustrates that 
Germany could be rightfully be called a ―civilian power‖ at that time. Germany's 
participation in bi- and multinational military units, its preference for sending non-
combat troops into out-of-area missions, its initial reluctance to deploy to areas where the 
Wehrmacht had fought, and its adherence to conscription support this claim. 
However, strategic culture alone cannot sufficiently explain the path of the 
Bundeswehr in the 1990s. For example, the fact that it took Germany four years after the 
end of the Cold War to publish a new Defense White Paper and to initiate the first serious 
attempts to restructure the Bundeswehr can only be understood in the context of the 
imperative of reunification. All measures which had been taken before 1994 constituted 
the integration of the former NVA troops (however few) as well as a large-scale 
reduction of manpower and Cold-War materiel in the light of the provisions of 
international obligations and incorporating the former NVA into the army of unity.  
Even the decision to distinguish between Crisis Reaction Forces and Main 
Defense Forces was a political compromise rather than an optimal outcome of a thorough 
and comprehensive military reform. In the face of insufficient financial resources on the 
one hand and international expectations on the other, Germany tried to establish at least a 
credible force element for military missions abroad. However, with no record of 
expeditionary military engagements and deployments after the Second World War the 
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German armed forces had to build these capabilities from scratch with limited resources. 
Without appropriate transport-, logistic-, reconnaissance-, and command and control 
capacities even the deployment of a few hundred troops presented the Bundeswehr and 
its leadership with a real challenge at the time. 
As has been shown, domestic political causes also played a role. The Kohl 
government sometimes delayed or circumvented decisions concerning issues of security 
and defense when it feared a risk of political upheaval in times of elections. For example, 
it eschewed discussions about base closures and prestigious but expensive Cold War 
procurement programs such as the Eurofighter, which secured jobs in Bavaria and 
elsewhere in Europe. Other projects which were regarded as too offensive in nature were 
simply taken off the agenda. For instance, Minister Rühe was informed by the press that 
members of the BMVg planned to develop an innovative Mehrzweckschiff (multi-purpose 
ship), capable of supporting crisis-response operations and equipped with modern C4I 
systems. Fearing that the ship would arouse political suspicions about the Bundeswehr 
generating ―interventionist‖ power projection capabilities, he abandoned the plans.224 
Subsequently, Minister Rühe even ordered a Denkverbot (ban on thinking) within the 
BMVg because he wanted to prevent such a form of ambitious reform proposals from 
becoming stigmatized again by the media as a ―militarization of German foreign 
policy,‖225 These examples show that the Kohl cabinet was far from having embraced the 
new role of the Bundeswehr. 
The result of this unique combination of constraints and driving forces was a 
Bundeswehr that, despite some remarkable achievements with regard to out-of-area 
missions and the structure of higher headquarters, was still struggling with the legacies of 
the Cold War at the end of the Kohl chancellorship in 1998. 
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IV. MILITARY REFORMS BETWEEN 1998 AND 2002: A MISSED 
OPPORTUNITY? 
The 1998 federal elections witnessed a profound change of government in 
Germany with the advent of the ―Red-Green‖ coalition of the SPD and the Greens.226 For 
the first time in the history of contemporary Germany, security policy-makers took office 
who had not experienced the Second World War and the critical juncture of Stunde Null. 
Given the political careers and attitudes of the new ruling elite—Chancellor Gerhard 
Schröder (SPD), Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer (Greens), and Defense Minister 
Rudolf Scharping (SPD)—it was far from self-evident that this troika would follow the 
same security policy path as their predecessors.227 Indeed, both Schröder and Fischer 
even had a political record of far left, antimilitaristic agitation in the early 1970s.228 
Schröder, a former lawyer who had belonged to the radical Young Socialists in 
his younger days, had expertise in domestic, party, and German regional politics but was 
inexperienced in international affairs.229 Although he initially focused on domestic 
issues, foreign policy became a Chefsache (matter for the boss) when he recognized that 
a good international reputation proved valuable in promoting his domestic agenda.230 
Schröder’s relationship to the Bundeswehr was marked by ambivalence during his 
chancellorship. He principally regarded the German armed forces as a costly, if 
necessary, means to maintain or enhance Germany’s international influence.231  
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Fischer’s political career had started in 1982 in the party Die Grünen (The 
Greens). During his time in the political opposition, Fischer had vehemently and 
repeatedly advised against any militarization of German foreign policy and the threat of 
resurgent German nationalism after reunification.232 Even as Foreign Minister, he 
remained true to his aversion to military force as an instrument of Realpolitik in 
international relations. Instead, he preferred the notion of a ―civilian power‖ approach, 
above all, in a European context.233 
Both Schröder and Fischer subsequently became the undisputed leaders of 
German foreign and security policy in the media as well as in the international scene.234 
In contrast to these two high-profile characters, Scharping’s political star was already 
waning, although he had been a long-standing fellow party member of Schröder’s.235 He 
belonged to a group of SPD politicians who had dedicated themselves to foreign and 
security policy issues.236 As such, he already had plans for the future of the Bundeswehr 
before his appointment as Defense Minister. These plans included a 300,000-strong 
force—which should be equally able to defend German territory as well as to participate 
in crisis response operations—and compulsory service reduced to six months.237  
 
 
                                                 
232 Jeffrey Herf, ―Legacies of divided memory and the Berlin Republic,‖ in Germany at Fifty-Five; 
Berlin ist nicht Bonn?, ed. James Sperling (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 
2004), 101. 
233 Hacke, Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 449. 
234 Sometimes they did not even consult with Scharping over security policy themes. For example, 
Fischer had not informed the Defense Minister before he announced that Germany would send Bundeswehr 
medical specialists to East-Timor at the UN General Assembly in September 1999. Von Neubeck, Die 
Transformation der Bundeswehr von der Verteidigungs- zur Einsatzarmee, 324. 
235 He had run for chancellor in 1994 but lost the elections. In 1995 he had also lost his post as SPD 
party chair to Oskar Lafontaine. The latter became Finance Minister in 1998, but abruptly resigned in 1999. 
Furthermore, Scharping never had an easy access to the political circles of the chancellor’s office, because 
Schröder regarded him as one of his internal rivals. Tom Dyson, ―German Military Reform 1998-2004: 
Leadership and the Triumph of Domestic Constraint over International Opportunity,‖ European Security 14 
(2005), 366. 
236 Dyson, The Politics of German Defense and Security, 72. 
237 ―Lebendiges Museum Online,‖ official website of the Stiftung Haus der Geschichte der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, http://www.hdg.de/lemo/html/biografien/ScharpingRudolf/index.html 
(accessed November 22, 2010). 
 65 
However, different schools of thought within his own party, which even included 
proposals for an all-volunteer force, prevented the SPD from taking a unified position on 
security and defense matters.238  
Because the SPD leadership sought to avoid any divisive discussions about this 
topic in the wake of the 1998 elections, the party conceived of a Wehrstrukturkommission 
(force structure commission) to address the issue through an expert-level forum after an 
election victory. Yet, even before this commission could commence developing proposals 
for the future role and structure of the Bundeswehr, the attention of Germany’s top 
security policy-makers was called to events on the international stage. 
A. THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
The conflicts in the former Yugoslavia directly affected the European security 
environment in general, and Germany’s in particular, as hundreds of thousands of 
refugees continued to pour into the country. The subsequent military action against 
Serbian targets that had begun more or less in 1994 and reached a climax in 1998-9 had 
consequences for both NATO and the European Union. Beyond that, the aftermath of the 
terrorist attacks against New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, posed a new 
dimension of threat to the Euro-Atlantic community.  
1. NATO—New Missions Versus Capability Gaps 
In this context, Germany’s membership in the Alliance offered opportunities as 
well as challenges. For example, the first round of post-Cold War NATO enlargement in 
1999 led to substantial gains in Germany’s external security. As a result, it seemed 
necessary to reevaluate the German force posture, which, at the time, was largely based 
on forces oriented toward the air-land defense of Central Europe. 
Furthermore, NATO continued to follow a path of transforming its role from a 
classical collective defense alliance to an emphasis on collective security during the 
course of the 1990s. In particular, the Kosovo episode served as a catalyst, as it caused 
frustrations on both sides of the Atlantic. On the one hand, the Americans were 
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disillusioned about NATO’s complex planning and consensus-building processes—the 
so-called ―war by committee‖—and the European militaries’ shortfalls in command and 
control capabilities, aircraft, and weaponry.239 On the other hand, the European allies 
were dissatisfied with the apparent U.S. ―paternalism‖ in NATO affairs.  
In light of these diverging perceptions, the new Strategic Concept (SC 99), 
approved at the anniversary summit in Washington in April 1999, called for a bigger, 
more effective and flexible Alliance in particular for such peace enforcement/security 
missions as SFOR, as well as a reappraisal of its role and mission.240 While the defense 
of the security and freedom of its members remained NATO’s core function, SC 99 also 
stressed that the changes in the security environment demanded a focus on conflict 
prevention and crisis management, including out-of-area crisis response operations.241 
These new missions required the development of ―essential operational capabilities such 
as an effective engagement capability, capacity to deploy over distances and mobility; 
survivability of forces and infrastructure; and sustainability.‖242As a consequence, NATO 
concurrently initiated a Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) in order to enhance the 
military capabilities of the European allies in these key areas.  
The urgency of these commitments was reinvigorated by the fact that the new 
Strategic Concept specifically acknowledged the growing role of the European pillar of 
the Alliance, enshrined in ESDI. Thus, DCI was seen as a vital issue to preserve the 
transatlantic link.243  Since Germany took part in DCI, it was supposed to modernize its 
armed forces accordingly. However, Germany—like other European Allies—failed to 
meet fully these high expectations or to raise its defense expenditures.244 Therefore, the 
first ever invocation of Article 5 after the terrorist attacks in September 2001 was of 
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symbolic relevance only, because the United States relied on its own military strength 
and conducted Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) outside the NATO framework. The 
subsequent fight against transnational terrorism kept earlier debates about the scope of 
NATO missions at bay and spurred new efforts among European allies to play a greater 
military role vis-à-vis the United States.245 
2. The EU and Its Aspirations for an Independent Role 
These ambitions reflected attempts to strengthen the role of CFSP.246 The 
groundbreaking French-British summit at Saint-Malo in 1998 paved the way for the 
implementation of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).247 During its EU 
presidency in the first half of 1999, Germany gave up its passivity and actively supported 
this initiative.248 Thus, at the EU summits in Cologne and Helsinki the member states 
agreed on the buildup of European military capabilities.249 Under the so-called Helsinki 
Headline Goal (HHG 2003) the EU substantiated this commitment. No later than 2003, 
the member states pledged to be prepared to provide 50,000–60,000 troops, deployable 
within sixty days, in order to conduct the full range of the Petersberg Tasks for the 
duration of one year.250  
During the capabilities commitment conferences, Berlin announced that it would 
contribute a total of 13,500 ground troops. However, this German share did not help to 
overcome the EU’s lack of force projection capabilities.251 It is also important to note 
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that, to a certain extent, the EU’s HHG 2003 vied with NATO’s DCI for scarce financial 
resources.252 All in all, the major shifts in the roles of both NATO and the EU confronted 
the Bundeswehr with new and urgent pressures to transform.  
3. From Kosovo to Kabul—Germany and Multinational Military 
Operations 
This notion of necessary and comprehensive changes in the roles, structures, and 
capabilities of the Bundeswehr stemmed in part from increasing military missions abroad. 
For example, in 1998 clashes between Serbian military and police forces and the ethnic 
Albanian rebels in Kosovo intensified. The member states of NATO and the EU—and 
especially Germany, which had already taken in over 140,000 ethnic Albanian 
refugees—were interested in a prompt resolution of the conflict to prevent a humanitarian 
disaster and a further destabilization of the region.253 After the failure of the Rambouillet 
negotiations NATO prepared for Operation Allied Force.254 For the first time in its 
history, the Bundeswehr took part in combat operations by supporting NATO air strikes 
against Serbian targets between March and June 1999. Fourteen Tornado jets flew 
approximately 500 sorties.255 More importantly, Germany also contributed substantially 
to the relief efforts to provide humanitarian aid and to the international post-conflict 
management, including a participation in the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR).256 
KFOR’s task was to enable the return of refugees, the freedom of movement of the staff 
of international and non-governmental organizations, and the buildup of interim 
governmental structures.257 With its 4,600 troops in the Multinational Brigade (MNB) 
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South, as well as responsibility for its own sector in the southwestern part of Kosovo, 
Germany was one of the largest military contributors.258 The Bundeswehr was also 
involved in other parts of the Balkans. For example, it continued to be part of NATO’s 
SFOR mission in Bosnia.259 
After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Germany—like other close 
allies—declared its solidarity with the United States through Article 5 of the Washington 
Treaty. Since the United States initially chose to organize Operation Enduring Freedom 
(OEF) in Afghanistan as a coalition of the willing separate from NATO’s consensus and 
command structure, Germany’s military involvement was twofold. First, Germany 
supported the U.S.-led OEF against international terrorism.260 Second, a contingent of 
Bundeswehr troops was deployed to Kabul as part of an International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) to support the Afghan interim government.261  
While these military missions helped to enhance Germany’s reputation as a 
reliable partner in international affairs, they also confronted the Bundeswehr with several 
unprecedented challenges that carried the fate of the forces into a new realm symbolized 
by the Afghan and other distant theaters. The operations in the Balkans and in 
Afghanistan entailed a long-term deployment of large troop contingents. These troops 
necessitated accommodation, resupply, force protection, communications, and above all, 
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command and control arrangements.262 New operational requirements, which called for 
satellite communications and reconnaissance, light and flexible forces, and the ability to 
establish and maintain remote operating bases under adverse climatic conditions, clashed 
with a Bundeswehr that mainly consisted of legacy forces and weapon systems at the 
time. Additionally, the lack of land lines of communication to and within the Afghan 
theater made sufficient airlift capacities a vital necessity. As a consequence, the out-of-
area missions were a main driving force for acquiring new capabilities and equipment 
and also laid bare the shortcomings in preparations for such missions as had unfolded in 
the 1990s. 
B. THE DOMESTIC CONTEXT 
While the turmoil in the international system imposed growing transformation 
pressure and obligations on the Bundeswehr, it faced some contrasting trends in the 
domestic environment. The specific societal context at the end of the 1990s had a lasting 
effect on the reform of the German armed forces. Additionally, the general tenets of 
Germany’s strategic culture continued to inform its state behavior. 
1. Doing Evil in Order to Do Good?263  
Despite the Kohl government’s incremental approach to accustom the political 
elites and the German public to a growing number of multilateral out-of-area 
deployments, the parliamentary opposition to the CDU/CSU-FDP government had not 
fully come to terms with such an active use of military force. Traditionally, many 
members of the SPD and Die Grünen were driven primarily by their antimilitarism and 
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hence they preferred a limited role for the Bundeswehr.264 Thus, German strategic culture 
seemingly relapsed to Cold War patterns, when the Red-Green coalition started its tenure 
in office with the slogan ―Deutsche Politik ist Friedenspolitik‖ (German policy is peace 
policy).265 It is important to note, however, that when these left-of-center parties accepted 
political responsibility as the governing majority, a significant role-reversal took place. In 
1998 the Green pacifists of the 1980s found themselves in a position of actual power that 
presented them with urgent demands of allies and partners to participate fully in 
international efforts of conflict management and resolution in Europe and beyond. 
Therefore, the crises in the Balkans and the fight against terrorism were a real test of the 
Schröder government’s willingness to assume responsibility in international affairs.  
NATO’s plans for military engagement in the Kosovo conflict resulted in a 
dilemma for German state behavior. Because military coercion seemed inevitable to end 
the bloodshed and ethnic cleansing, two foundational elements of German strategic 
culture collided: ―never again war‖ competed with ―never again genocide.‖266 The 
absence of a UNSCR approval—the multilateral legitimization of the German approach 
of ―never again alone‖—caused additional uneasiness among politicians from all 
parties.267  
The decision to participate in Operation Allied Force was therefore not without 
political risk for the Schröder government because it represented a constituency that 
traditionally objected to military means in foreign policy.268 The new government tried to 
build broad consensus in the Bundestag. Cross-partisan support was essential because the 
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Red-Green coalition continuously faced the risk of losing votes from its own left wing.269 
In order to help overcome internal resistance, leading members of the SPD and the 
Greens continuously pointed out that Germany had a historical obligation and a 
normative responsibility to inhibit an impending genocide.270 Finally, the Bundestag 
approved the German participation in NATO air operations.271  
Thus, the Kosovo crisis was seen as the final step to a broader consensus among 
political elites that a Bundeswehr involvement in peace-keeping as well as in peace-
enforcing military missions was not only acceptable, but also necessary.272 It paved the 
way for subsequent decisions on the use of military force in the Bundestag. For example, 
the declaration of Chancellor Schröder’s government on September 12, 2001, included 
the notion of ―unconditional solidarity‖ with the United States and clearly reflected the 
momentum of change in German strategic culture.273 On the international level, NATO’s 
new Strategic Concept and the European Headline Goal served as institutional behavioral 
norms and therefore facilitated and amplified these trends.274  
Despite this apparent evolution of the foundations of German state behavior, the 
new consensus remained rather fragile.275 U.S. responses to the terrorist attacks against 
New York and Washington were increasingly perceived by some members of the German 
elite and society as a unilateral policy that one-sidedly relied on the use of force.276 The 
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formal request of the Bush administration, which called for a German military 
contribution to OEF’s ―coalition of the willing‖ in November 2001, appeared to be 
inconsistent with Germany’s preference for both political and military means to be 
employed in an institutionalized multilateral framework.277 Because he was aware of 
these domestic restraints, Chancellor Schröder chose to combine the Bundestag’s 
decision on the participation of the Bundeswehr in OEF with a formal Vertrauensfrage 
(question of confidence) in order to silence members of his own coalition who had 
initially articulated their disagreement.278 The necessary risk of corroding the ruling 
coalition in exchange for political allegiance brought forward the boundaries of German 
strategic culture at the very beginning of the twenty-first century.  
These developments also had repercussions for the Bundeswehr. For example, the 
development of power projection capabilities would have contradicted German strategic 
culture.279 While such multilateral norms as SC 99 and EHG 2003, as well as new crises 
and threats in the international environment, militated for an effective transformation of 
the Bundeswehr from a defense force into a mission-oriented or even intervention force, 
German strategic culture provided major obstacles for such a path. The constraint on 
German policy behavior also applied to possible changes in the force structure of the 
Bundeswehr. Any proposal for an all-volunteer force would not have ―fit in with what 
Germans [saw] as being the role and purpose of their armed forces.‖280 Most of the 
political elites continued to regard conscription as the cornerstone of civil-military 
relations in Germany and as an expression of the successful integration of the armed 
forces into society.281 Thus, the basic elements of German strategic culture 
simultaneously promoted and constrained military reforms. 
                                                 
277 Wilke, German Strategic Culture Revisited, 90. 
278 Although successful in the end, Schröder’s bold political maneuver had serious consequences. A 
second resort to the procedure was impossible during his tenure in office. This was one of the reasons, why 
he announced that Germany would not be part of a military coalition against Saddam Hussein during the 
election campaign in August 2002. 
279 Varwick, Nordatlantische Allianz, 777. 
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2. Political and Social Challenges and Budgetary Constraints 
Besides these cultural factors, the overall economic and societal situation had a 
limiting effect on options for German security and defense policy. At the end of the 
1990s, Germany’s public budget was in a constant state of crisis. One of the most 
burdensome legacies of the Kohl era was a severe financial and structural burden worked 
by unification as well as the competitiveness of the German economy on the world scene 
because of the social welfare state. An outdated and inefficient German welfare system, 
as well as high unemployment rates, put additional pressure on the public budget. In this 
context, the European Stability and Growth Pact282 meant yet another restraint for public 
spending.283 Therefore, far-reaching reforms in the economic and social sector were the 
Schröder government’s top priority.284  
Concurrently, Germany’s Finance Minister, Hans Eichel, regarded a policy of 
budget reorganization, decreasing net borrowing and tax reductions, as inevitable.285 
Defense and security issues were definitely subordinate to these apparently far more 
salient themes of statecraft and the public good.286 At a conference with high-ranking 
Bundeswehr officials in 1999, Chancellor Schröder announced that the German armed 




                                                 
282 The Pact pertains to the third stage of the EU’s economic and monetary union, which began in 
January 1999. It is intended to ensure that the member states maintain budgetary discipline after the 
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stated that ―retirees, jobless persons, and most parts of the German public would have had 
no understanding, if the Bundeswehr had been excluded from the agreed cuts in public 
spending.‖287  
Thus, the defense minister had little, if any, leeway to propose reforms that called 
for an increase in the defense budget.288 Rather, defense outlays continued to stagnate at 
a total of 23 to 25 billion Euros in absolute terms between 1998 and 2002.289 To make 
matters worse, less than twenty-five percent of the annual defense budget could be 
committed to investment during this period because operating costs, such as personnel 
and maintenance, consumed most of the defense expenditure.290 As a consequence, these 
material constraints severely limited the scope of the efforts to restructure and reform the 
Bundeswehr. It was common wisdom that only substantial reductions in the overall size 
of the armed forces could free resources, which would then allow for a necessary 
modernization.291 Additionally, Scharping made efforts to increase efficiency through a 
large-scale privatization program, including the sale of government owned real estates 
and establishing public private partnerships, as well as the employment of management 
tools. 
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C. THE BUNDESWEHR AND HESITANT ATTEMPTS OF REFORM 
In the tradition of the commission headed by Hans Adolf Jacobsen nearly a 
decade earlier, the 1998 coalition agreement between the SPD and the Greens stated that 
another Wehrstrukturkommission, headed by the former Federal President Richard von 
Weizsäcker, would by the year 2000 analyze the role, size, structure, armament and 
training of the Bundeswehr in order to make proposals for a fundamental reform of the 
armed forces.292 As a consequence, there were no serious attempts to adapt the structures 
and the capabilities of the armed forces to the demands of the external context during the 
first two years of the Red-Green coalition’s tenure in office. 
1. Assessing the State of Affairs 
To get a clear and unadorned picture of the status of the German armed forces, 
Defense Minister Scharping tasked the Generalinspekteur to prepare an impartial 
assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the Bundeswehr.293 This evaluation 
became the starting point of the subsequent work of the Weizsäcker Commission. The 
report concluded first that the Bundeswehr lacked financial resources because the defense 
budget’s share in the German GDP had dropped by 50 percent between 1990 and 
1998.294 Second, the structure of the German army could not meet the demands of the 
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and weapon systems hampered performance in even those missions that the Bundeswehr 
could carry out. For example, the German air force had no precision-guided weapons or 
strategic airlift capacities at the time.296  
2. A Bridge Too Far? Proposals of the Weizsäcker Commission 
The Weizsäcker Commission, which built on these findings, was formally 
established on May 3, 1999.297 Only a few weeks after its inception, the independence of 
the commission’s analysis was already threatened by Finance Minister Eichel’s plans for 
budget consolidation.298 As a consequence, two of the fundamental premises of the 
commission—a 340,000-strong Bundeswehr and stable defense spending until 2000—
had been overtaken by events. Since further cuts in the budget were looming, Scharping 
asked the commission to publish its findings six months earlier than planned.299  
Therefore, the commission presented its final report, Gemeinsame Sicherheit und 
Zukunft der Bundeswehr (Common Security and the Future of the Bundeswehr), on 
May 23, 2000. The report provided an appropriate assessment of Germany’s security and 
the deficiencies of the Bundeswehr. The German armed forces of the year 2000 were 
described as too big, ill-composed, and unable to fulfill their international 
commitments.300  
Due to Germany’s favorable and stable security environment, the report suggested 
that the Bundeswehr adapt its structures, capabilities, and doctrine fundamentally and 
concentrate on its most likely tasks: multilateral crisis prevention and conflict resolution. 
The Bundeswehr was expected to be able to participate in two parallel out-of-area crisis-
                                                 
296 The absence of precision strike capabilities was one of the reasons for Germany’s limited role in 
Operation Allied Force. 
297 It comprised a large group of politicians, general officers, top managers, scholars, clerics, 
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response missions of unlimited duration.301 This national ―level of ambition‖ seemed to 
be informed by such international obligations as NATO’s SC 99 as well as the EU’s 
HHG 2003, which served as landmarks for the reform proposal.302  
Remarkably, the report also pointed out that future crises and threats could 
emerge anywhere, and therefore called for highly deployable forces.303 In this context, 
the commission proposed a significantly reduced force structure with a peacetime 
strength of only 240,000 soldiers, including an ―operational force component‖ of 140,000 
combat-ready troops, trained and equipped to conduct crisis response operations in a 
multilateral framework.304 Conscription would have played only a minor role in such a 
Bundeswehr and would have mainly served as a pool for recruitment.305 Notably, the 
commission emphasized the need to reorganize and optimize existing command and 
control structures, as well as to strengthen the role and responsibilities of the 
Generalinspekteur.306 The report also stated that a profound reform and modernization of 
the Bundeswehr would free up resources in the medium term at best, but required an 
initial influx of funding to promote the whole process.  
The far-reaching and innovative proposals of the Weizsäcker Commission were 
ahead of the times. Such policy could not overcome the inertia effects of German 
strategic culture. Despite the Kosovo crisis, German elites continued to regard the use of 
force as a means of last resort. Therefore, the commission’s plans for a relatively small 
and capable fighting force were probably perceived as attempts to transform the  
 
 
                                                 
301 The contributions of the different services included the deployment of two brigade-size army 
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become an all-volunteer force in the long run. 
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Bundeswehr into an instrument for interventions. Furthermore, the budgetary constraints 
set by the Finance Minister rendered the realization of any short-term modernization 
impossible. 
3. Alternative Drafts of the BMVg and the Issue of Conscription 
Besides the Weizsäcker proposals, two additional written reports emerged on 
military reform. One included an internal review of the BMVg, the so-called Eckwerte 
(parameters) paper of the Generalinspekteur—then General Hans Peter von Kirchbach—
and was published on the same day as the Weizsäcker report.307 The other was 
Scharping’s own proposal, which he announced on June 5, 2000.308 However, the exact 
reasons for the existence of three different reports remain disputed.309  
Notwithstanding these speculations, the Scharping report as well as the von 
Kirchbach paper both differed from the proposals of the Weizsäcker Commission. Von 
Kirchbach advocated only modest force reductions and the retention of large numbers of 
conscripts in order to ensure territorial and collective defense.310 Scharping’s response 
was less cautious, but still differed significantly from the commission’s plans. He 
proposed a reduction in the manning level from 340,000 to 285,000 soldiers, including 
                                                 
307 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Generalinspekteur der Bundeswehr, Eckwerte für die 
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310 Because General von Kirchbach regarded territorial and collective defense as the Bundeswehr’s 
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Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Eckwerte für die konzeptionelle und planerische Weiterentwicklung 
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80,000 conscripts. While territorial defense remained the Bundeswehr’s main task, the 
military was supposed to keep up to 150,000 troops ready to meet the various 
international commitments.311 Furthermore, the report explicitly emphasized that, based 
on a European court’s ruling and subsequent changes in German laws, all career fields of 
the Bundeswehr would be accessible for female applicants.312 Scharping’s reform outline 












Figure 8. Bundeswehr Peace Time Strength (1985–2002)314 
One important reason for the apparent unwillingness to adopt and implement the 
Weizsäcker proposals was, once again, the issue of military bases. A force reduction of 
100,000 soldiers would have led to a large-scale closure of Bundeswehr installations all 
over Germany. Even Scharping’s limited approach resulted in severe protests. Local 
politicians criticized his plans as biased and disadvantageous, especially for Länder that 
were not governed by the SPD.315 Thus, it took several rounds of negotiations with the 
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eine Erneuerung von Grund auf (Berlin: 2000), 25. 
312 Before that decision, women had only been granted very limited access to the Bundeswehr, for 
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minister-presidents of certain Länder to finally settle a Ressortkonzept Stationierung 
(departmental concept for military basing) in 2001.316 Due to this compromise, the 
concept could not be based on operational and economic considerations.317 This 
development, in turn, had a negative impact on the reform efforts because military 
operating costs could not be reduced to the desired extent. 
4. A Silent Revolution—Unified Command Structures 
Although the main thrust of the Bundeswehr reform was impeded by various 
factors, it triggered some important organizational changes; above all, adaptations of 
existing command and control arrangements. The growing number of out-of-area 
missions had already illustrated the necessity of a centralized command in the 1990s. 
Since all three reform proposals underlined the importance of this requirement, the 
Bundeswehr was finally allowed to establish a joint Einsatzführungskommando 
[EinsFüKdo] (Bundeswehr Operations Command) in Potsdam-Geltow in July 2001.318  
This measure not only closed a capability gap, but was also proof of the gradual 
change in German strategic culture after 1990. It had taken the Bundeswehr a whole 
decade to prove that there would be no resurgence of the ghosts of the past. A cautious 
and incremental approach was necessary to overcome the deeply rooted reservations of 
German political elites and the media about the creation of supposedly powerful military 
headquarters that were reminiscent of Germany’s militant history. Taking into 
consideration that in 1992 the German press had compared similar proposals with the  
 
 
                                                 
316 Official website of the Bundeswehr, 
http://www.bundeswehr.de/fileserving/PortalFiles/C1256EF40036B05B/W2652FK6894INFODE/ressortko
nzept.pdf (accessed November 29, 2010). 
317 Clement and Jöris, 50 Jahre Bundeswehr 1955-2005, 136. 
318 The Einsatzführungskommando turns the political leadership guidelines into military action by 
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Additional information (in German as well as in English) is available at the official website of the 
Bundeswehr Operations Command, 
http://www.einsatz.bundeswehr.de/fileserving/PortalFiles/C1256F200023713E/W26KXL4S657INFODE/b
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High Command of the Wehrmacht, this was remarkable progress. Unsurprisingly, some 
observers called the foundation of the EinsFüKdo the ―final painstaking step in creating a 
normalized [German] command structure.‖319  
As a result, the single service commands—the Führungskommandos of the army, 
the air force, and the navy—ceased to have the lead in exercising command over 
deployed Bundeswehr forces and evolved into the role of mere ―force providers.‖320 
Since the EinsFüKdo assumed command over the different German contingents for the 
duration of their mission, this new chain of command initially faced resistance from the 
three services.321 As a joint headquarters organized along NATO precepts, the 
EinsFüKdo was supposed to serve as the nucleus of an Operation Headquarters (OHQ) 
for the EU as well.322 
The foundation of the Einsatzführungskommando also corresponded with 
alterations in the command structures on the ministerial level. The conversion of the 
FüZBw into the Stabsabteilung (Division) V of the Führungsstab der Streitkräfte [Fü S] 
(Armed Forces Staff) streamlined the processes and put this element under the 
supervision of the Generalinspekteur. The latter subsequently became responsible for the 
planning and execution of all Bundeswehr missions. All in all, these different measures 
removed the fragmentation of responsibilities and increased effectiveness. 
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Figure 9. National Chain of Command (2002) 
5. Restructuring the Forces 
The ―two pillar‖ model continued to serve as an important common element of all 
new Bundeswehr force structures. Below the ministerial level, all three services consisted 
of a force command, which exercised (peace-time) command of all active units of that 
service,323 and a service office, which was responsible for training and doctrine as well as 
other cross-functional tasks.324 With 134,000 soldiers, the German army remained the 
largest service and retained the bulk of its units, but lost substantial parts of its manpower 
and heavy armor. The new structure was called Heer der Zukunft (Army of the Future) 
and centered on five mechanized divisions and three specialized divisions.325 It had to 
increase the number of its rapidly deployable forces to be able to engage in out-of-area 
missions with the equivalent of a reinforced mechanized division in one theater or with 
                                                 
323 For example, the service command of the army, the Heeresführungskommando (Army Forces 
Command), exercises command over all German army divisions as well as over the German elements in the 
staffs of multinational army corps.  
324 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Die Bundeswehr–sicher ins 21. Jahrhundert, 37. 
325 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr; Grobausplanung, 
Ergebnisse und Entscheidungen, (Berlin: September 2000), Stichwort: Struktur des Heeres. 
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two brigade-size contingents in two parallel operations in different theaters.326 To meet 
this requirement for lighter, more flexible forces, the German army established the 
Division Spezielle Operationen [DSO] (Special Operations Division) and the Division 
Luftbewegliche Operationen [DLO] (Air Mobile Division) in 2001 to participate in 
armed repatriation, operations against irregular forces, initial entry and concluding 
operations, and deep operations.327 The specialized roles of these two units clearly 
reflected the new era in which the Bundeswehr and German strategic culture had arrived.  
The foundation of a Streitkräftebasis [SKB] (Joint Support Service) was 
comprised of support units of the three services and the medical branch represented a 
large step towards more mission-oriented armed forces. The main task of this new 
Organisationsbereich (Organizational Area)328 was to ensure basic logistical support for 
Bundeswehr units in Germany, as well as in out-of-area missions. Additionally, the SKB 
would also serve as a force enabler by providing services and performing functions such 
as strategic mobility, communications, intelligence, reconnaissance, electronic combat, 
explosive ordnance disposal, or military police.329 Remarkably, the SKB gradually 
became the second-largest structural element of the Bundeswehr with more than 50,000 
troops.330 It also had its own ministerial representation in the form of an Inspekteur der 
SKB (chief of staff, SKB) with its own staff, the Führungsstab der Streitkräftebasis. In 
addition to the SKB, the Sanitätsdienst (Medical Service) was reorganized into a (fifth) 
                                                 
326 Official website of the German army, 
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independent organizational area.331 These revisions of the force structure, although 
incomplete and sometimes even inconsistent, attempted to account for the changes in the 
external security environment and mirrored ―normalization‖ processes in German 
security and defense policy behavior. 
6. Procurement/Materiel and the Legacy of the Cold War 
One of the reasons why the Bundeswehr could not adapt quickly to the new 
security environment was the limited usability of some of its equipment for crisis-
response scenarios.332 Most of its weapon systems had a purely Cold War legacy, and 
recent out-of-area missions had shown a lack of strategic mobility and sophisticated C4I 
systems as well as the need for an independent intelligence-gathering capability.333 
However, major armament projects faced long cycles of research and development 
activities and tied up substantial financial resources.334  
In light of the overall budgetary constraints in Germany and the evident 
unwillingness to increase defense spending, several modernization efforts had to be 
postponed or realized in the long run. In some cases even Cold War military thinking 
within the BMVg itself protracted the purchase of highly mobile and deployable 
equipment because the services staffs adhered to the procurement of heavy weapon 
systems which had initially been planned during the 1980s.335 In this context, the 
interests of the German and European defense industry also played a role. Multinational 
programs such as the Eurofighter, which had been criticized for their costliness, could not 
been halted because they enjoyed a high political visibility and secured thousands of jobs 
in the European aerospace industry.336 
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Nonetheless, some important decisions concerning strategic capabilities were 
made all at the same. For example, in 2000 the Schröder government announced the 
development of a space-based observation capability, the SAR-Lupe system, which 
would consist of several radar satellites.337 In June 2001, Germany, along with several 
other European countries, decided to purchase seventy-three Airbus A-400M transport 
aircraft to replace its fleet of aging C-160 Transall aircraft.338  
D. CONCLUSION 
The active involvement in the military missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan 
underlined the fact that the Bundeswehr had de facto become an active instrument of 
German foreign and security policy at that time. While during Operation Allied Force the 
need for a humanitarian intervention was stressed—which was perceived as compatible 
with German strategic culture—the deployment of Special Forces to the battlefields in the 
Hindukush illustrated that key German decision-makers were at times even willing to 
disregard their traditional antimilitarism and to gradually retreat from their ―culture of 
reticence.‖ 
However, these remarkable developments in the German strategic culture and the 
increased willingness to use military force did not lead to sufficient institutional and 
operational efforts to adapt the Bundeswehr that would have cost substantial sums amid 
the financial stringency of the era. Rather, military reforms during the first tenure of 
Chancellor Schröder showed mixed results at best. On the one hand, the founding of a 
joint support service, the centralization of command and control arrangements, the 
creation of some highly mobile military units, and the procurement of certain systems 
with a strategic reach must all be viewed as steps to increase the Bundeswehr’s ability to 
participate in multilateral military missions. On the other hand, the Defense Minister 
adhered to territorial defense as the Bundeswehr’s main task. His reform lacked a 
                                                 
337 Sarotte, German Military Reform and European Security, 51. SAR-Lupe was part of a German-
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comprehensive approach to include all parts of the armed forces into a reorganization 
process according to the demands of crisis response and conflict management missions. 
The result was a Bundeswehr whose units often had to rely on structures and equipment 
of the Cold War era. 
Thus, an opportunity for a sound military reform—represented by the proposals of 
the Weizsäcker Commission—was missed because of domestic politics, strategic culture 
and the conservatism of the German Ministry of Defense itself. Neither the loose 
obligations of NATO’s Defense Capabilities Initiative nor the Headline Goal of the EU 
managed to put enough external pressure on Germany to influence the evolution of the 
Bundeswehr.  
Once again a complex set of factors, including a domestic focus on supposedly 
more salient political issues, electoral interests, and the imbalance of power between key 
decision-makers in the cabinet and parliament and beyond, determined the limited scope 
and depth of the Bundeswehr reform. Against this background, the German armed forces 
got caught in a political crossfire between high expectations, on the one hand, and a lack 
of powerful sponsors—as exist in such countries as the United Kingdom, France and the 
United States—and dwindling resources, on the other. The apparent unwillingness of the 
political opposition to support the concept of a more professional Bundeswehr 
reinvigorated these trends.339 
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V. EMBRACING MILITARY TRANSFORMATION, 2002–2005 
The second term of Chancellor Schröder coincided with a time of political 
upheaval in the international scene associated with the post-September 11 campaigns of 
the Global War on Terror. This period saw both NATO and the EU trying to adapt to the 
new security threats of the twenty-first century. The dispute over the Iraq War in 2003 
impaired trans-Atlantic relations and left the EU without a unified position. Several 
attempts were made to strengthen or to revive the military and political relevance of these 
institutions. From a military perspective, these measures were deemed crucial for the 
future of the Alliance because they aimed at reducing the trans-Atlantic capability gap. 
Most of the European NATO member states had to acknowledge that they had failed to 
improve their military capabilities in order to conduct autonomous operations or to 
remain interoperable with U.S. forces. Consequently, new initiatives were launched that 
aimed at closing existing gaps. These approaches also called for a more assertive German 
commitment.  
To be sure, the Bundeswehr was already operating in different theaters, mainly 
the Balkans and Afghanistan. These long-term deployments proved to be a burden for the 
armed forces, amid their partial reforms and the persistent focus on their traditional 
defense role. Furthermore, continuously high operating costs because of a whole fleet of 
aging air and land systems, as well as a scattered and inefficient pattern of military basing 
and the absence of privatization revenues, all impeded modernization. The tightrope walk 
between demanding missions on the one hand, and piecemeal and inert reforms on the 
other, proved unsustainable. Rather, the widening gap between qualitatively and 
quantitatively increased tasks and available resources made drastic measures and changes 
inevitable. 
Against this background, the new German Defense Minister, Peter Struck, had a 
lasting effect on the course of the Bundeswehr at this time. He took office in July 2002 




the BMVg to develop new Defense Policy Guidelines as a conceptual framework and 
starting point for a process that was deemed by his Generalinspekteur, General Wolfgang 
Schneiderhan, as the ―Transformation of the Bundeswehr.‖ 
A. THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
The 2004 enlargement of both NATO and the EU members extended the zone of 
political and economic stability in Europe significantly. Germany in particular was a 
major beneficiary of these developments because one of its essential security interests 
had been the integration into Western Europe of its eastern neighbors.340 As this process 
continued, the earlier notions of territorial and Alliance defense as the main goals of 
German security policy—to say nothing of universal conscription—seemed to be more 
than obsolete. 
Furthermore, Germany and its NATO and EU allies were continuously occupied 
with managing several crises on the European periphery and in other areas of conflict 
throughout the course of Chancellor Schröder's second term. The post-September 11 fight 
against terrorism had serious consequences for trans-Atlantic relations as well as 
multinational security institutions. It proved to be a determining factor for the security 
and defense policy of NATO and the EU member states. Both institutions experienced 
serious internal crises in these fateful years. At the same time, the EU emerged as an 
autonomous security organization and conducted its first military missions in the Balkans 
as well as in Africa. Germany was confronted with new risks from the dynamic 
international system and a multitude of demands from its partners. Would German state 
behavior live up to these expectations? 
1. The End of the Trans-Atlantic Era? 
The fact that the United States chose to rely on a ―coalition of the willing‖ for 
combating terrorism in Afghanistan in late 2001—although NATO had shown 
unconditional solidarity by invoking Article 5—alienated some European Alliance 
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members. ―NATO’s absence created the feeling among some Europeans that the United 
States had disregarded NATO.‖341 This perception of NATO’s diminishing role as the 
hub of U.S.-European security policy strained trans-Atlantic relations. Controversy about 
the right policy vis-à-vis the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, as well as the 
appropriateness of the preemptive use of military force enshrined in the U.S. National 
Security Strategy (NSS) of 2002, contributed to this erosion. 
Notwithstanding these trends, the ―Transformation Summit‖ in Prague in late 
November 2002 marked a milestone in NATO’s history. Under U.S. leadership, the 
Alliance approved not only its most ambitious enlargement,342 but also a new command 
structure; improvements in capabilities, including the creation of a NATO Response 
Force (NRF); and—probably most importantly—an adaptation of its role. The member 
states agreed to the transformation of the Alliance in order to fend off the threats created 
by transnational terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 
Notably, the Alliance also abstained from setting geographical limits for its future 
missions, stating that ―NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to 
wherever they are needed.‖343 Thus, NATO was beginning to emerge as a 
―multifunctional security agency with global reach.‖344 
Both the ambitions for a global role of the Alliance and the technological 
superiority of U.S. forces urgently called for substantial increases in military capabilities 
of the European NATO members. As described in the previous chapter, NATO had 
launched a Defense Capabilities Initiative in 1999 to enhance its operational 
capabilities.345 However, progress under DCI had been mixed at best because member 
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states had no obligation to report officially their individual achievements.346 To rectify 
this shortcoming, the 2002 summit inaugurated the so-called Prague Capabilities 
Commitment (PCC). This new initiative covered more than 400 specific areas, which 
were grouped in eight essential fields.347 To prevent slow or uneven progress NATO 
members had to enter into specific commitments and target dates. The PCC was meant to 
correct capability shortfalls through cooperation, shared procurement, or the pooling of 
resources.348 As a result, several multinational consortia, headed by individual member 
states, were founded to allow for the development of certain capabilities.349  
NATO members also agreed to establish a ―NATO fire brigade,‖ the NATO 
Response Force, which was supposed to consist of ―a technologically advanced, flexible, 
deployable, interoperable and sustainable force including land, sea, and air elements 
ready to move quickly to wherever needed.‖350 This approximately 21,000-strong high-
readiness force was to be deployable within five to thirty days.351 The NRF was regarded 
as a litmus test for NATO transformation in general and the European NATO members’ 
willingness to invest in modernization and interoperability in particular.352  
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2. The EU on the Road to Emancipation 
The Iraq crisis represented a catalyst for promoting the European Security and 
Defense Policy (ESDP).353 From the European perspective, U.S. unilateralism—in the 
form of the Bush administration’s refusal to ask NATO as a whole for assistance in 
Operation Enduring Freedom and, two years later, ousting Saddam Hussein more or less 
on its own—had undermined the coherence of the Alliance.354 European NATO 
members focused more on the EU as a forum for security cooperation and 
consultation.355 As a consequence, ESDP enjoyed a political appreciation in 2003. 
With the ―Berlin Plus‖ framework agreement of March 2003, the EU and NATO 
strengthened their cooperation and strategic partnership by providing the EU with 
recourse to NATO assets and capabilities.356 The European Council also approved a 
framework for autonomous EU operations in December 2003. The latter required the 
establishment of a planning capacity on the strategic level in the form of a civil/military 
cell within the EU Military Staff.357 On the operational level, national headquarters of a 
Union member—eventually reinforced by other member states—would be responsible 
for the command and control of a mission.  
In the wake of the discord over the U.S. Global War on Terror and the notion of 
preemptive strikes, the EU announced its first European Security Strategy (ESS) in 
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December 2003. This document defined not only European security interests but also a 
broad framework for ESDP operations. Furthermore, the ESS highlighted the dynamism 
of potential crises and the unprecedented dimension of the threats posed by transnational 
terrorism and the proliferation of WMD. In this context, the strategy called on EU 
members ―to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, 
robust intervention.‖358 Based on a comprehensive approach to security, the ESS 
advocated effective multilateralism and the use of both civilian and military instruments. 
The ESS also served as the rule for the further development of the Helsinki 
Headline Goal (HHG). Since the EU had declared its operational capability to conduct 
the full range of Petersberg tasks in May 2003, the changes in the overall security 
environment and the fight against terrorism set new targets for the improvement of 
European military capabilities.359 The Headline Goal (HG) 2010 emphasized the need to 
develop capabilities to simultaneously conduct several small- and medium-sized 
operations.360 In June 2004, the EU member states decided to implement the HG.361 At 
its core stood the proposal to create a total of thirteen European ―Battle Groups‖ (EU 
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BG)—1,500-strong high-readiness force packages, capable of launching their mission 
within ten days of official approval of the EU Council.362  
Thus, the Union modified the HHG’s initial plans to establish a large corps-sized 
European peacekeeping force. Instead, it shifted from a quantitative to a qualitative 
approach by focusing on small but advanced military units.363 Being part of the 
HG 2010, the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) was adapted to a process 
comparable to and largely compatible with NATO’s PCC. Multinational project groups 
attempted to develop specific measures and road maps for the removal of capability 
shortfalls in key areas such as combat search and rescue (CSAR), strategic airlift, or air-
to-air refueling.364 These steps were coordinated with NATO in order to prevent overlaps 
and redundancies. 
3. Implications and Challenges for the Bundeswehr 
The broad array of transformation and modernization activities within NATO and 
the EU had considerable repercussions for the Bundeswehr. Germany, as the largest 
European member state of both institutions for example, had to make substantial 
contributions in terms of military personnel. Germany accepted to provide up to 5,000 
troops for the NRF. Any participation in the Response Force was based on biannual 
rotation and required a period of austere training and certification ranging from six to 
twelve months prior to the stand-by phase of six months.365 Therefore, the calculative 
Bundeswehr commitment to the NRF initiative was a total of 15,000 troops.366 As a 
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result, Germany faced challenges with regard to training, equipping, deploying, and 
supplying these forces.367 But also the quality of the personnel of these new multinational 
units was challenging. Since the NRF and the Battle Groups would only comprise 
professionals and volunteers, especially the German army, which had the most conscripts 
of all three services of the Bundeswehr at the time, would face certain difficulties in 
assembling an NRF contingent. 
The ambitions of the EU to conduct autonomous ESDP missions meant yet 
another burden for the German armed forces. After all, the Bundeswehr’s contribution to 
the Headline Goal was confined to a maximum of 18,000 troops.368 Such EU military 
ventures also necessitated greater national efforts because of the absence of ancillary 
capabilities of major NATO powers. For example, in case of an autonomous EU mission 
with Germany as the framework nation, the Einsatzführungskommando (Bundeswehr 
Operations Command) in Potsdam would have taken the lead as a multinational 
operations headquarters. This would have been a daunting task given the fact that 
effective national command and control structures had only been established recently. 
Within the framework of PCC and ECAP, Germany was confronted with 
additional issues. For example, Germany took over the lead for the NATO working 
groups that focused on capability areas such as air-to-ground surveillance, strategic lift, 
and CBRN defense.369 As a consequence, German armament policy and procurement had 
to account for the goals of PCC.370 The latter’s ambitious timeframe put additional 
pressure on German defense policy which was already constrained by budget cuts.  
Several European initiatives such as a combined training center for A-400M 
crews or the recourse to the Eurokorps as a headquarters for initial entry operations of 
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European intervention forces were launched as well.371 Additionally, Germany and 
several other European partners intended to create a European air transport command 
(EATC) by 2010.372 
This pooling of scarce military resources would improve the Bundeswehr’s 
efficiency over time. Therefore, such initiatives as the NRF reflected Germany’s 
traditional preference for an effective multilateralism, but they also touched sensitive 
questions of national sovereignty and parliamentary control over the Bundeswehr. Would 
Germany be willing to provide air force assets on very short notice in order to redeploy 
British or French troops to a crisis region when push came to shove? Would Germany be 
a reliable ally in case of an involvement of the NRF in a high-intensity scenario?  
Apart from these trends in NATO and the EU, Germany’s international 
deployments proved to be a strong stimulus for learning processes within the 
Bundeswehr. According to its new post-Cold War role of a ―security provider,‖ Germany 
continued to participate in a plethora of international military missions. Between 1998 
and 2003 alone, a total of more than 100,000 Bundeswehr soldiers had been deployed to 
different theaters in Europe, Africa, and Asia.373 
For example, Germany sustained its engagement in the Balkans. The NATO-led 
KFOR and SFOR missions were the most prominent ones; they included the deployment 
of 3,450 troops to Kosovo and 1,350 soldiers to Bosnia.374 The Bundeswehr also 
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participated in the first military missions of the EU under the ―Berlin Plus‖ agreement, 
Concordia in Macedonia in March 2003 and EUFOR Althea in Bosnia.375  
Operation Artemis in Congo was yet another novelty. This first autonomous 
ESDP mission was led by France and paved the way for a larger UN operation in that 
country.376 The Bundeswehr supported the French troops by providing air transport 
capacities. 
Although Germany had repeatedly rejected any military involvement in Iraq, it 
offered to increase its ISAF engagement in Afghanistan in compensation.377 Thus, the 
Hindu Kush remained a focal point of Bundeswehr missions at the time. NATO assumed 
responsibility for ISAF in August 2003.378 While this step solved the problem of finding 
new lead nations every six months, it de facto cemented the long-term deployment of 
German troops to Afghanistan.  
All these deployments were a continuous drain on the Bundeswehr’s financial, 
material and manpower resources. Because international missions had to be paid from the 
current defense expenditure, less money was available for modernization efforts.379 But 
the financial consequences were not the only implications for the transformation of the 
Bundeswehr. Others stemmed from lessons learned. For instance, the increasing 
insurgency in Afghanistan resulted in an urgent demand for armored personnel carriers 
and other vehicles capable of protecting soldiers from suicide bombers, improvised 
explosive devices, or even mines. The Bundeswehr of 2003 faced a lack of such 
equipment. 
                                                 
375 The latter was a follow-on operation of NATO’s SFOR mission. 
376 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Bundeswehr im Einsatz (Berlin: 2009), 56. 
377 Overhaus, Civilian Power under Stress, 72. 
378 ―ISAF History,‖ official ISAF website, http://www.isaf.nato.int/history.html (accessed March 10, 
2011). 
379 For example, the costs for international deployments of the Bundeswehr increased from 180 
million euros in 1998 to 1.7 billion euros in 2002. Johannes Varwick, ―Militär als Instrument der Politik,‖ 
in Handbuch Militär und Sozialwissenschaft, eds. Sven B. Gareis and Paul Klein (Wiesbaden: Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften, 2006), 97. 
 99 
Despite Germany’s absence from the Iraq War, Operation Iraqi Freedom 
provided valuable insights for the Bundeswehr. It once again disclosed the technological 
superiority of the U.S. military. From a Bundeswehr perspective, the U.S. forces served 
as a landmark for the ability to conduct network-enabled military operations in a high-
intensity conflict. Consequently, the concept of Vernetzte Operationsführung [NetOpFü] 
(Network Enabled Operations) became a leitmotif of Bundeswehr transformation. 
Furthermore, the riots in Kosovo in March 2004 presented the Bundeswehr with a 
sobering experience. The official rhetoric had always pointed to the mainly humanitarian 
character of the mission and the media had portrayed the soldiers as ―helpers in need.‖ 
However, when the peaceful KFOR routine was interrupted by the violent protests of 
ethnic Albanians, the German ―peacekeepers‖ were ill-equipped as well as mentally and 
legally ill-prepared to handle the situation.380 This episode not only demonstrated that the 
Bundeswehr needed better equipment for low-intensity conflicts such as non-lethal 
weaponry, but also that a clear definition of the political end-state, unambiguous rules of 
engagement, a robust mandate, and soldierly initiative were essential prerequisites for 
mission success. 
B. THE DOMESTIC CONTEXT 
Chancellor Schröder’s success in the 2002 elections was based on two events with 
a focus on the fate of the SPD in eastern Germany. He had demonstrated leadership 
during the disastrous flooding of the river Elbe prior to the elections.381 But more 
importantly, through his public opposition against a possible U.S.-led invasion of Iraq 
during the federal election campaign German foreign and security policy ―became 
hijacked by the domestic struggle for the chancellorship.‖382 The latter episode under the 
dictates of left versus left in the frame of a skeptical domestic politics eventually became 
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a heavy burden for Germany’s credibility and its external relations—regaining trust of 
important partners and allies was therefore a political imperative. 
Albeit for these profound dynamics and changes in the international environment, 
the primacy of domestic challenges prevailed during Gerhard Schröder’s second term in 
office. Economic trends in Germany presented the government with major difficulties. 
The country was continuously plagued by slow economic growth and the persistence of 
high levels of unemployment. For example, with a mere 0.2 percent increase Germany 
featured the slowest growth rate within the euro zone, and also one of the highest 
unemployment rates in 2003—11.3 percent or 4.7 million in absolute terms.383 The 
former ―economic power house‖ had become ―the sick man of Europe.‖384 As a 
consequence, the Schröder administration initiated an additional series of deep budgetary 
cuts by reducing unemployment benefits and other areas of public spending. The 
coalition agreement of October 2002 stated that the fight against unemployment and 
budget deficits would be a top priority of the new government.385 
Against this background, the defense budget—like other areas of public 
spending—was no sanctuary. For example, the Ministry of Finance ordered a ―global 
underissue‖ in 2004 to ensure the funding of the reorganized German pension 
insurance.386  
The defense minister did not display strong resistance in this situation. Peter 
Struck was a highly prominent figure in the political establishment of the Social 
Democrats. As the former head of the influential SPD faction, he had a very good 
political network and was a reliable ally of the Chancellor. This had repercussions for the 
Bundeswehr. On the one hand, his position of relative power provided him with a high 
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assertiveness within the coalition cabinet and vis-à-vis the foreign minister. On the other 
hand, Struck remained a loyal member of the ruling coalition and did not try to struggle 
for more financial resources for the Bundeswehr.387 
C. A RETURN OF UNILATERALISM OR SCHAUKELPOLITIK? 
Chancellor Schröder’s second tenure received a lot of attention from political 
scientists because of his policy during the Iraq crisis. German state behavior obviously 
indicated a significant change in elite attitudes towards Germany’s role in the 
international system in general and the use of force in particular. Schröder’s public 
statement that the vital issues and questions regarding Germany were decided in Berlin—
rather than in the capitals of close allies—was perceived as a return to old patterns of 
German unilateralism and therefore labeled as a ―German Way‖ or Sonderweg,388 or the 
policy of choosing sides between east and west in a Schaukelpolitik as had existed prior 
to 1918 or 1933.  
While German members of the realist school of thought praised the strong 
assertiveness of the Chancellor and his attempts to form a ―counterweight‖ to the 
unilateral U.S. policy,389 constructivists referred to the dilemmas in German strategic 
culture at the time. In light of a strong anti-war sentiment in German public opinion and 
the federal elections of late 2002, the reluctance to support the use of force (―never again 
war‖) finally prevailed over the commitment to multilateralism and the desire to be 
perceived as a reliable ally (―never again alone‖).390 Several lessons can be derived from 
the events in 2002 and 2003. First, the episode illustrates that the German public had not 
lost its traditional antimilitarism.391 Second, the notion of ―never again war‖ can prevail 
over the other basic tenet of German strategic culture—―never again alone‖—under 
certain circumstances. In the case of Iraq the missing UNSC resolution as a form of 
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legitimacy, the perception of regime change as an ―unjust‖ cause of war, and the high-
intensity conflict with the prospect of many casualties on both sides were crucial 
elements of public thinking in Germany. 
All in all, the 2003 Iraq War was not a general deviation from the foundational 
elements of German strategic culture. Rather, it underlined the limits of the German 
public’s willingness to support the use of military force. Opinion polls in Germany 
showed that public support for the use of force was limited to cases of defense against an 
immediate threat on home territory or the protection of individuals or groups abroad 
against security threats such as civil war or ethnic cleansing.392 The promotion of values 
and ideas abroad, regime change, or the use of preemptive force received little to no 
support. Thus, the German public was less willing to accept Bundeswehr missions that 
were mainly based on the notion of being a loyal member of an international alliance. 
This trend indicated a certain rift between the general public and political elites in 
Germany. The new societal consensus that had emerged at the end of the 1990s and its 
reappraisal for the role of the Bundeswehr proved to be rather fragile.393 
Notwithstanding these internal differences and the external dispute over Iraq, 
NATO and the EU remained the two key institutional frameworks for German security 
and defense policy. The proposal to transform ESDP into a supranational European 
Security and Defense Union (ESDU) in the long run was an example that once again 
underlined the German preference for ―effective multilateralism.‖394 The German 
government was also eager to meet all of its multinational obligations, be it in NATO or 
the EU, in Afghanistan, in the Balkans, or at the Horn of Africa.395 The German 
parliament, the Bundestag, had to approve sixteen international Bundeswehr missions 
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throughout the course of Schröder’s second tenure. Most notably, any controversial 
debates were omitted and none of these ballots received less than 89 percent of consent.  
Thus, the Bundeswehr had become a self-evident instrument of a multilateral German 
foreign and security policy—at least from the perspective of political elites.  
In March 2005 the government announced the so-called Parlaments-
beteiligungsgesetz,396 a law that regulated which Bundeswehr missions had to be 
approved by the Bundestag.397 This measure accommodated the fact that the Bundeswehr 
would continue to participate in multinational missions in the foreseeable future. 
However, this ―normalcy‖ of military engagements was restricted to peacekeeping or 
mostly humanitarian missions in low to medium intensity conflicts and crises. 
How did these overall trends in German strategic culture affect defense policy and 
the Bundeswehr? First, Germany’s firm stance of ―never again alone‖ reinforced its 
strong commitment to NATO and the EU and its efforts to meet the capability and 
interoperability requirements set by these two organizations. Second—and to some extent 
in line with the former conclusion—the persistence of an antimilitaristic sentiment among 
the German public had an impact on the scope, intensity, and character of possible 
military ventures that German politicians were willing to support. 
D. THE BUNDESWEHR IN TRANSFORMATION 
When Defense Minister Struck took office in mid-2002, the structural, financial, 
and technological problems of the Bundeswehr were far from being resolved. On the 
contrary: the general lack of salience in security and defense issues in the Berlin 
Republic, consecutive cuts in defense spending, a dense sequence of international 
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deployments, and a series of halfhearted reforms under Defense Ministers Rühe and 
Scharping widened the gap between roles, missions and available resources as these 
became more acute in the ISAF mission. 
In lieu of being able to play in the same military league as its peer middle powers 
France and the United Kingdom, it became increasingly difficult for Germany to fulfill its 
international obligations in comparison to these allies. Decisive action was necessary to 
cut the Gordian knot in this unfavorable situation. 
1. The Need for a Reform of the Reform 
Against this backdrop, Defense Minister Peter Struck faced a burdensome legacy. 
On the one hand, Germany had made substantial commitments to both NATO and the 
EU. Demanding and innovative projects such as the NRF and the EU Battle Groups 
called for an allocation of several thousand professionally trained and equipped troops as 
well as high value military assets. Additionally, current operations under the auspices of 
NATO, the EU, and the UN on three continents permanently pinned down between 7,000 
and 10,000 German troops. Taking the necessary force rotations into account, these 
figures went up to between 20,000 and 30,000—the Bundeswehr was overstretched. The 
international focus on advanced military formations, capable of fighting complex and 
high intensity missions in a network enabled environment, also cast doubt on Germany’s 
adherence to conscription. 
On the other hand, the guiding principles of the military reform that had been 
initiated in 2000 did not reflect the realities of conceivable Bundeswehr missions any 
more.398 Furthermore, the promises of the German chancellor and the finance minister to 
abstain from further reductions of the defense expenditure had been broken.399 Initially 
the Red-Green coalition had announced the intent to freeze the defense budget at a level 
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of € 24.40 billion during the period from 2003 to 2006.400 However, as early as 2004 the 
expenditure was reduced to € 23.80 billion for 2004 and to € 23.65 billion in 2005. These 
nominal cuts did not even account for additional costs in the form of international 
deployments, inflation, and higher wages.401 If one observer is correct in stating that the 
size of the defense budget generally reflects the degree of political appraisal for the 
armed forces,402 then the Bundeswehr apparently was not very popular among German 
political elites at the time.  
The general budget constraints were reinforced by high operating costs and ―the 
failure of Scharping’s efforts to raise finances from selling government real estate, 
privatization, and efficiency measures.‖403 They impeded any serious attempt to 
modernize the Bundeswehr and to adapt it to its future roles and tasks. Furthermore, the 
bulk of German political elites still supported conscription—despite the fact that regular 
conscripts could not take part in out-of-area missions.  
This twofold dilemma—external obligations in conjunction with insufficient 
resources—could only be solved by a revision of the Bundeswehr reform that had been 
implemented under Defense Minister Scharping in 2000.  
2. A New Conceptual Framework 
As a consequence, Defense Minister Struck published a new set of 
Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien [VPR] (Defense Policy Guidelines) in May 2003, 
only ten months after taking office. Some scholars called these VPR a paradigm shift that 
would adopt the Bundeswehr to the security environment of the twenty-first century.404 
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Struck’s widely recognized public statement that ―Germany’s security would also be 
defended in the Hindu Kush‖ apparently underlined this claim.405 
With regard to the long-standing principles of German security policy, the VPR 
acknowledged the central role of NATO. The trans-Atlantic partnership was seen as the 
anchor and foundation of European and German security. ESDP was viewed as 
complementing NATO rather than competing with the Alliance. Apart from national 
evacuation and rescue operations, any German military engagement would be placed in 
the existing multilateral framework of the UN, NATO or the EU.  
In contrast to official documents and rhetoric of previous governments, the 2003 
defense policy guidelines pointed out that Germany’s territorial integrity was not 
threatened by Cold War-type opponents any longer. Therefore, military capabilities for 
the territorial defense against a conventional aggressor were regarded as obsolete. Rather, 
the rapidly changing security environment called for a thorough reassessment of German 
defense policy. Notably, this conclusion resembled some of the main findings of the 
report of the Weizsäcker Commission of 2000: conflict prevention and crisis 
management—rather than territorial defense—were henceforth expected to be the 
Bundeswehr’s main tasks. Additionally, the VPR identified the fight against transnational 
terrorism and the proliferation of WMD as well as their means of delivery as a major 
challenge for the Bundeswehr. This assessment clearly reflected the new consensus on 
the elite level about the legitimacy and the goals of the use of force that had emerged in 
the wake of Kosovo and the terrorist attacks of September 11. The VPR also rested on a 
very broad understanding of the term ―defense,‖ which resulted in the statement that there 
were in fact no geographical limits for future Bundeswehr missions. In the light of this 
substantial reorientation, the defense minister was aware of the necessity to limit the 
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scope and duration of German contributions to international missions in order not to 
overburden the Bundeswehr during its phase of reforms.406 
The Bundeswehr’s future structure would be primarily informed by these new 
missions.407 Joint military capabilities of the armed forces as a whole should have 
priority over capabilities of the army, the air force, or the navy, indicating a renunciation 
from the traditional single service-oriented thinking. In this context, the VPR defined a 
basic capability profile consisting of six different categories: command and control; 
intelligence collection and reconnaissance; mobility; effective engagement; support and 
sustainability; and survivability and protection.  
Did the VPR represent the necessary quantum leap to prepare the Bundeswehr for 
the challenges of the twenty-first century? At first glance, the guidelines seemed to be in 
line with similar assessments of both NATO and the EU—the main landmarks of German 
security policy. However, the VPR suffered from a lack of broad and effective support 
within the Schröder administration. They had not been developed as an interagency 
project, incorporating the expertise of other important actors in the field of foreign and 
security policy. Both the need for a sufficient funding of the reforms and the German 
mantra of a ―comprehensive approach to security‖ would have called for the 
involvement—or at least the consent—of the Foreign Office, the Chancellor’s Office, the 
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, and, above all, the Ministry of 
Finance. Instead, the VPR were solely hammered out by the Ministry of Defense.  
One of the underlying reasons for this approach was Struck’s attempt to 
circumvent any intra-governmental debates about the question of whether German 
security policy should focus on the trans-Atlantic link through NATO or on the European 
Union.408 Since both the chancellor and the foreign minister were avowed 
―Europeanists,‖ such concerns were justifiable from the perspective of the traditionally 
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―Atlanticist‖ Ministry of Defense. Thus, the VPR were an important conceptual 
groundwork rather than a widely accepted strategic outlook. 
3. From Vision to Reality—Conceptualizing the VPR 
After the VPR had been released, the Weisung zur Weiterentwicklung der 
Bundeswehr [WWB] (Directive for the Advancement of the Bundeswehr) of October 
2003 paved the way for the next reform steps. This directive tasked the BMVg to develop 
a concept for implementing the VPR, a proposal for the future role of the 
Generalinspekteur, and a draft of a new military basing concept. 
The Generalinspekteur, General Wolfgang Schneiderhan, announced his concept 
for the implementation of the guiding principles and axioms of the VPR in August 2004. 
This Konzeption der Bundeswehr [KdB]409 (Concept for the Bundeswehr) made 
statements about and specifications for the role of the armed forces in future conflicts as 
well as vis-à-vis Germany’s international allies, the force structure, a portfolio of joint 
capabilities, and the future of conscription. 
The KdB recognized the need for a new approach to military reforms. The 
dynamic security environment seemed to render obsolete any former series of successive 
reforms which had featured a clearly framed beginning and end. Rather, the Bundeswehr 
had to become an adaptive and flexible organization, capable of meeting future 
challenges through a process of permanent realignment and ―transformation.‖ This 
transformation was defined as ―a political task and a military goal—a mission derived 
from a vision for using Information Age technologies, proven business practices and 
management procedures, and knowledge-based leadership in security and defense 
management.‖410 
Consequently, the KdB emphasized the importance of Vernetzte 
Operationsführung as one of the essential driving factors of German military 
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transformation. NetOpFü was regarded as a means to increase both the operational 
effectiveness of German forces and their interoperability by shortening the technological 
gap between the Bundeswehr and major allies such as the United States. This approach 
was expected to trigger a German version of the U.S. ―revolution in military affairs.‖ 
Furthermore, the KdB reiterated the main message of the VPR, namely that the 
defense of Germany must not be restrained to national borders. Rather, threats had to be 
met at an early stage and where they emerged. Therefore, out-of-area conflict prevention 
and crisis management, including the fight against international terrorism, were defined 
as the Bundeswehr’s main task.411 As a consequence, its force structure, doctrine, and 
equipment had to be adapted comprehensively. The Bundeswehr had to develop a joint 
capability portfolio along the lines of the six main capability classes of the VPR. 
With regard to the overall strength of the Bundeswehr, the KdB announced a 
further reduction from 285,000 to 252,500 troops.412 This downsizing was mainly caused 
by the tense situation of the defense budget. In order to free financial resources for 
essential modernization and capability enhancement programs, operating costs had to be 
minimized. In the face of urgent internal and external transformation pressures a larger 
Bundeswehr was simply not affordable any more. Therefore, staff was suspended, bases 
were closed and major weapon systems were decommissioned.  
Based on these parameters, the KdB determined the national ―level of ambition 
(LoA):‖ a contingent of up 14,000 troops for peacekeeping operations, capable of 
operating in up to five different low to medium intensity conflicts, and a joint task force 
of up to 35,000 troops for multinational peace-enforcing operations. In consideration of 
Germany’s international commitments and the LoA, the Bundeswehr was divided into 
three different force categories: first, 35,000 Eingreifkräfte (response forces), comprising 
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high-readiness forces of all services, trained and equipped to conduct combined 
operations in high-intensity environments; second, 70,000 Stabilisierungskräfte 
(stabilization forces), specialized in long-term engagements in post-conflict 
reconstruction and peacekeeping missions; and third, 106,000 Unterstützungskräfte 
(support forces),413 responsible for supplementing and enabling the two other force 
categories and also providing basic homeland requirements and training facilities.414 
 
Figure 10. Bundeswehr Force Categories415 
At first glance, the Eingreifkräfte, with their profile of expeditionary warfare, 
seemed to deviate significantly from the antimilitaristic strand of German strategic 
culture. However, their total number of 35,000 simply stemmed from an addition of the 
15,000 NRF troops, the 18,000 Headline Goal troops, 1,000 UNSAS416 troops, and 1,000 
troops for national evacuation operations. Thus, almost all of the German high-readiness 
forces were exclusively dedicated to NATO and the EU. In other words, the Bundeswehr 
was far from establishing an offensive national power projection capability. Rather, the 
Eingreifkräfte represented a strong commitment to ―never again alone.‖  
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Nonetheless, the underlying idea of these standing intervention forces remained a 
provocation in a sense because the German public was unlikely to support any Iraq-type 
venture of the NRF. Therefore, it is remarkable that the creation of this force category did 
not result in any public outcry in Germany. On the contrary, both political elites and the 
general public seemed to accept Defense Minister Struck’s new concept.417  
After all, the gradually differentiated profiles of the three force categories 
accounted for the overall lack of financial resources. Only the Eingreifkräfte were 
eligible for state-of-the-art equipment. Hence, the transformation was a classical 
compromise—the least common denominator between external obligations and the 
willingness to accept different quality standards in the Bundeswehr. Thus, the 
combination of scarce financial resources and the traditional desire to live up to 
international expectations once again shaped the face of the Bundeswehr. 
a. Leaner and Meaner? 
How did the budgetary situation and the new conceptual tripartition of 
force categories affect the services as well as the organizational areas in general and the 
force structures in particular? First of all, the three services were faced with the necessity 
to disband forces and to decommission units in order to free financial resources in the 
short-run. For example, the German air force had to disband all its Roland and Hawk air 
defense units and decommission a total of ninety Tornado fighter bombers. The navy 
handed its remaining jet aircraft over to the air force and decommissioned parts of its fast 
patrol boats.418 This abdication of certain military capabilities was perceived as the only 
way of ensuring the planned procurement of major weapon systems such as the 
Eurofighter, the A-400M, and the NH-90 as well as new frigates, corvettes, and 
submarines. 
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The German army was also hit hard by additional force reductions. From 
its former eight division commands only five, with a total of twelve brigades, were 
supposed to form the operational forces of the ―New Army‖ of 2010.419  
 
Figure 11. Bundeswehr Force Structure (2010)420 
As Figure 11 shows, the army had to provide the bulk of both response 
and stabilization forces. The overall goal was to be able to bring to bear up to one army 
division in ―NRF-like‖ rapid-response, high-intensity operations in a multinational 
setting.421 The other four divisions were mainly labeled as stabilization forces, available 
for the out-of-area missions of the Bundeswehr.422 
In this context, the army was confronted with several difficulties. First, the 
creation of a ―response forces division‖ required thorough training, and above all, 
sophisticated equipment. Interoperability, including network-enabled capabilities, 
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deployability and effectiveness were essential features of such a highly capable 
formation. However, the ongoing large-scale procurement programs of the other services 
rendered a short-term resolution of the army’s capability shortfalls impossible. Second, 
the prioritization of the army’s response forces was likely to have negative consequences 
for its stabilization forces. On the one hand, the emphasis on this force category could be 
perceived as a step towards a ―two-tier army,‖ with a small, but modern part at the one 
end and the bulk of the army with ageing material at the other.423 On the other hand, the 
Stabilisierungskräfte were permanently tied down by the current international missions of 
the Bundeswehr and urgently in need of better equipment. This fact would actually have 
called for a reversal of the army’s procurement priorities at the time.424  
Notwithstanding these challenges, the army also contributed to the 
establishment of additional German command and control structures by reorganizing the 
headquarters of the II German-U.S. army corps in Ulm. Subsequently, this corps 
headquarters was converted to the Kommando Operative Führung Eingreifkräfte 
[KdoOpFüEingrKr] (Response Forces Operations Command) in 2005. This joint 
command marked the nucleus of a deployable multinational Force Headquarters (FHQ) 
that could, for example, control EU operations according to the specifications of the 
Helsinki Headline Goal. Because its internal structure resembled the provisions of 
NATO’s CJTF concept, it could meet international standards. The headquarters closed a 
capability gap because Germany could now provide an OHQ as well as an FHQ for 
NATO- and EU missions.425 Consequently, the new command was yet another sign of 
Germany’s willingness to assume greater responsibility on the international stage. 
While the three services faced further reductions at the time, one important 
result of the concept of transformation was the increased importance of the 
Streitkräftebasis. It has previously been mentioned that this new organizational area had 
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been much more than a joint logistics organization from the outset. Rather, it combined a 
broad range of strategic enablers and essential support functions, thereby bridging the 
gulf between Germany and all Bundeswehr missions abroad.  
In light of the emphasis on the joint capability portfolio of the Bundeswehr 
as a whole and growing international obligations the Streitkräftebasis became a focal 
point of transformation.426 Its logistics, signal, and other units contributed substantially to 
the capability classes of intelligence collection and reconnaissance, mobility, and support 
and sustainability. Furthermore, the SKB played a central role with regard to a national 
command and control organization. Its agencies and units not only comprised the 
Bundeswehr Operations Command, but were also crucial for the development of a 
NetOpFü framework and architecture. 
In 2003, the Chief of Staff of the Joint Support Service was assigned with 
the responsibilities of the Vice Chief of Staff, Bundeswehr. The personal union of these 
two influential positions and the fact that the other services had to hand over 
competences, capabilities and personnel over to the Generalinspekteur and the Joint 
Support Service underlined the significance of the SKB within the Bundeswehr. 
In general, the evolution of the Streitkräftebasis is an example that reflects 
the profound changes that were beginning to materialize within the German military. Had 
the reforms of the 1990s mainly consisted of force reductions and improvised measures 
to help fulfill international obligations, the transformation process initiated fundamental 
alterations and adaptations that were irreversible. Transformation and the aspect of 
―jointness‖ did not only have an impact on the capabilities and structures of the 
Bundeswehr. The whole system of military education, training and doctrine had to be 
adapted as well. Whenever feasible, single-services schools were replaced by joint 
schools.427 For example, a logistics school of the Bundeswehr was founded which served  
 
                                                 
426 The Streitkräftebasis is also a joint service in itself because its personnel comprise all three 
services (71% army, 22% air force, 7% navy). Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Die Streitkräftebasis 
(Bonn, October 2006), 10. 
427 Engelhardt, Transforming the German Bundeswehr: The Way Ahead, 98. 
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all three services. The establishment of a joint general staff officer education program in 
2004 also proved that ―jointness‖ was not an empty cliché any more.428 The Bundeswehr 
entered a new era. 
b. Strengthening the Office of the Generalinspekteur 
This new chapter also pertained to the role and influence of the 
Generalinspekteur, which had traditionally been a sensitive issue within the BMVg. The 
WWB instructed the director of the policy planning staff of the BMVg to develop a 
follow-up document for the ―Blankeneser Erlass‖ (Blankenese Directive) of 1970 which 
had administered the competences and tasks of the Generalinspekteur. 
On January 21, 2005, Defense Minister Struck published the so-called 
―Berliner Erlass‖ (Berlin Directive), which rearranged the assignment of responsibilities 
and the processes at the highest ministerial level.429 The Generalinspekteur remained the 
military advisor of the German government, the highest-ranking soldier of the 
Bundeswehr, its representative in all international committees at the CHOD level, and the 
immediate superior of the armed forces staff within the BMVg. With regard to 
Germany’s international obligations he was officially enthroned as the central planning, 
coordinating and control authority for all Bundeswehr missions in Germany and abroad. 
Additionally, he became responsible for force planning, concept development, and the 
operational readiness for the armed forces as a whole. This included the right to define 
military capabilities that were deemed necessary for the fulfillment of the Bundeswehr’s 
tasks and to issue general instructions about joint doctrine and training.  
Although the new document did not fully undermine the strong position of 
the chiefs of staff of the single services, it strengthened the role of the Generalinspekteur 
significantly. The ―Berliner Erlass‖ represented a major step forward with regard to 
coherence in defense planning and national command and control. This was also a clear 
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sign of further normalization in civil-military relations in Germany. A more powerful 
position of the Generalinspekteur was the result of challenging externalities and a 
diminishing skepticism of political vis-à-vis military elites. 
c. Additional Base Closures 
Like his predecessor, Defense Minister Struck attempted to reduce the 
financial burden of high operating costs of the Bundeswehr by addressing the issue of 
base closures. He announced a new Stationierungskonzept (military basing concept) in 
2004, which led to a further reduction of military installations.430 Some scholars claim 
that Struck expedited these base closures to ensure that this sensitive issue would not be a 
source of political disputes in the run-up to the next federal elections in 2006.431 Bases in 
105 locations were earmarked for closing over the next few years.432 The Bundeswehr 
was supposed to have concentrated all of its garrisons and facilities at a total of 392 
locations by the end of 2010.433 Taking an economical approach, the BMVg wanted the 
future military basing to be exclusively based on military and functional aspects434 as 
well as on cost-effectiveness. As a consequence, the Bundeswehr's role of being an 
economic ―sponsor‖ of underdeveloped regions in Germany gradually diminished. Since 
the overall peacetime strength of the Bundeswehr was further reduced, mainly by drafting 
less conscripts, the armed forces ceased to be part of the everyday life in many German 
cities. 
4. Retaining Conscription 
The fact that regular conscripts would comprise less than one-fifth of the 
Bundeswehr cast doubt on the future role of conscription. Compulsory military service 
had always taken center stage in civil-military relations. It had been deeply ingrained in 
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German strategic culture as a means to prevent the reemergence of German militarism 
and a ―state within the state.‖ A whole generation of ―elder statesmen,‖ influential 
politicians of the catch-all parties, and high-ranking Bundeswehr officials kept being 
informed by this notion. However, this axiom was not only questioned by the long-
standing and strict democratic control over the armed forces, but also by the growing 
number of international obligations and missions that called for volunteers. 
In particular, the Green party, as well as the oppositional FDP, advocated an 
intermission of conscription. Since an agreement between the SPD and the Greens could 
not be reached over this controversial issue during the negotiations about a coalition 
agreement in 2002, a final decision was postponed to the end of the legislative period.435 
Being a strong proponent of the idea of integrating the Bundeswehr into society, 
Defense Minister Struck retained conscription. Consequently, his VPR stated that 
conscripts were deemed vital for the overall readiness and efficiency of the Bundeswehr 
as well as its ability to reconstitute in case of a serious crisis or an emergency such as a 
natural disaster or a terrorist attack. There were some practical reasons for this stance as 
well. Conscripts had always been a valuable pool for recruitment—many officers and 
enlisted personnel had started their Bundeswehr careers that way.436 Additionally, the 
future force structure would provide a total of 25,000 positions for conscripts who could 
voluntarily serve an extended period of up to twenty-three months. These volunteers 
would be available for international military missions.437 Thus, the VPR were used to 
defend conscription against its political opponents.438  In this case German strategic 
culture as well as practical deliberations impeded a radical shift in this particular area of 
German defense policy. 
                                                 
435 The coalition agreement stated that the constitutional foundations of conscription would be revised 
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E. CONCLUSION 
This section has shown that the transformation of the Bundeswehr, which had 
been initiated in 2004, was once again shaped by external developments and trends as 
well as domestic factors, including strategic culture. Transformation was a decisive and 
drastic attempt to adapt essential parts of the notoriously underfunded German armed 
forces to its most likely future tasks. By deliberately sacrificing obsolete structures, bases 
and equipment it finally increased the Bundeswehr's leeway to modernize. Although the 
Bundeswehr could not match the operational readiness and the professionalism of, for 
example, the British or the French forces at the time, its new threefold structure and the 
emphasis on capabilities of the Bundeswehr as a whole rather than on single Services or 
even systems facilitated a future-oriented approach.  
The focus on network enabled capabilities paved the way for developing 
innovative programs that would improve the Bundeswehr's interoperability in the 
medium term. Transformation also laid the foundations for a change of the predominant 
mindset within the forces by triggering a joint and more mission-oriented way of thinking 
which was essential for gradually overcoming the traditional dominance of the Services. 
The new force categories ensured that Germany was able to meet its obligations with 
regard to NATO, the EU, and current out-of-area missions. Taking the initial difficulties 
to establish national command and control structures during the 1990s into account it was 
one of the remarkable achievement of transformation that Germany was even able to 
provide headquarters for multinational missions at the end of 2005.  
Nonetheless, the overall lack of resources once again resulted in a security and 
defense policy that reacted to external developments rather than seizing the initiative. 
Therefore, agenda setting took place elsewhere. Although Germany had become a 
―security provider‖ and an increasingly capable partner in international military missions, 
it was far from being an active ―framer‖ of security policy. 
All in all, Defense Minister Struck’s decision to shift the role of the Bundeswehr 
from territorial defense to conflict prevention and crisis management was a major leap 
forward and initiated the most fundamental military reform in the post-Cold War era. At 
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the same time, however, Struck tried to ―calm down‖ calls for an end of conscription and 
opposition against alleged German ―intervention capabilities‖ and therefore abstained 
from any thorough discussion among political elites and the general public. His project 
remained exclusively in the hands of the BMVg. Struck and others did not seek a broad 
elite or societal consensus about the question of why Germany's security had to be 
defended in places like the Hindu Kush. As a consequence, the remarkable processes of 
change that were beginning to transform the Bundeswehr into a full-fledged foreign 
policy instrument remained largely unrecognized by the general public—a fact that 
contributed to spurring new discussions about the role of the Bundeswehr in following 
years. 
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VI. SECURITY POLICY AND MILITARY TRANSFORMATION 
SINCE 2005 
The federal elections of 2005 brought a grand coalition of the CDU and the SPD 
into power, the first such cabinet since that of 1966-1969. Chancellor Angela Merkel, 
Germany’s first female head of government and protégé of former Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl, sought reconciliation with the United States over the Iraq issue at the beginning of 
her tenure.439 She also attempted to maintain good bilateral relations with France and 
Russia and to spur new initiatives for European integration after the failure of the EU 
Constitutional Treaty. All in all, her foreign and security policy initially followed 
traditional patterns and was marked by a return to the classical role of a ―balancer‖ in the 
triangle between Washington and Paris and the desire for being perceived as a reliable 
ally.440 Most recently, however, Germany’s refusal in 2011 to participate in Anglo-
French-U.S. NATO military operations in Libya has called this reliability into question 
and has recalled the Schröder policy of Germany between the camps as in former times.  
Merkel’s first Defense Minister, Franz-Josef Jung, was stigmatized by the 
German media and professional soldiers as the weak minister in her cabinet because he 
often seemed to be overstrained by his position.441 Jung was not an agenda-setter like his 
predecessor, Peter Struck. It is therefore unsurprising that during his tenure from 2005 to 
2009, the transformation of the Bundeswehr mainly meant an implementation of the 
reforms that had been initiated earlier. Nonetheless, new impulses for change stemmed 
from the international environment, namely from the experiences gained during the  
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ongoing German engagement in Afghanistan that became more violent and problematic 
in these years, as well as from new security and military missions under the auspices of 
the EU and the UN.  
Military transformation during the second tenure of Chancellor Merkel was first 
and foremost caused by an external shock: the world financial crisis of 2008–2009 atop 
the strains caused by the impact of September 11 on the international system. This crisis 
resulted in the need to consolidate government deficits anew. Subsequent cuts in defense 
spending were regarded as inevitable by the ruling CDU-FDP coalition. In this context, 
Franz-Josef Jung’s successor as Defense Minister, Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg (CSU)—
a high profile politician celebrity and rising star in the cabinet—proved crucial for 
initiating proposals for a new reform and bringing conscription to an end in 2010. 
A. THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
Apart from the role played by individual decision-makers, the international 
environment continued to inform German security and defense. The period from 2005 
onward saw both NATO and the EU at a crossroads. While NATO’s involvement in 
Afghanistan became a growing source of discord among the member states, the failure of 
the EU’s Constitutional Treaty threatened the future of ESDP and defense integration.  
The diverging perspectives between NATO and the EU were yet another area of 
concern. These views partially stemmed from different approaches on both sides of the 
Atlantic, or as one observer notes: ―[…] the United States has tended to prioritize military 
instruments over diplomatic, unilateral approaches over multilateral, war-fighting over 
nation-building and ad hoc coalition forming over Alliance nurturing. The EU, for its 
part, has done pretty much the opposite.‖442 
1. Major Developments in NATO 
The trans-Atlantic rift and the notions of an ―old‖ versus a ―new‖ Europe that had 
emerged in the years 2002–2005 amid the Iraq War led to a crisis in NATO as serious as 
the one in 1956 over Suez. The course of events resulted in a rapprochement of the allies 
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after 2005, granted the alternative (NATO’s collapse and unacceptable political costs for 
all). Because of their large-scale military commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, the 
United States in the second Bush cabinet ―rediscovered‖ NATO as a forum for mutual 
support and burden-sharing.443 The Merkel government, on the other hand, reemphasized 
the role of the Alliance as the anchor of German security and moved away from overly 
close bilateral security cooperation with France and the flirtations with the Russia of 
Vladimir Putin. 
NATO’s expanding military security building and possible combat role in 
Afghanistan, however, was a source of further tensions within the Alliance. The longer 
the ISAF mission continued, the larger the gap became between political rhetoric and 
actual military commitments by certain the allies. Capability shortfalls, a lack of domestic 
public support, and diverging assessments about the right approach to stabilize the 
country proved to be additional obstacles to Alliance cohesion, as did the operational and 
legal restrictions—also known as national caveats and a feature in NATO of long 
standing—of Germany and other participating countries.444 In short, most NATO 
members that participated in ISAF were plagued by ―deployment fatigue.‖  
Furthermore, the escalation of violence and the increase in military forces 
deployed to Afghanistan also affected the NATO Response Force—the catalyst of NATO 
transformation. The NRF had been declared fully operational at the Riga Summit in 
November 2006.445  Granted the NRF’s character as a strategic reserve and expeditionary 
force, its troops did not participate in peacekeeping and stabilization missions in Kosovo 
or Afghanistan and hence represented an additional military burden to troop-contributing  
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nations. Therefore, in 2008 the Alliance adopted a more flexible cadre structure for the 
NRF, relying on a core of immediately available troops and reinforcements with a lower 
readiness status.446  
All in all, NATO’s post-2001 course toward becoming a global actor that was 
perpetually engaged in costly military ventures was marked by the recurrent divergence 
of interests and policies, as is the norm in NATO.447 These different perspectives made a 
compromise and a reappraisal of NATO’s role inevitable in order to keep the Alliance 
intact.  
As a consequence, NATO developed a new Strategic Concept, announced at the 
Lisbon Summit in November 2010 to replace the document of 1999. This concept 
reflected influences of different interest groups within the Alliance because it 
simultaneously underlined the importance of collective defense, crisis management, and 
cooperative security.448 Based on a revised threat assessment, member states decided to 
complement NATO’s conventional and nuclear defense posture with such new 
capabilities as ballistic missile defense, cyber defense, a capacity to contribute to energy 
security, and civilian crisis management. Because the EU already had civilian crisis 
management capabilities and instruments, the latter goal raised questions about the future 
of NATO-EU relations. 
2. Major Developments in the European Union 
In this context, the small island of Cyprus in the Mediterranean, as an expression 
of greater issues of security and geography, became a real obstacle to better cooperation 
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between the two organizations. Due to the fact that the southern part, the Republic of 
Cyprus, had been admitted to the EU in 2004 without a previous political solution for the 
Turkish-Greek dispute over the divided island, the issue has hampered a closer security 
cooperation between NATO and the EU ever since.449 This stalemate has effectively 
blocked EU military missions with recourse to NATO resources under the ―Berlin Plus‖ 
framework because of the fate of Turkey in the European system. Consequently, the EU 
had to conduct its missions autonomously after 2004. Without access to NATO’s vast 
pool of military capabilities, efficient planning processes, and command structures, EU 
members had to make greater national efforts and contributions to missions. Thus, 
Germany and other countries had to ensure that they had sufficient capabilities at their 
disposal to support EU missions. 
After the failure of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005, the Lisbon Treaty marked 
the attempt to regain momentum in the process of European integration. With regard to 
CSDP, the document provided the notion of a ―permanent structured cooperation,‖ which 
basically allowed for a group of member states to intensify their cooperation on issues of 
security and defense. In theory, this concept provided an excellent vehicle for enhanced 
European defense integration and military transformation, especially among the more 
powerful member states. However, Germany’s reluctance to include more than training, 
logistics, and command structures in the approach was not received well by Paris and 
London.450 Thus, France and the United Kingdom agreed to a bilateral defense initiative 
outside the institutional framework of the permanent structured cooperation in 2010. 
Observers agree that this bilateral approach casts doubt on the future of CSDP because 
the latter is not viable without an active commitment of the ―big three:‖ France, 
Germany, and the United Kingdom.451 These bilateral activities pose a real threat to 
German military transformation. Since the institutionalization of ESDP/CSDP in 1999, 
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the EU has always been a driving force for the development and improvement of military 
capabilities of the member states. If France and the United Kingdom turned away from 
this established modus operandi because of frustrations over a lack of real progress, 
Germany would be unable to fill that gap.  
3. Implications and Challenges for the Bundeswehr 
Notwithstanding these more fundamental aspects of European defense integration, 
actual ESDP missions had a concrete impact on the Bundeswehr. For example, in 
December 2005, the EU was invited by the UN to deploy armed forces to an assistance 
mission in the Democratic Republic (DR) of Congo. After the request had been approved 
by the EU Council in March 2006 Germany provided the Operation Commander and the 
Bundeswehr Operations Command in Potsdam assumed responsibility as the EU 
Operation Headquarters (OHQ) for the mission. Additionally, Germany’s commitment 
comprised 780 military personnel.452 The operation once again underlined the capability 
shortfalls with regard to strategic airlift.453 It also proved that the Operations Command 
did not have enough capacities to run an international mission and to oversee all other 
German deployments simultaneously. 
While such EU missions were clearly limited in scale, intensity, and duration, the 
German participation in ISAF presented the Bundeswehr with the most serious 
challenges in its history—mainly because the nature of the mission changed 
fundamentally over time from peace building without violence to a combat role amid 
security and state building. The difference could not have been more striking between the 
situation in 2003, when roughly 2,000 German troops were fielded in Kabul and 
conducted their patrols without helmets, and the situation in 2010, when a contingent of  
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5,350 Bundeswehr soldiers employed over 1,100 armored vehicles, pieces of heavy 
artillery, and dozens of infantry fighting vehicles against insurgents in northern 
Afghanistan.454  
Against this background, the ISAF mission brought several unresolved problems 
of strategy, operations, command, and materiel to the fore. Given the chronic lack of 
strategic and modern tactical airlift capacities, it remained a challenge for the 
Bundeswehr to operate and resupply in that large area and under adverse climatic 
conditions. As the growing insurgency called for a robust military presence, more and 
more armored vehicles, above all with mine protection, were needed.455 Thus, the 
Afghan theater often served as a catalyst for new operational and technical requirements 
or as a test bed for new weapon system.456  
The substantial increase in deployed Bundeswehr troops and the urgent need for 
light forces also underscored a general lack of infantry units in the German army as it has 
evolved since 1990. The long-term character of the Afghanistan mission cast doubt on the 
three force categories of the Bundeswehr: response, stabilization, and support forces. 
Above all, the stabilization forces of the army proved insufficient to sustain their different 
operations abroad. Therefore, the army had to deploy parts of its response forces to 
Afghanistan—a force category that was not earmarked for this kind of stabilization 
operation. 
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Apart from these technical or organizational aspects, the ISAF mission also raised 
the fundamental issue of German casualties. For the first time in German out-of-area 
military missions since 1990, Bundeswehr ground troops had to conduct costly 
counterinsurgency operations and suffered battle deaths and wounded.457 The long-term 
effects of soldiers who have experienced continuous fighting and of a growing number of 
Afghanistan veterans with post-traumatic stress disorders or disabilities on the self-
perception and inner order of the Bundeswehr cannot be fully estimated yet. The growing 
number of fallen or injured soldiers also ignited heated debates among German political 
elites and increased public opposition against a German military involvement 
Afghanistan because these concomitants of the mission challenged the traditional element 
of antimilitarism in German strategic culture. 
B. GERMAN STRATEGIC CULTURE—BACK TO THE ROOTS? 
While Bundeswehr missions abroad had generally experienced high levels of 
political support in the Bundestag during the second tenure of Chancellor Schröder, this 
trend did not endure fully during the Merkel chancellorship. 
One of the controversial issues was the EU’s military support for the UN 
peacekeeping mission MONUC458 in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2006. 
Initially, France had proposed to deploy one of the new EU Battle Groups to that country. 
However, Germany as the lead nation of that Battle Group at the time was unwilling to 
bear the whole military and financial burden and to shoulder such a potentially dangerous 
venture basically on its own.459 As a consequence, France and other EU members agreed 
to contribute troops and to conduct the mission without recourse to the Battle Group. The 
subsequent deployment of European troops under German command was only approved 
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459 Thomas Jäger, ―EUFOR RD Congo: Defizite eines glücklich verlaufenen Einsatzes,‖ in Armee im 
Einsatz, eds. Hans J. Gießmann and Armin Wagner (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2009) 355. 
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because Germany wanted to strengthen the multilateral security regimes of the UN and 
the EU.460 Opponents of a Bundeswehr participation stated that Germany had no vital 
interests in the area and should not get involved into issues of such former European 
colonial powers as France or Belgium. After the debates in the Bundestag in early June 
2006, only seventy-five percent of the parliamentarians voted in favor of the mission—a 
number that was significantly lower than previous ballots.461 Even the government itself 
was not eager to send German troops deep into Africa as part of an autonomous ESDP 
mission. The fact that German decision-makers insisted on stationing Bundeswehr 
combat troops as an ―over-the-horizon‖ force in the neighboring Gabon instead of the 
RD Congo and that the mission was limited to four months underlines this reluctance. 
Thus, EUFOR RD Congo highlighted that Germany’s Bündnisräson—its preference for 
―never again alone‖—was far from becoming the dominant hallmark of its strategic 
culture. 
Another mission that stirred political disputes was the maritime support for the 
UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). While it had been self-evident that Germany 
would provide Lebanon with humanitarian aid and technical assistance after the short but 
violent Israeli campaign in 2006, the plans for a deployment of German armed forces met 
domestic resistance. Politicians from all parties claimed that there remained a risk of 
Bundeswehr troops as part of the UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon getting involved in 
accidental firefights with soldiers of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).462 Given 
Germany’s historic responsibility for the Holocaust, such a worst-case scenario had to be 
avoided under all circumstances. On the other hand, representatives of the Merkel 
government pointed out that it was exactly Germany’s historic responsibility for the state 
                                                 
460 Denis M. Tull, ―Die Führung und Beteiligung der Bundeswehr an EUFOR RD Congo,‖ in 
Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr; Leitfragen, Entscheidungsspielräume und Lehren, ed. Stefan Mair 
(Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2007), 69. 
461 135 politicians (out of a total of 581) from all parties voted against the military mission. 
―Namentliche Abstimmungen der 16. Wahlperiode,‖ official website of the Bundestag, 
http://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/datenhandbuch/07/07_13/07_13_06.html (accessed May 16, 2011). 
462 Muriel Asseburg, ―Der Bundeswehreinsatz im Libanon: Die Maritime Task Force im Rahmen von 
UNIFIL plus,‖ in Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr; Leitfragen, Entscheidungsspielräume und Lehren, ed. 
Stefan Mair (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2007), 100. 
 130 
of Israel that called for an active involvement in the UNIFIL mission.463 As a result, 
German participation in the Maritime Task Force (MTF) UNIFIL was approved by a 
majority of seventy-two percent of the members of the Bundestag in September 2006.464 
The discussions about the first ever Bundeswehr mission in the Middle East close to 
Israeli borders brought a re-interpretation of ―never again genocide‖ to the fore: because 
ensuring the survival of an independent state of Israel had always been part of Germany’s 
post-war Staatsräson, a military effort to stabilize the region would contribute to this 
primary goal. However, Germany decided to deploy only navy units in order to minimize 
the risk of getting caught in any kind of crossfire with IDF forces.  
It was the Afghanistan mission that mutated into the most contentious issue in the 
German strategic discourse. It proved that the anti-war elements of German strategic 
culture could not and cannot be easily overcome. German participation had initially been 
based on solidarity with the United States, and not on support for the notion of a Global 
War on Terror that called for decisive military action. Therefore, the way in which 
German political elites tried to elucidate the importance and purpose of this military 
involvement to the German public between 2001 and 2009 underlined that it remains 
difficult for Germany to come to terms with a more assertive stance on security and 
defense issues. Representatives of almost all political parties always emphasized the 
peaceful aspects of the Bundeswehr’s activities—delivering humanitarian aid and 
rebuilding a viable Afghan state which could not be held hostage again by extremist 
groups and terrorists. They portrayed the German troops in Afghanistan as some sort of 
―armed development workers‖ who mainly drilled well holes and built roads and 
schools.465 However, when the insurgency spread through the southern and eastern  
 
 
                                                 
463 Mara Albrecht, ―Einsatz im Nahen Osten: Die UNIFIL und die Maritime Task Force im Libanon,‖ 
in Armee im Einsatz, eds. Hans J. Gießmann and Armin Wagner (Baden-Baden: Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft, 2009) 369. 
464 The fact that both Israel and Lebanon publicly announced their support for the Bundeswehr 
deployment made the decision easier on the German side. 
465 In this context, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) with their military and civilian 
capacities were regarded as a successful instrument of the comprehensive approach to Afghan security. 
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provinces of Afghanistan and the death toll among ISAF troops began to rise after 2006, 
it became increasingly difficult to uphold this notion of a purely peacekeeping and 
stabilization mission.  
Public statements and coverage in the German media even tried to contrast the 
robustness of allied military operations in the south and in the east that apparently 
resulted in many civilian casualties and collateral damage with the peaceful German 
approach in the north.466 Consequently, the German government rejected claims of the 
United States and other NATO allies to send troops to those hard-fought regions. In the 
face of strong public resistance against a German participation in combat operations in 
Afghanistan, German decision-makers tried to avoid these calls of ―Germans to the front‖ 
at all cost.467 Instead, Germany offered to deploy Tornado reconnaissance aircraft to 
Afghanistan in 2007.468 This measure can be seen as yet another compromise between 
the need to meet the demands of its international partners and a domestic anti-war 
sentiment. 
Even when the insurgency spilled over to the German area of responsibility in 
northern Afghanistan and Bundeswehr troops were attacked regularly, Defense Minister 
Jung was reluctant to clearly denote those events as an ―armed conflict‖ or ―war‖ in his 
official rhetoric, granted the legal issues and the anti-war political culture more generally. 
Only in 2008 did he use the term ―killed in action‖ for the first time for soldiers who had 
been killed by improvised explosive devices (IED) or suicide bombers.469  
This evasive approach became a political boomerang when the most severe civil-
military incident of crisis in command in conflict in Germany’s post-war era took place: 
                                                 
466 Dieter Weiss, ―Deutschland am Hindukusch,‖ Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 43 (2008), 9. 
467 ―Germans to the Front,‖ Handelsblatt, November 20, 2006, http://www.handelsblatt.com/germans-
to-the-front/2735298.html (accessed May 13, 2011). 
468 Subsequently, six RECCE TORNADO jets were deployed to Mazar-e-Sharif.  Gareis, Militärische 
Beiträge zur Sicherheit, 108. From 2007 to 2010 these aircraft conducted several thousand reconnaissance 
flights over the whole Afghan territory and contributed substantially to the situational awareness of the 
ISAF mission. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Die Bundeswehr: modern und leistungsstark (Berlin: 
February 2009), 32. 
469 ―Jung spricht erstmals von Gefallenen,‖ Die WELT, October 25, 2008, 
http://www.welt.de/welt_print/article2624476/Jung-spricht-erstmals-von-Gefallenen.html (accessed May 
13, 2011). Prior to that, he had talked about soldiers who had ―lost their lives‖ during the ISAF mission. 
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the accidental bombing of Afghan civilians on September 4, 2009.470 The incident came 
at a time when there was a clear strategic and operational divide between Europe and the 
United States over the appropriate strategy for the overall campaign in Afghanistan.471 
Because the U.S. commander of the ISAF mission, General Stanley McChrystal, had 
ordered that civilian casualties and collateral damage be kept to a minimum, Germany 
was heavily criticized by both the Afghan government and its international partners for 
the incident.  At the same time, the dilemmas of command were dissected in the media, 
and opinion polls demonstrated that a growing number of Germans objected to further 
participation of Bundeswehr troops in the ISAF. Taking the aforementioned rhetoric 
about the peaceful German stabilization operations in northern Afghanistan into account, 
it was unsurprising that the incident provoked political upheaval in Germany about 
policy, civil military relations, the nature of conflict and the role of soldiers. In its 
aftermath three high-ranking officials, Minister Jung, then Generalinspekteur Wolfgang 
Schneiderhan, and one of the undersecretaries of defense, all lost their posts once the new 
Defense Minister, Karl Theodor zu Guttenberg, assumed office in 2009 as the new broom 
to sort out the problems with the Bundeswehr. Eventually, even Chancellor Merkel had to 
testify in front of a parliamentary investigation committee.  
In light of the immense political costs, it can be argued that the Kunduz episode 
may have a lasting effect on German security thinking by reaffirming the traditional 
―never again war‖ stance in security and defense policy. Germany’s 2011 abstention in 
the UN Security Council in conjunction with a resolution allowing for air strikes against 
the Libyan dictator Gaddafi amid the Arab Spring of 2011 and the subsequent German 
refusal to participate in the military operations might be a consequence of the accidental 
bombing in Afghanistan in 2009, at least to some extent.  
                                                 
470 On September 4, 2009, the German military commander of the PRT in Kunduz requested a U.S. 
airstrike against a fuel truck which had been hijacked by insurgents because he feared a terrorist attack 
against his own troops and also wanted to target some Taliban leaders. Because parts of the local 
population tried to steal fuel from the truck, which had a break down in a dry riverbed, the bombing not 
only killed the insurgents but also several civilians from nearby villages. Press reports about the attack 
stated that over 100 people were killed in the incident. ―Schneiderhan fühlt sich aus dem Amt gemobbt,‖ 
SPIEGEL Online, March 18, 2010, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,684391,00.html 
(accessed May 13, 2011).  
471 ―NATO Strike Magnifies Divide on Afghan War,‖ The New York Times, September 4, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/05/world/asia/05afghan.html (accessed May 13, 2011). 
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In the case of Libya in 2011, there are also other reasons for Germany’s show of 
un-solidarity. The Anglo-French decision to attack the Libyan regime had to be made in 
the run-up to important regional elections in Germany, vital for the survival of the 
CDU/CSU/FDP cabinet. Therefore, it is most likely that the ruling coalition wanted to 
avoid issues of war and peace from becoming prominent among a skeptical electorate 
during this critical period.472 This kind of behavior reconfirms a previous conclusion: the 
concept of strategic culture alone cannot sufficiently explain German security policy 
outcomes. Rather, the strategic interests of political key actors have to taken into the 
equation as well. 
C. CONSOLIDATING MILITARY REFORMS 2005–2009 
From a military perspective, the first chancellorship of Angela Merkel from 2005 
to 2009 was basically a period of consolidating and fine-tuning the transformation that 
had been initiated by the Red-Green coalition. Thus, the Bundeswehr mainly focused on 
the implementation of its ―Force Structure 2010‖ that comprised a restructuring and a 
reduction to a total 252,500 troops, consisting of 35,000 response forces, 70,000 
stabilization forces, and 147,500 support forces. This task was not easy, given Germany’s 
international obligations and operations that had to be maintained simultaneously. 
1. The White Paper 2006 
One visible expression of the course of consolidation was the publication of a new 
Defense White Paper in 2006, the first since 1994. The document was based on the 
Defense Policy Guidelines of 2003 and the Concept of the Bundeswehr of 2004.473 With 
regard to the main functions of the Bundeswehr, the White Paper demonstrated continuity 
with those preceding strategic documents by stating that crisis management and conflict 
prevention, including the fight against international terrorism, remained the most likely 
task for the German armed forces in the foreseeable future. Given the disputes within 
                                                 
472 This pattern recurs in German state behavior because Chancellor Kohl had refused to participate in 
Desert Storm in 1990–1991 and Chancellor Schröder had rejected a German military involvement in Iraqi 
Freedom in 2002 because of domestic concerns during election campaigns in Germany. 
473 Ernst-Christoph Meier, Vom Verteidigungsauftrag des Grundgesetzes zum Begriff Vernetzter 
Sicherheit, 55. 
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NATO about the Iraq War, the White Paper reemphasized the importance of the Alliance. 
The document called NATO the ―cornerstone of German security and defense.‖ 
Nonetheless, it also pointed to the legitimizing role of the UN and the relevance of the 
EU as an independent security actor. Against this background, the White Paper 
introduced the concept of ―networked security,‖ a comprehensive approach to security 
which underlined that the classic instruments of foreign, security, and development 
policy had to be complemented by and interconnected with economic, environmental, 
financial, educational, and social policies in a multilateral institutional framework.474  
This interagency approach with a focus on civil conflict prevention represented 
the leading thoughts of the notion of Germany playing the role of a cautious ―civilian 
power:‖ multilateralism, the preference for soft power instruments, and the use of 
military force as a last resort. ―Never again alone‖ required a visible commitment to 
NATO (NRF) and the EU (Battle Groups), but at the same time ―never again war‖ called 
for an emphasis on non-military means. Therefore, it is unsurprising that the Bundeswehr 
made only very modest attempts, for example, to increase its force projection capabilities 
while such other major European powers as France and Britain developed plans for the 
largest aircraft carriers in the history of their navies at the time.  
2. Fine-tuning Command and Control Structures 
Six months after the publication of the White Paper, a group of former general 
officers was established by the BMVg to evaluate existing preparatory measures as well 
as planning and decision-making procedures for out-of-area missions. The team 
announced its findings in July 2007. The report comprised proposals to enhance the 
effectiveness of the coordination between the services, the division of labor between 
different commands, mission training, and the role of the BMVg. 
                                                 
474 Federal Ministry of Defense, White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the 
Bundeswehr, (Berlin: October 2006), 23. The concept of ―networked security‖ was in line with parallel 
developments in NATO, namely the Comprehensive Political Guidance of 2006 and the ―comprehensive 
approach‖ which was announced at the Bucharest Summit. North Atlantic Council, ―Bucharest Summit 
Declaration,‖ April 3, 2008, official NATO website, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm?mode=pressrelease (accessed May 20, 2011). 
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Some of these recommendations were implemented. For example, training 
courses in crisis management missions were standardized and the Bundeswehr 
Operations Command gained more competences vis-à-vis the other services. 
Furthermore, the Response Forces Operations Command (RFOC) in Ulm assumed 
responsibility for establishing an OHQ in 2009 in addition to its role as a European 
FHQ.475 In light of the current limits of the ―Berlin Plus‖ framework, this visible 
commitment to the CSDP of the EU is likely to remain an important asset and thus 
contributes to Germany being perceived as a reliable European partner. 
The most important change in existing command arrangements was the 
conversion of the Operations Branch in the Armed Forces Staff (Fü S V) into a full-
fledged Einsatzführungsstab [EinsFüStab] (Joint Operations Staff) in 2008.476  
 
                                                 
475 ―Das Kommando Operative Führung Eingreifkräfte,‖ official website of the Joint Support Service, 
http://www.streitkraeftebasis.de/portal/a/streitkraeftebasis/!ut/p/c4/DckxDoAgDADAt_iBdnfzF-
piiiBpMG0DRRNfL7nxcMdB6OFMzip044rbyXN4oZVwGH8QOUlzMK1eib1Biap29ZQK9JBqF6B-
jctoZZl-l4csEA!!/ (accessed May 21, 2011). Since then, the RFOC has gained experiences by conducting a 
series of multinational exercises and has been regularly earmarked for assuming command over possible 
EU Battlegroup operations.   
476 The Joint Operations Staff (JOS) is responsible for developing strategic guidance on operations 
and commitments. In accordance with this strategic guidance, the Bundeswehr Operations Command 























Figure 12. National Command and Control Structures (ca. 2008)477 
This staff was directly subordinate to the Generalinspekteur and represented the 
first serious attempt to incorporate all relevant actors within the BMVg. In order to make 
the whole range of ministerial expertise available for the political and military decision-
makers at short notice, a process-oriented organization was established that not only 
included representatives of the military services, but also representatives of the civilian 
directorates.478 On the one hand, this was a clear sign that the strict divide between 
military and civilian branches within the BMVg was beginning to diminish in favor of a 
more operational approach that broke with ministerial custom. On the other hand, the fact 
that it took sixteen years after the first Bundeswehr out-of-area deployment to establish 
such an organization underlined the inertia effects in German political culture and 
military institutions and the difficulties in overcoming reservations about the military. 
                                                 
477 Source: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. 
478 Lutz Krake, ―Einsatzführungsstab - Ziele, Aufgaben, Fähigkeiten, Strukturen,‖ Europäische 
Sicherheit Online, September 2008, http://www.europaeische-
sicherheit.de/Ausgaben/2008/2008_09/05_Krake/2008,09,05.html (accessed May 05, 2011). 
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Remarkably, the Joint Operations Staff even comprised liaison elements of other 
governmental agencies. It was shaped by the White Paper’s call for networked security 
because it established a formal link between different security actors on the national 
level. Other examples of such cooperation included a new division of labor between the 
Bundeswehr and the Bundesnachrichtendienst [BND] (Federal Intelligence Service) in 
the field of intelligence gathering and situation analysis.479 And, although some progress 
has been made so far with regard to interagency cooperation, plenty of room for 
improvement remains in this area. Thus, efforts to better coordinate with other security 
actors will be an important part of Bundeswehr transformation in the future. 
D. DEFENSE SPENDING AND THE IMPACT OF THE 2008–2009 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 
Despite the diplomatic upheaval in the trans-Atlantic community that had been 
caused by the different perspectives on the Iraq War, issues of security and defense had 
only played a minor role in German politics during the second term of Chancellor 
Schröder. This trend also continued after Angela Merkel’s takeover. The high 
government deficit spending presented her Grand Coalition with one of its largest 
political liabilities. Because of the stagnation of the German economy and Schröder’s 
labor market reforms, tax revenues had decreased and social transfer payments increased 
between 2001 and 2005. These developments resulted in German violations of the EU’s 
Maastricht Criteria.480 As a consequence, the Merkel government declared budget 
consolidation as one of its most urgent political tasks. The coalition agreement of 2005 
even called for a ―common national effort on all levels‖ to fight deficit spending and to 
promote economic growth.481 
                                                 
479 Additionally, several other agencies and working groups were established. These comprised, for 
example, a National Air Security Center, a Joint Counterterrorism Center, and an inter-ministerial steering 
group for crisis prevention and conflict resolution. 
480 Germany had exceeded the three percent margin of the ratio of government deficit to GDP in 2002 
and 2003. 
481 ―Gemeinsam für Deutschland - mit Mut und Menschlichkeit,‖ Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, 
CSU und SPD, November 11, 2005, official website of the CDU, 
http://www.cdu.de/doc/pdf/05_11_11_Koalitionsvertrag.pdf (accessed May 18, 2011). 
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In this context, the German defense spending was not exempted from the general 
need to consolidate and save. As Figure 13 illustrates, the defense budget did not change 
substantially between 2005 and 2011. 
 
 
Figure 13. German Defense Expenditure (Billion €)482 
The nominal gains in 2006 that can be depicted from the blue line represent no 
real increase. Rather, they account for the pensions of former soldiers and civilian 
employees who had to be incorporated into the balance sheet of the BMVg. The red line 
excludes these payments and reveals that the defense expenditure only increased slowly 
over time, ranging from € 23.8 billion in 2005 to € 26.9 billion in 2011.483 
However, these additional financial resources were often dissipated by increases 
in personnel related costs or higher operating costs. For example, the Bundeswehr 
deployment to Afghanistan required an annual funding of well over € 1 billion.484 
Consequently, fewer resources could be invested in research and development as well as 
in procurement. These factors were real obstacles for short- and medium-term 
modernization efforts and hence impeded the transformation of the Bundeswehr. In spite 
                                                 
482 Source: Official website of the Federal Ministry of Defense, www.bmvg.de (accessed May 18, 
2011). 
483 This nominal increase of 13% does not account for inflation. 
484 ―Bundeswehreinsatz in Afghanistan dreimal so teuer wie bekannt,‖ SPIEGEL Online, May 20, 
2010, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,695430,00.html (accessed May 18, 2011). 
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of the increases in the defense expenditure between 2005 and 2009, the German armed 
forces fell short of achieving their goal of a balanced budget.  That is a ratio of 70 percent 
operating and personnel costs and 30 percent investment, which is seen as a necessary 
prerequisite for maintaining armed forces with modern, combat-ready equipment. Figure 
14 shows that only one-quarter of the current defense budget is available for investment. 
 
 
Figure 14. German Defense Expenditure (2011)485 
The diminishing significance of defense spending in Germany can also be 
assessed by looking at the defense expenditure as a share of the federal government 
budget. It remained at a 10 percent share of the overall budget between 2005 and 2011. 
Thus, Figure 15 not only indicates this long-term trend in German defense spending, but 
also shows the overall low priority of security and defense issues in German politics. The 
underfunding of the German armed forces had two major implications. First, decision-
makers in Germany were always inclined to reduce the peacetime strength of the 
Bundeswehr in order to save personnel and operating costs. Second, the overall tempo of 
military transformation was slowed. 
 
                                                 




Figure 15. Defense Expenditure as a Share of the German Federal Budget486 
The year 2009 had a strong impact on both the economy and on the government 
budget. Economic activities in Germany, above all exports, were hurt badly by the slump 
in international demand that had been triggered by the world financial crisis. After a 
phase of growth in 2006 and 2007, Germany faced the most severe economic downturn 
in sixty years. Large-scale governmental recovery initiatives to fight the recession 
resulted in the highest annual new indebtedness in German history.487  
These emergency measures made consolidation efforts inevitable in order to keep 
deficits under control. Observers described the situation as follows:  
What we are looking at is not a blip but a lasting reduction in revenues and 
spending, so the consolidation process will have to aim beyond short-term 
cuts to seek structural spending reforms designed to bite in the medium 
term.488  
                                                 
486 Source: Data derived from the official websites of the Federal Ministry of Defense 
(http://www.bmvg.de) and the Federal Government (http://www.bundesregierung.de); (both accessed May 
18, 2011). 
487 The German government had to contract € 44 Billion new debts in 2010. ―Haushaltsabschluss 
2010,‖ Bundesministerium der Finanzen; official website of the Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 
http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/nn_53848/DE/BMF__Startseite/Aktuelles/Monatsbericht__des__
BMF/2011/02/analysen-und-berichte/b02-haushaltsabschluss-2010/Haushaltsabschluss-
2010.html?__nnn=true (accessed May 19, 2011). 
488 Sophie-Charlotte Brune et al., ―The German Armed Forces and the Financial Crisis,‖ SWP 
Comments 13 (May 2010), 1. 
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As a consequence, the government budget in general, and defense spending in particular, 
came under pressure. The German cabinet decided in June 2010 that the Bundeswehr had 
to save a total of € 8.3 billion over the next four years.489 Several weapon systems, such 
as fighter bombers, submarines, and tanks, were put out of service in order to save 
operating costs.490  
The Merkel government also agreed to a further reduction of A-400M orders. The 
German air force will only put forty of these urgently needed transport aircraft into 
service.491 Since the A-400M will be operated in different roles—transport, tanker, and 
medical evacuation—this significant reduction casts doubt on Germany’s ambitions to 
increase the number of troops readily available for international crisis response 
operations. Additionally, Germany announced its intention to sell the last tranche of the 
new Eurofighter, which will consist of thirty-seven aircraft, to foreign bidders.492 Further 
cutbacks to other major weapon systems cannot be ruled out, as shown in Table 1. 
 
Program Role Initial Order 2011 
A-400M Transport Aircraft 60 40 
NH-90 Light Transport Helicopter 122 80? 
Tiger Combat Support Helicopter 80 40? 
Eurofighter Multirole Combat Aircraft 180 143? 
F-125 Multirole Frigate 4 3? 
Puma Infantry Fighting Vehicle 405 280? 
Table 1. Potential Changes in Major Procurement Programs493 
                                                 
489 Christian Mölling, Sophie-Charlotte Brune, and Marcel Dickow, Finanzkrise und 
Verteidigungskooperation, Arbeitspapier Forschungsgruppe Sicherheitspolitik, Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik (Berlin: October 2010), 7.  
490 Ibid., 8-9. 
491 ―Bundeswehr bekommt noch weniger A-400M,‖ Financial Times Deutschland, January 25, 2011; 
http://www.ftd.de/politik/deutschland/:groesstes-europaeisches-ruestungsprojekt-bundeswehr-bekommt-
noch-weniger-a400-m/60002621.html (accessed May 18, 2011). Due to higher than expected development 
costs most of the European A-400M customers reduced their orders. Germany, which had initially agreed 
to buy a total of 73 aircraft in 2001, reduced its orders to 60 in 2003 and to 53 in 2010.‖Der lange Weg zum 
A-400M,‖ Tagesanzeiger, November 5, 2010, www.tagesanzeiger.ch/wirtschaft/agenturen-
ticker/Ruestungsindustrie-Der-lange-Weg-zum-A400M/story/24063888 (accessed May 18, 2011). 
492 Brune et al., The German Armed Forces and the Financial Crisis, 4. 
493 Source: Mölling et al., Finanzkrise und Verteidigungskooperation, 8-9. 
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E. THE BUNDESWEHR OF 2011 AND BEYOND 
Against this background of financial shortfalls, the coalition agreement of 2009 
stated that compulsory military service would be reduced from nine to six months and 
that an expert commission would develop proposals for a new force structure, a more 
efficient chain of command, and improved administrative procedures for the Bundeswehr 
until the end of 2010.494 
1. The Weise Commission 2010 
The new force structure commission was headed by the chief executive of the 
Federal Employment Agency, Frank-Jürgen Weise, and comprised a total of six 
members.495 Their high economic expertise already indicated that the question of how to 
make the Bundeswehr a more efficient and effective organization would be the focal 
point of their work. Although the decision to make use of a commission had already been 
made in October 2009, it was constituted as late as April 12, 2010. This delay resulted in 
a tight schedule for the commission because it was supposed to present its proposals in 
October 2010. The assessment of the commission was based on two main sources: first, it 
evaluated internal analyses of the BMVg;496 second, it conducted a series of confidential 
interviews with active and former members of the Bundeswehr as well as political, 
corporate, and international military representatives. 
                                                 
494 Koalitionsvertrag 2009, 124. The decision to reduce compulsory service to six months was a 
classic political compromise. While the CDU/CSU still regarded conscription as necessary to sustain the 
link between the armed forces and society and therefore wanted to uphold the status quo, its coalition 
partner, the FDP, wanted to curtail conscription. Consequently, both parties agreed to a shortened period of 
service. 
495 The commission consisted of Dr. Weise, who is a colonel of the Bundeswehr reserve, two German 
top managers, the political coordinator for trans-Atlantic relations, a former president of the German 
Federal Court of Auditors, and General Karl-Heinz Lather, who was chief of staff of Allied Command 
Operations at the time.  
496 Between January and April 2010 all military and civilian branches within the BMVg had to 
analyze existing strengths and weaknesses in structures, procedures, and capabilities. ―Die 
Strukturkommission,‖ Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, April 12, 2010, http://www.bmvg.de 
(accessed May 20, 2011). 
 143 
The final report of the commission was issued on October 22, 2010.497 
Remarkably, it explicitly referred to the findings of the Weizsäcker Commission of 2000, 
indicating that its goal was an evolutionary, rather than a revolutionary reform. Its main 
critique pointed to the fact that the Bundeswehr with its 252,000 military personnel had 
difficulties achieving its desired level of ambition; that is, being able to sustain 
international operations with a deployment of up to 14,000 troops to up to five different 
theaters.498 The report also observed deficiencies in the procurement processes of the 
Bundeswehr, notably the long time frames for the introduction of modern weapon 
systems into the forces and the inability to adjust current development programs to new 
or additional operational needs. Finally, the commission criticized the number and 
complexity of existing structures and procedures on the level of the BMVg (Figure 16) 
and below. 
                                                 
497 ―Vom Einsatz her denken. Konzentration, Flexibilität, Effizienz,‖ Bericht der Strukturkommission 
der Bundeswehr, October 2010. 
498 Instead, the Bundeswehr faced operational limits even with only 7,000 to 8,000 troops being 



















































































Figure 16. Structure of the BMVg (ca. 2006)499 
Based on this assessment of the state of affairs in the Bundeswehr of 2010, the 
commission proposed some remarkable changes to improve the situation. These included 
a streamlined defense planning, a process-oriented, adaptive organization that would 
replace inflexible ―stovepipe‖ hierarchies, the creation of ―capability commands,‖500 and 
incentives to improve recruiting. The commission report also prompted a substantial 
downsizing and complete restructuring of the BMVg which was perceived as too large, 
too unwieldy, and inefficient. The new ministry was supposed to reorganize and fuse 
existing tasks and to subsequently dispense with nine of its seventeen directorates and 
2,000 of its 3,500-strong staff. The result would blur the traditional divide between the 
military and the civilian branches within the BMVg. 
Another important adjustment was the notion of a chief of defense. The 
commission attempted the fairly radical step to place the Generalinspekteur at the top of 
                                                 
499 Source: Federal Ministry of Defense, White Paper 2006, 87. 
500 Capability commands, such as a Joint Logistics Command or a Joint Medical Command, were 
regarded as alternatives to traditional command arrangements.  
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the chain of command of all Bundeswehr soldiers by excluding the chiefs of staff of the 
services and military organizational areas from the structures of the BMVg. This was a 
radical proposal for two reasons. On the one hand, it would place the chief of defense on 
the same hierarchical level as the state secretaries,501 an approach that challenged more 
than fifty years of civil-military custom within the Bundeswehr, namely that the 
―executive group‖502 of the BMVg only consists of civilians. On the other hand, it would 
finally put an end to the powerful positions of the chiefs of staff of the different services, 
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Figure 17. Restructuring Proposal for the BMVg 2011503 
                                                 
501 A German state secretary equates to a U.S. undersecretary of defense. 
502 The executive group consists of the defense minister, two Parliamentary state secretaries and two 
additional civil service state secretaries and represents the highest echelon of authority within the BMVg. 
The state secretaries act on behalf of the defense minister in his capacity as head of a supreme federal body 
in the areas of responsibility assigned to them. The Parliamentary state secretaries assist the defense 
minister in his political functions, for instance by deputizing for him in the Bundestag, the Bundesrat – the 
second chamber of the German legislature - or in governmental meetings. 
503 Source: Bericht der Strukturkommission, 60 (translated by author). 
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With regard to the Bundeswehr as a whole, the report suggested creating an all-
volunteer force of approximately 180,000 soldiers by curtailing conscription. Of course, 
this proposal represented a significant deviation from all preceding military reforms 
because it challenged one of the core elements of democratic civil-military relations in 
Germany: the citizen in uniform. The commission, however, argued that in light of the 
lack of existential external threats and the diminishing acceptance of conscription in 
society the adherence to compulsory service was obsolete.504  
2. Curtailing Conscription 
The recommendation to intermit conscription was seized by new Defense 
Minister zu Guttenberg.505 He arguably played a significant role in bringing conscription 
to an end. Being perceived as charismatic and one of the most promising political talents 
within the ruling coalition in 2009–2010, his celebrity reputation helped him to pacify 
potential opposition against his proposal. Minister zu Guttenberg even managed to 
overcome objections within his own party, the CSU, which had historically been a strong 
supporter of conscription. He could underscore his proposal with objective arguments: 
Although the Bundeswehr was able to convince 7,000 to 8,000 conscripts per year to 
become long-term volunteers, the training of these young men permanently tied down 
substantial amounts of equipment and infrastructure as well as 10,000 instructors.506 The 
end of conscription would free these resources for more urgent tasks. Subsequently, draft 
legislation was developed in order to curtail conscription and to implement a volunteer 
military service of up to twenty-three months.507  
The general preference for an end to compulsory service might be explained by 
two additional arguments. First, it might underscore the claim that the Bundeswehr had 
                                                 
504 As an alternative to conscription the commission proposed to establish a voluntary community 
service of up to 23 months open to all German adults. 
505 ―Guttenberg will Wehrpflicht aussetzen,‖ Focus Online, June 2, 2010, 
http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/sparplaene-guttenberg-will-wehrpflicht-
aussetzen_aid_514791.html (accessed May 20, 2011). 
506 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Bericht des Generalinspekteurs der Bundeswehr zum 
Prüfauftrag aus der Kabinettsklausur vom 7. Juni 2010 (Berlin: September 2010), 49. 
507 From July 1, 2011, compulsory military service will be intermitted in Germany. Although it 
remains a part of the Basic Law, no conscripts will be drafted anymore. 
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become an integral and commonly accepted part of state and society. Consequently, 
conscripts were not needed any more to maintain this link. Secondly, the lack of urgency 
of security and defense issues among political elites as well as in public perception might 
have led to a general lack of interest in the matter over time. It is most likely that both 
explanations apply to some extent. Zu Guttenberg, however, failed to serve through the 
reforms, as a political scandal in early 2011 about plagiarism and his doctoral dissertation 
cost him his office, adding an additional element of drama to the making of defense 
policy and the future of the Bundeswehr.508 
3. The Outline of a New Bundeswehr in Mid-2011 
The end of conscription was only the first of several steps that will change the 
character, the size, the structure, and the capabilities of the Bundeswehr profoundly. 
Based on the findings of the Weise Commission and additional assessments of the 
BMVg, Defense Minister Thomas de Maizière509 announced both a new set of Defense 
Policy Guidelines (VPR) and his outline for new Bundeswehr reforms on May 18, 
2011.510 
Given Germany’s reliance on NATO, it is unsurprising that the VPR 2011 are in 
line with the Alliance’s new strategic concept. Their risk and threat assessment is 
basically identical; the only deviation from SC 2010 is the missing reference to the threat 
posed by ballistic missiles.511 Similar to current developments in NATO, the new VPR 
focus on collective defense as the Bundeswehr’s top priority. However, crisis 
management, including the fight against international terrorism, and military missions in 
                                                 
508 ―Guttenberg geht, die Probleme bleiben,‖ ZEIT online, March 1, 2011, 
http://pdf.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2011-03/guttenberg-ruecktritt-fragen-antworten.pdf (accessed May 21, 
2011). 
509 Thomas de Maizière became the new defense minister on March 3, 2011, after the resignation of 
Karl Theodor zu Guttenberg. 
510 Federal Ministry of Defense, Defense Policy Guidelines - Safeguarding National Interests, 
Assuming International Responsibility, Shaping Security Together (Berlin: 2011). 
511 The absence of the missile threat and the aspect of missile defense might have been caused by the 
uncertainty of the Alliance's plans for a NATO missile defense and the fact that the United States has 
recently cancelled its further participation in the trilateral (U.S.-German-Italian) MEADS (Medium 
Extended Air Defense System) program, which could have complemented the NATO system. 
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the framework of CSDP are still perceived as the most likely tasks.512 In this context, it is 
remarkable that the VPR place an emphasis on national interests: ―In each individual 
case, there must be a clear answer to the question of whether German interests require 
and justify an operation and what the consequences of non-action would be.‖513 On the 
one hand, this sentence seems to indicate a new form of German assertiveness in 
international affairs that may collide at times with its traditional ―never again alone‖ 
stance. On the other hand, it may also be regarded as an attempt to provide a criterion or 
precept for the participation in international military missions, an alternative to ―reflexive 
multilateralism.‖ In the face of dwindling resources the VPR also scale down Germany’s 
national level of ambition. Instead of a maximum of 14,000 troops, Germany now wants 
to be able to field and sustain only 10,000 troops in long-term crisis management 
operations. In the context of tight defense budgets, Germany promotes the notion of 
―pooling‖ and ―role sharing‖ of military capabilities on the European level. All in all, the 
Defense Policy Guidelines set the stage for a Bundeswehr that will play a limited role in 
both NATO and the EU in the future. 
Apart from the VPR, the defense minister also outlined the main goals for the new 
military reform. The Bundeswehr will be reduced to a peacetime strength of 170,000 
regulars and temporary-career volunteers. These troops will be augmented by 5,000 to 
15,000 military service volunteers.514 These figures basically resemble the proposals of 
the Weise commission. However, Defense Minister de Maizière will not fully implement 
its recommendations for a reorganization of the BMVg. Although the chiefs of staff of 
the services will head their services outside the Ministry and the Generalinspekteur will 
become the administrative superior of all German troops in his new function of ―chief of 
defense,‖ the state secretaries, together with the minister, remain the highest authorities in 
the BMVg.515 The most important change in the structure of the Ministry will be the de 
                                                 
512 Consequently, the Bundeswehr remains committed to its international obligations in the form of 
contributions to the NATO Response Force and the EU Battlegroups. 
513 Federal Ministry of Defense, Defense Policy Guidelines 2011, 4. 
514 Federal Ministry of Defense, The Reorientation of the Bundeswehr, (Berlin: May 18, 2011), para. 
II.1. 
515 The commission's proposal to lift the position of the chief of defense to the same hierarchical level 
as the state secretaries has arguably been perceived as too radical. 
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facto abolition of the distinction between military and civilian branches. Rather, the 
reorganized directorates will be staffed with a mix of civilian and military personnel.516 
This development may be seen as another step toward a military that is no longer viewed 






























Figure 18. Future Structure of the BMVg517 
                                                 
516 This measure is likely to create frictions in the short term, but will strengthen cohesion and 
efficiency in the long-run. 
517 Source: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (translated by author). 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
This thesis started with a puzzle of policy and arms: the alleged gap between 
Germany's substantial political and economic power on the one hand, and the limited 
resources it has devoted to defense since 1990 on the other. By comprehensively 
exploring the last two decades of German security and defense policy this study has not 
only attempted to elaborate on the root causes in theory and practice for this apparent 
contradiction, but also to shed light on the fundamental factors of state and policy that 
shape or restrain German security policy outcomes in general and military reforms in 
particular. The analysis underscores that an understanding of German state behavior and 
military transformation requires a broad approach which relies on a distinct set of 
variables on the international as well as on the domestic level.  
In this context, NATO and the EU have historically played a crucial role as 
foundations of German security and defense. They presented (West) Germany with an 
opportunity to regain sovereignty in the 1950s and to overcome its pre-war 
Schaukelpolitik through a process of political, economic and, above all, military 
integration into the western system of democracies. Since the Adenauer era, NATO has 
served as a strategic compass that helped to navigate the German defense policy and the 
armed forces from the NATO strategies of massive retaliation and flexible response in 
the Cold War to global crisis management tasks in the twenty-first century. This Atlantic 
strategic orientation continued after the end of the bipolar world in 1990 because it was 
based on a common threat and risk assessment of the allies; yet, at the same, time new 
factors have arisen which have formed the subject of this paper. Germany's White Papers 
and Defense Policy Guidelines since 1969 have been congruent with the evolution of 
overarching strategies of the Alliance and remain so today. The ensuing transformation of 
NATO into an organization that attempted to resolve crises and project stability beyond 
its borders had an essential impact on changes in the role, structure, and capabilities of 
the Bundeswehr.   
Because of the advent of the EU as an independent security actor at the end of the 
1990s, the same holds for the Common Security and Defense Policy.  European Union 
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policy and strategy emerged as a new lode star in the making of German defense and the 
work of the armed forces in the past decade, a signal development.  
By employing the concept of strategic culture, this thesis has illustrated that 
Germany’s strong adherence to these two organizations is not mainly based on a rational 
cost-benefit calculus and burden-sharing. Rather, this general preference for multilateral 
security regimes reflects Germany’s deep-rooted ―never again alone‖ stance in politics 
and society as an answer to the militarism and lost wars of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. Thus, the specific character of German strategic culture proved to be a 
powerful tool to explain Germany’s actions and the general course of the Bundeswehr 
since 1990. The recourse to another basic element of German strategic culture, the notion 
of ―never again war,‖ helps to understand the piecemeal fashion of German military 
reforms after unification. This stance closed certain avenues to a more vigorous military 
transformation as might have been had in other NATO countries, for example, by 
impeding the development of force projection capabilities that would have been 
perceived as too ―interventionist‖ by political elites and the general public. Especially in 
the 1990s, all concerned regarded as inconsistent with post-war German antimilitarism to 
transform the Bundeswehr into an all-volunteer force. Even today, there is ample 
evidence that the foundational elements of post-war German strategic culture will prevail 
in this and other issues. For example, the CDU-FDP coalition agreement of 2009 states 
that German foreign and security policy will continue to be guided by its traditional 
―culture of reticence.‖518 
There are, however, other important factors on the domestic level that need to be 
taken into account as well. Above all, continuous low levels of defense spending which 
can be partially explained by the aftermath of reunification, namely high government 
deficits and slow economic growth, limited military modernization efforts. Furthermore, 
some basic features of the political culture of the Berlin Republic cannot be taken off the 
                                                 
518 ―Wachstum, Bildung, Zusammenhalt,‖ Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und FDP, October 
26, 2009, official website of the CDU, http://www.cdu.de/doc/pdfc/091026-koalitionsvertrag-cducsu-
fdp.pdf (accessed May 13, 2011). 
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equation. The balance of power between the main security policy actors as well as their 
strategic interests sometimes affected the scope and depth of military reforms.  
All in all, the Bundeswehr has continuously sailed between the Scylla of 
international obligations and the Charybdis of domestic constraints after the end of the 
Cold War. While such a fact might enrage those who insist that Germany shared a larger 
burden in collective defense, such statecraft has well served the overall ends of state, 
policy and society in Germany what with so-called lessons of the twentieth century and a 
national ambivalence about power.  
In light of these complex set of driving forces and determinants, additional 
questions come to the fore: What has been achieved by the architects of German military 
reforms thus far? Where do the German armed forces stand today in their transit from the 
roles and missions of 1990 until the present? The Bundeswehr has come a long way. The 
Bundestag has sent German troops into several dozen military missions since then, 
ranging from low intensity and low profile observer missions to high intensity peace 
enforcement and humanitarian intervention. The Bundeswehr of 2011 represents a pro-
active and capable tool of German foreign and security policy in the framework of the 
Alliance and the European Union. To achieve this status, a process of gradual reforms 
was necessary that often did not follow a straight path.  
The period from 1990 to 1994 was marked by the consequences of reunification, 
namely the need to cope with the legacy of the former National People's Army and to 
fulfill the obligations of 2+4 Treaty. These large-scale reductions of personnel and 
materiel rendered any purposeful reform impossible. Nonetheless, the Bundeswehr, under 
the auspices of the UN, made its first cautious attempts to deploy troops beyond the 
classic geographical realm of the Cold War. Without established national command and 
control structures or expeditionary capabilities at hand, these early out-of-area missions 
required a great deal of improvisation. 
From 1994 to 1998 the Bundeswehr has established a pool of troops earmarked 
and ready for international peacekeeping missions: the crisis reaction forces. In light of 
insufficient funds to ensure an all-embracing modernization of the armed forces as a 
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whole, these troops were better equipped than the other parts of the Bundeswehr. 
However, this twofold force structure was not based on a long-term strategic military 
reorientation of the most cohesive sort. Rather, it reflected Germany’s willingness to 
meet the expectations of its closest allies who wished for German military contributions 
in international affairs as alliance statecraft. The fundamental ruling of the German 
Constitutional court of 1994 finally paved the way for such out-of-area missions. 
Consequently, the Bundeswehr tried to develop or acquire strategic military enablers. 
Thus, armaments programs that comprised, for example, space-based communications 
and reconnaissance assets, airlift capacities, and C4I-systems were initiated at the time. 
Between 1998 and 2002 obviously a gap persisted between German political 
ambitions to actively participate in peacekeeping and peace enforcing missions, on the 
one hand, and sufficient military capabilities, modern equipment, and adequate structures, 
on the other. Drastic reforms were inevitable, but their implementation was watered down 
by inertia effects among political and military decision-makers. Subsequent attempts to 
substantially increase the number of combat-ready forces proved overly ambitious and 
were doomed to failure. Nonetheless, this timeframe also saw the introduction of 
permanent national command and control structures as well as the foundation of the 
innovative Joint Support Service—important steps toward jointness and a more mission-
oriented Bundeswehr.  
After 2002 the discrepancy between resource-intensive, long-term out-of-area 
deployments and dwindling resources caused a rethinking in defense priorities and 
initiated a profound conceptual overhaul of existing structures and procedures. Its main 
goal was to establish an à la carte Bundeswehr: a core of network-enabled expeditionary 
forces for high-intensity operations of NATO or the EU, a larger contingent of forces for 
low- and medium-intensity peacekeeping missions, and the bulk of forces for the support 
of ongoing operations and routine duty. In this context, crisis management and conflict 
prevention were regarded as the Bundeswehr's most likely tasks of the future. 
Over the following years, however, the long-term stabilization efforts in the 
Balkans (IFOR, SFOR, KFOR) and, above all, in Afghanistan (ISAF), demonstrated that 
the Bundeswehr was still confronted with an unfavorable ―tooth-to-tail ratio;‖ that is, a 
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limited number of rapidly deployable light to medium forces on the one hand, and a 
multitude of bureaucratic and hierarchical headquarters, staffs, and installations with 
research, training, and administrative functions on the other. Therefore, the current 
reform of 2011 is likely to disestablish the aforementioned force categories and to focus 
on an overall increase in efficiency. And, more importantly, the Bundeswehr will become 
an all-volunteer force. 
However, despite this remarkable progress, reforming the Bundeswehr has been a 
rather cumbersome project, especially in the view of soldiers in the field and those in 
senior echelons of command who within alliance integration confront differing postures 
in allied forces. In retrospect, it seems unsurprising that the armed forces which were 
constrained by German strategic culture and faced limited funding as a result of the 
―peace dividend‖ of the early 1990s and which had to build the capacity to deploy, 
command and sustain troops abroad from scratch were a laggard of military 
transformation compared to other European allies. Amidst this process, one central 
recurring pattern for military reforms in Germany has emerged: whenever the armed 
forces were in need of funding for modernization programs and restructuring efforts, 
financial resources were made available by reducing the overall strength of the 
Bundeswehr rather than by increasing the defense expenditure. It is far from clear that the 
most recent plans to scale down to 175,000 troops will be the last cut for the years to 
come.   
This leads to the question mark that stands above the future of the Bundeswehr in 
2011, granted the upheaval that has surrounded this institution especially in the years 
from 2009-2011. Given the general low salience of security and defense topics on 
German political and public agendas and the severe financial crisis within the eurozone, 
the Bundeswehr will most likely have to continue to cope with stagnating or declining 
financial resources. In recent years, the German armed forces have managed these 
shortfalls by equipping military units according to varying standards. While this pattern is 
likely to persist in the future, the magnitude of the current crisis and its negative long-
term effects on public spending in most member states demands closer defense 
cooperation in the EU. 
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Against this background, the German Defense Policy Guidelines of 2011 propose 
the ―pooling‖ and ―sharing‖ of capabilities and resources on the European level. While 
these are effective ways of burden-sharing, current developments in CSDP call them into 
question. Germany, for example, has stated that mutual dependencies on the European 
level must not lead to a situation in which a member state can be put under pressure to 
pursue a specific policy.519 As a consequence, it has recommended focusing on such 
areas as training, logistics, and command structures. Member states like France and the 
United Kingdom, on the other hand, are interested in enhancing the EU's expeditionary 
warfare capacities. They have already agreed to better coordinate their defense policies in 
the future, but outside the EU framework of ―permanent structured cooperation.‖ These 
diverging perspectives not only pose a threat for the cohesion of the EU, but also for 
Germany's military transformation because ESDP/CSDP has provided an important 
impetus in recent years.520 Furthermore, it also remains unclear to what extent NATO 
will be a driving force for change in the Bundeswehr in the future. Although the NATO 
Strategic Concept 2010 points to some new focal points of collective defense such as 
cyber or missile defense, these have not evolved into concrete measures yet. 
With regard to Bundeswehr's coming participation in international military 
missions, it seems unlikely that Germany will divest itself of its ―culture of reticence‖ 
and instead adopt a ―culture of responsibility.‖ The 2011 abstention from an active 
involvement in NATO operations against the Gaddafi regime in the face of important 
Länder elections of the same year, which determine the fate of the Merkel cabinet, 
underscore that German political elites are susceptible to the swings in sentiment in the 
general public in the age of social media as well as in the age of insecurity worked by the 
forces of the twenty-first century, which seem to resemble the less fortunate ones of the 
past. Given these preoccupations it is not unlikely that a German decision to participate in 
                                                 
519 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Bericht des Generalinspekteurs der Bundeswehr zum 
Prüfauftrag aus der Kabinettsklausur vom 7. Juni 2010, 9. 
520 This problematic is aggravated by the fact that reductions in defense spending and cutbacks in 
capabilities have only been made on a unilateral basis so far. There have been no negotiations about the 
question of who reduces what between the European partners. 
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future military missions will remain highly selective and will be based on several 
political considerations that in turn dominate the shape of armies, navies and air forces.  
In this context, current volatile and skeptical trends in German society and public 
opinion must not be underestimated. Some observers point out that after having 
experienced a period of over twenty years without an existential threat: ―the German 
society neither wants to make sacrifices nor to bemoan casualties.‖521 Attempts of 
German political decision-makers to explain to a skeptic German public the necessity for 
a participation of the Bundeswehr in the costly counterinsurgency and stabilization 
campaign in Afghanistan have failed thus far. While German soldiers nowadays receive 
decorations for their valor and earn combat medals in the Hindu Kush, public opinion in 
Germany strongly embraces its traditional ―never again war‖ stance. Against this 
background of a self-absorbed and uninterested German society, and a security elite 
unwilling and unable to convince the public otherwise, the recruitment of talented 
specialists in a now all-volunteer force that simultaneously remains true to the tradition 
and ideal of ―citizens in uniform‖ will probably become one of the biggest challenges for 




                                                 
521 ―Beruf: Töten,‖ ZEIT online, May 20, 2011, http://www.zeit.de/2011/21/Berufsbild-Soldat?page=2 
(accessed May 20, 2011). 
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